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THE SPIRITUAL BACKGROUND OF HITLERISM

Analysis of the German Mind

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To understand Hitler's personality and the wide range of his activity an examination of the spiritual background of Hitlerism becomes essential. This background, however, could not be clarified without an analysis of German mentality as such. We must make it clear to what extent the national character was instrumental in producing the figure of Hitler and to what extent it influenced the era which interests us at the moment. The author does not propose to discuss the question of the national character itself, but will only try to outline his own position briefly.

In our opinion there is such a thing as a separate psychic structure which may be called the national character. As in the case of an individual, so in this case as well, both the inherent and the acquired characteristics (the latter caused by environment and events) make up the complexity of the structure in question.

The characteristic trait of this psychic structure consists of attributes of such nature that not only do events affect said psychic structure's make-up, but that it in turn affects the course of events. The same holds true in relation to the individual, although here the components are simpler and certain factors—economic for instance—play a much smaller part.

What will hereinafter be said of the German character shall by no means exhaust the question. It will rather have the character of an experiment based on historical sources and the conclusions of but a small number of students. It is possible, nevertheless, that as a result of this

study, motives and inferences will assume a clearer and deeper meaning. As had been mentioned above, no endeavor has been made herein completely to clarify this issue, but merely an attempt to study some aspects of the national character in its direct relationship to the main problem.

Nietzsche, who made a special study of the German soul, considered it a conglomeration of inconsistencies. He expanded Goethe's famous saying of the "two souls" of the Germans by stating: "not two, but a hundred, a thousand, and even more souls dwell in the German bosom."⁽¹⁾

The two epithets, "good-natured and wily," which could never be applied in the same breath to any other nationality, can be applied to the Germans with full justification. "The German soul has passages and galleries in it, there are caves, hiding-places and dungeons herein; the German is well acquainted with the by-paths of chaos." "Finally, we should do honour to our name—we are not called the *Täusche Volk* (deceptive people) for nothing!" "The German lets himself go, all the while gazing with faithful, blue empty German eyes—and other countries forthwith mistake him for him with his lounging-robe."⁽¹⁾

As to the myth about race, as spread by Nazism, it seems quite a propos to mention Nietzsche's maxims: "To associate with no man who takes any part in the mendacious race swindle."⁽²⁾ Accordingly, the "purity" of German race is acknowledged by him in the following words: "As a people made up of a conglomeration of races, perhaps even with a preponderance of pre-Aryan element, the Germans are more unaccountable, unpredictable, inconsistent, incomprehensible, impetuous and finally, even more addicted to fear than any other race."⁽¹⁾ Nietzsche objects to any easy historic explication of German psychology: "The smallness and baseness of the German soul were not and are not consequences of the system of small states . . ."⁽²⁾

In his work "*Psychologie des peuples européens*," Fouillée devoted the most important chapter to the Germans. It must be borne in mind that this work was written in the years after the defeat of 1871 and undoubtedly did not escape the influence of the period. Fouillée maintains that even the early Germans held to the principle of "*Lebensraum*." "They declared it to be with them a principle of law that the extent of

(1) "Beyond Good and Evil," Werke VII, Kroner.

(2) "Genealogy of Morals."

their occupation of territory should equal their need. From the beginning of history the Germans had rights where others had none."

The old German character does not admit of any ties in matters public. Instead it admits of ties between one individual and another. On the other hand the great emphasis placed on warfare finds its expression in the fervent belief in a militant future life. "The German mind," says Fouillée, "responds and kindles slowly though lastingly. . . This inner fervor has a negative side to it, for it goes hand in hand with hatred against those who oppose a good cause, a good race and a good fatherland . . . All the old enemies, the Romans, the Gauls, and the Slavs are treated with the same malevolence as though they were still attacking the frontier."

Hatred which at first divided the German tribes and later the small German states, found a centrifugal escape after the unification of Germany. "After such a long period of mutual hate within the state, the Germans have continued this custom to date. But now it is direct-*et* with a violence not found elsewhere at the enemy outside their state." Even Treitschke admits, "We are a race capable of the greatest hate."

German unification brought only a transitory rise of idealism which was immediately followed by a descent onto the plane of realism where aggressiveness and vainglorious chauvinism flourished. Expressing oneself historically, one may say that while sitting on the lap of modern civilization the German still retains a feudal mind.

In relation to the above, Hegel makes an interesting observation on German's transition from the feudal system to a present day monarchy. He says that the weakening of feudal relations between king and subject allows the power to become centralized in the king's hand. The vassals become independent princes and utilize their strength in constant wars. Each state becomes a battlefield, but these aggressive forces of egoism, so claims Hegel, were demolished by the strict discipline of the Middle Ages (Church, State and Monarchy). Further, in his idealistic reasoning, Hegel says that this brutality caused its own annihilation. "Humanity has not been emancipated from slavery, but through slavery."⁽³⁾

(3) "The hardness of the egoistic German mind resulting from individualism—this gnarled oaktree of the German mind—had been broken and crushed by the frightful discipline of the Middle Ages." Hegel, "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte."

Historical reality, on the other hand, diverging from philosophic idealism, supports Fouillée in his conclusion that traces of feudalism, which Hegel calls "mutual dependence," still remain in the German mentality. Fouillée says, "The German mentality strives to broaden itself without any success, for national particularism is imbedded too deeply in its original character."⁽⁴⁾

To get a complete picture of German imperialism, eternally unsatiated and thus ever ready to swallow more, one needs only consider the aggressiveness of princes and state within the Reich. After the unification of Germany this aggressiveness was directed towards other nations. At the same time, the feeling of importance and superiority, both attributes of the composite German character and based on primitive narcissism, was not defeated, but instead was adopted by Germany as a whole. Idealistic philosophy of this period of diversion created a convenient system of thought which was utilized by modern German imperialism for its own purposes. The beautiful philosophic ideals were made use of to sanction passions, to give them a more pleasing aspect, and last, but not least, to sway the masses by their power of suggestion. With the aid of these concepts, medieval savagery became cloaked in adorning robes.

In the year 1922, a German psychologist, Müller-Freienfels, produced a work which contains many interesting theories on this subject.⁽⁵⁾ According to M. F., the irrational factor is dominant in the psychological make-up of the Germans. Madame de Stael also wrote that the Germans have, "*Trop d'idées neuves pas assez d'idées communes.*" The German soul matures slowly and becomes rational only with the greatest effort.

In his thinking the German is diffuse and prolix. His expressions are less clear; his phraseology is obscure and his speech is filled with synonyms and metaphors. His conceptions verge on the fantastic, and overcome the mind which should, but does not, control them. His sensual impressions are not distinct. That is why a German is capable of enduring so much dissonance, ugliness and dejection.

Principles of voluntary action play a large part in the German make-up, though this very activity, this will to do things, is not impelled by the rational, but by the subjective and highly imaginative motives.

(4) "A vrai dire la conscience allemande a eu beau tout ensemble et se remplir et s'élargir progressivement, elle a trop conservé son caractère original de particularisme national."

(5) Müller-Freienfels. "Psychologie des deutschen Volkes."

The German conceives of "Will," particularly the "Will of the Universe," as aimless and infinite. It is such a will, boundless and without design, which constitutes the formula for German policies. The author adds, "German people have always surrendered themselves to fantastic ideas. What amount of blood has been spilled because of the Holy Roman Empire and the Crusades."

These fantastic ideas exist also in the rivalry of party life. But only that party whose program corresponds to this fantasy can hope for victory. This desire for the infinite, manifest in matters political as a lack of control and restraint, has brought a great deal of misfortune to the Germans up to the present time. It is the tragedy of German history that in times of pulsating national growth no German could understand that even the highest tree could not reach the sky. Thus German history is rich in moments of supreme grandeur which, as Nietzsche says, shattered themselves on the infinite. This German will, so restless and limitless, is as boundless in its desire to rule as in its surrender. No race has ever produced such a variety of leaders, and at the same time in no other race does such a propensity for submission exist. How strange that an arbitrary force does not seem to be out of harmony with freedom! On the contrary, the German mind finds its expression as easily in the vagaries of leaders, as in the voluntary submission to external stimuli. Müller-Freienfels considers this a peculiarly characteristic German trait and call it an "unresisting acceptance of force."

From the very onset, the German serf considered his servility as a voluntary duty and an accepted fact, while with equal calmness his lord pictured himself as the first servant of the state. The German race, more than any other, demands leaders who rule them. In no other race do we meet with a case where the leader, while still living, became the object of a cult, which created around him something in the form of a myth. His high position depended on the fact that his figure embodied the typical German traits. Thus the leader in turn became led himself.

It is by no means a matter of accident that the German government, no matter how unreasonably despotic, has never been overthrown by the Germans themselves. This is due to the undemocratic disposition of the Germans, who prefer the rule of a strong hand to the rule of the majority. The German race demands force even in its relation to God.⁽⁶⁾

(6) "One does not do them a service by removing the yoke of suppression, since the wish for coercion is inherent in them. A true German rejoices at a clear and sharp command."

The peculiar relation of the people to the leader and the state is best expressed by the political theories of German philosophers, and particularly by those of Hegel. "Up to the present day it has never been customary in Germany, to consider the state in the light of theory on social contract. To the Germans the state is something transcendental, a power above the nation. In this respect it would be questionable whether a president chosen by the people *"viva voce"* could ever satisfactorily represent their idea of the state." Thus the state becomes a thing apart and takes on a metaphysical aspect.

In direct correlation with this the Germans feel that they are chosen, as it were, and led by predestination; that they have a particular mission in this world which extends even beyond their national boundaries.

The part played by Prussia answered the need for a strong leading power. She became the seed which, when planted in the German soil, bore such fruits as complete regimentation, militarism, and standardization. The Prussian dynasty, which took the lead in the unification of Germany, was resting on the class of nobles who lived side by side with the conquered Slavs. After some strife, these lords became a class of grasping aristocrats.

Müller-Freienfels considers this new German order, with its drill and discipline, as a hyper-compensating reaction. He finds this same tendency toward uniformity in the social-democratic movement. Here again we meet with a strange mixture of contradictions—freedom and suppression. The fact that Bebel was the son of a Prussian officer has for him a symbolic connotation.

This psychologist, nevertheless, offers much valuable material for the explanation of our problem. He even comes very close to solving it. To the extent of his definitions concerning will, and the relation of German psychology to force and freedom being really correct, we should like to explain their genesis. Just as the study of genesis occupies an important place in the psychology of the individual character, so in this connection genesis is also the basic factor, while the problem of differentiating between the inherent and the structural as well as acquired character traits constitutes the main theme.

The following observation of the psychologist gives us the key to our problem. "Regimentation of the Germans into patriarchal states strengthened in them their inherent aversion to rational decision, but

such regimentation corresponded to their inclination to a voluntary submission based on emotional motives."

Feudalism left its traces not only in the social structure of the German Reich but also in its psychic make-up. It seems as if German reality had not wholly succeeded in overcoming the feudal dependence of vassal upon sovereign. In the field of individual psychology this complex is equivalent to the dependence of an infant on its father. This relationship is responsible not only for the desire for complete submission, but also for idealization, if not worship, of the object admired. The image of the father then becomes the embodiment of religious emotions which, in childhood and in the primitive era of mankind, takes on the character of magical omnipotence.

The peculiar relation which exists between the ego and the father, is transferred to the psychic field and the image of the father becomes a permanent representation of the real figure. This image then undergoes many changes and serves as the source for the super-ego which is an inner formation within the limits of the ego, as such. This instance becomes the embodiment of moral standard and a prototype of laws, customs and morals. It is made up of two basic factors, the positive that is imperative and the negative that is prohibitive. In the case of the German mind, we have an accumulation of old and subsequent factors, sanctioned by already existing social conditions. The super-ego then becomes very powerful in regulating the manner of thinking and feeling and also in forming a foundation for further development of the social structure.

With the need for submission and worship already present, individuals who fulfill certain requirements substitute for the image of the father and inspire similar emotions. Therefore, they are able to fill with their own image, as if it were a fresh content, the frame of the super-ego, prepared for it for generations. In this manner, the relation of dependence is carried over into the psychic field without ceasing to bind it to the powerful and influencing external factor.

The close relation between the image of the father, or the leader, and the dominant super-ego causes the social structure itself with its own standards, to assume a higher and almost religious character. The findings of the sociological school of France illustrate that the social structure, as such, is closely allied to the basic factors and beginnings of religious life. Even social ties and sanctions of social rules have pri-

marily a preternatural character. The primitive conception of the mysterious and mystical power, ethnologically known as "mana," seems to be closely linked to the pressure which is exercised by the collectivity, and with which the primitive individual was united more closely than in modern social civilization; he had not yet become sufficiently separated therefrom.

Within the purview of German mentality which, as we have stated above, had not yet succeeded in overcoming the feudal structure, it is very easy to find the equivalent of that elevation of social sanctions to the rank of a transcendental and religious entity. Although at first the primitive "mana," Hegel's ideas of state, and the modern German idea of blood or race, seem widely separated, it becomes evident, after due consideration, that the transcendental character and mystic aura which surround all those ideas in the German mind, have their source in the layers of primitive and pre-logic mentality. Close analysis of the new version of the old myth is further proof that these tendencies cling with the same strength to the German mind.

If a synthetic picture of the German character is desired, the earliest sources will provide a good illustration. Regardless of the theoretical question as to what measure the old German ethnical elements have influenced the modern national character, and to what degree they have been preserved in the cauldron of history, Tacitus' work on Germany should prove interesting.

The most characteristic qualities of the Germanic tribes seem to have been their militarism and loyalty to their leaders. Of these the hero cult is the most outstanding. "It is considered to be an ignominy and a life-long disgrace to live after the leader has died on the battlefield. For it is a sacred duty of each man to protect him and sacrifice personal fame to his glory. The leader fights for victory, and the army fights for the leader."

Thus worship of power and the extolling of conquest leads the vanquished to enslave themselves voluntarily to the conqueror. Though younger and hardier, they allow themselves to be bound and sold. Such stubbornness in small matters they call fidelity. The conquering lord, ashamed of such an inglorious victory, sells them into slavery.

Their other characteristic was their love of battle: "If any republic, after a long period of peace grows feeble, the young nobles travel to other countries embroiled in wars and there participate in battles. For the Germans hate idleness. They prefer to attain fame through the

hardships of war and strife. It is much easier for them to inveigle each other into war with the enemy, than into the cultivation of fields . . . these same people, who love inaction, cannot rest." Therefore the Germanic tribes worship war and power. They submit themselves willingly and even with a certain fanaticism to the will of their leader. For in him they see their most sacred ideal crystalized. With equal fanaticism they yield to the will of a foreign conqueror and gladly exchange their freedom for the fetters of bondage.

A second source from which sprang the protoplasts of the present-day Germans was the Monastic Order of the Teutonic Knights. To make the picture complete for the reader, only a short synthesis is required in this connection. The Teutonic Order established its headquarters in East Prussia, and from these carried on expeditions against the Lithuanians and the neighboring Slavs. This most aggressive of all forms of imperialism masqueraded under the mantle of missionary proselytism. Since the persecuted peoples were not as yet cognizant of the blessings of Christianity, it was accordingly the sacred duty of the Knights to convert them, be it by fire and sword if necessary. Hiding under the cloak of their calling, they committed the most atrocious crimes, all the while claiming that their superiority justified the methods used. They applied the same methods even at a later date in the persecution of Christianized Poland and Lithuania. Pride, brutality, cunning and fanaticism brought them ill repute and the very name of the Order became loathed and despised. The general character of this small Order, which enslaved the neighbouring peoples in an iron cage of discipline and brutality, is typical of the new direction taken by modern German history as a whole.

The great upheavals and the disintegration of the Empire into several hundreds of small states was swiftly followed by a process of unification. From the very beginning, Prussia was the moving force behind this slowly evolving process of unification. It was she who left her indelible stamp on the German temperament and mentality.

The actions of Frederick the Great are most characteristic of all the methods used by the Germans. They are illustrative of German policy and of its basic psychological principles. In his "Foundations of Germany," published during the World War, Baker J. Ellis compared the political theories of Fredrick II with the war policies of Wilhelm II, and most recently a number of new experiences materially added to past

records. No details, however, are required, for the most vital principles stand out clearly by themselves.

"Anti-Machiavelli," written by Frederick the Great before he reached the height of his career, is a masterpiece of idealism, a hymn of peace, and a condemnation of acquisitive warriors. In this work we find even the modern and revolutionary assertion that the heroic warriors were brigands, the only difference being that the warrior was famous and the outlaw unknown. After Frederick II came to power, all these lofty ideals disappeared into thin air and what, if any, were left—he employed to justify his aggressiveness—or to deceive and lull the vigilance of his enemies. The cynicism and deception he displayed might have remained unparalleled examples were it not for the fact that even more glaring samples of them are being witnessed by us in our days.

When reading the documents collected by Ellis, the analogy with modern history is striking; at times it appears as if only some of the dates and names of countries had been changed. Only a month before marching into Saxony (1756), Frederick vowed that his military preparations had no sinister motives. His procedure before attacking Austria ran as follows: first he issued an appeal to the people assuring them of his good intentions (assertions of greatest hypocrisy), second, he addressed official note to the European Powers, in which he declared that his occupation of Silesia was not motivated by any evil intentions against the Vienna Court, and finally he served an ultimatum on Austria, in which he announced his desire to save her from impending disaster. For, so he said, the freedom of Germany and the German Empire was at stake. He even promised to sign an agreement with Austria and to defend her from her enemies, provided she ceded Silesia to Prussia.

Frederick organized his Fifth Column on an extensive scale. He sacrificed large sums of money to bribe foreign officials and their mistresses. He placed his secret agents in high diplomatic positions and through them tried to bring about a rift within the government on which he was preparing an attack. Just as he insisted on his good intentions before attacking, he trumped up all kinds of motives to justify his actions before the attack. One of such justifications is particularly interesting. After the occupation of Dresden, Frederick had the government archives searched for documents containing defense agreements between Saxony, Austria and Russia. These documents were then placed before the world as evidence of the nefarious conspiracy against Prussia. His own motives are aptly explained in his "Memoire Raisonné" as being

"based on the most exact rules of equity and justice. They are not motives of ambition or intentions of aggrandizement."

Barker Ellis' observation about "Germany's assertions that a conspiracy was formed against her by King Edward and Sir Edward Grey finds its exact counterpart in Frederick's assertion of 1756," could be expanded further. The present work, however, is not a comparison of political history but a compilation of facts for a psychological study.

The first basic trait of the Germans could be called idealism with an exception clause. One is an idealist, or at least claims to be one, as long as out of power. But as soon as one becomes powerful then all ballast is thrown overboard or serves only to deceive the enemy. Power as soon as attained serves as a base for a greater expansion and greater aggressiveness. At this point we come to the second basic trait. Personal power becomes identical with the power of the state, and the plan of attaining maximum strength for the state is co-terminous with personal strength. It is precisely in this sense that Frederick spoke of himself as the first servant of the state.

German outlook on law and war, or to speak briefly on international law and morality, are a result of a self-conscious and aggressive absolutism. Here again Frederick made a valuable contribution in his work on the Seven Year's War. "If a ruler wishes to make war, he is not restrained by any arguments of justification to be made to the public. He simply outlines a course of action, makes war and leaves the trouble of justifying his actions to some industrious legal sharpster."

War is the sole right of the king, and the common people have no voice whatever. "Where the kings gamble for a province the people are mere pawns." Personal intentions are always correct and always justified merely because they are one's own. The argument and interests of the adversary simply do not exist, and his very existence, his needs and interests are a crime. The conception of the "Lebensraum" then made its first appearance on the political horizon. Such living place was being determined by one's own personal aggressiveness characterized by an unqualified egoism. That is why the very existence of any other interests which would be in opposition to one's own constitutes a crime and an assault on the part of the peaceful enemy.

The above serves as a strong buttress for the third and highly important trait: to wit, an unusual inclination and proclivity for projec-

tion. This point deserves particular consideration. Projection consists in attributing one's own intentions and wishes to the environment. In relation to the adversaries, projection takes on a special character: they become the cause and source of assault, and from being the object of aggression they become the subject and point of departure thereof. The projection also serves as an alibi and exonerates the aggressor who is either already attacking or is about to attack. If he is attacking, then the assault is to appear as self-protection and if the attack had not as yet taken place, then an accusation of the enemy justifies one's own military preparations.

Frederick II, always posing as the wronged party, exclaimed with hypocritical indignation when he met with reverses in the course of the Seven Years' War: "A conspiracy! A disgrace and crime against morality. Did the world ever see three powerful rulers conspire against a fourth, who had never done anything wrong? . . ."

At the end of the Seven Years War, the famous Prussian idea of encirclement made its bow to the public. "Were it only that the Prussian rulers of the future would not be forced to take such rash steps which had to be taken now in order to protect our country from the jealousy and hatred of all Europe which desired the extinction of the house of Brandenburg and of the name of Prussia."

It is preposterous to think that Frederick really believed in such absurd assumptions. Aren't such low and cynical excuses out of place in a psychological study? Is it possible when speaking of a base to speak in the same breath of projection? Unquestionably so. Not only cannot the pattern of the lie or the fantasy remain indifferent to us but we also can never eliminate the difference between a lie and a subconscious or unconscious fancy. What to a leader may only constitute the usual fantasy can very easily become a deep conviction to his adherents.

It will be seen that such projective mechanisms play a large part in the case of a more modern German leader, known as the "Restorer" of German soil. To a certain degree these projections do seem to imply a distinctive trait of the collective German psychology.

Further, on the strength of this example, we may infer the reason why the Germans are inclined to this kind of projection and to collective delusions resulting therefrom. As subsequent events of German history had plainly shown, the fear of encirclement became in fact a real delusion. Small Prussia was getting ready to jump upon her neigh-

bors and to attain the might of the greatest powers of Europe. Even Frederick, with all his ambitions and confidence of his possibilities for greatness, was acutely aware of his still inferior station among his fellow-monarchs of Europe. Such a situation, a mixture of youthful imperialism, politically speaking, and of sensitive awareness, psychologically speaking, of one's inferior station and high worth, built a foundation for aggressiveness and created a need for projection. Suspicion of encirclement and of attack developed in conjunction with personal ambitions and greed.

In Frederick the Great, the mysterious change from an idealistic prince, tyrannized by his father, into an aggressive and cynical ruler, is explained by the fact that by coming to the throne, new fields for his ambition and desire for power became opened. Alfred Rosenberg very fittingly calls him the "Frederick, the one and only" (*Friedrich der Einzige*).

This desire for power, this "will for force," plays an important part in the thinking processes of later German intellectuals. Two of them stand far above the others because each represents one characteristic point of view without which it would be impossible to understand the psychology of German nationalism, Treitschke and Nietzsche.

Hegel had already prepared the apotheosis of the state. In his philosophical works he devoted barely one page to international law, wherein he outlines the position of the state during the war as follows: "The state of war brings out the importance of the State above the separate individual. The country and the fatherland become all powerful and the individual becomes a non-entity."⁽⁷⁾

From this time on, the theory in question never disappears from the horizon of German thought. It was developed by Treitschke as follows: The sovereignty of a state practically connotes freedom from any international responsibility. The place which we take in this world is attained by the might of the sword and does not, by any means, mean anything lasting or limiting. The state is supreme. There is nothing of greater importance in the social organization. The moral duty of a state is its power. Weakness is the most repulsive and the most despicable of all political mistakes. It is a sin committed against the sacred spirit of policy. All the recent doctrines on German Imperialism are

(7) See Barker, "Nietzsche and Treitschke. The Worship of Power in Modern Germany." Oxford Pamphlets, 1914.

based on the theories of this historian who worships the state, its power, and its incontestible right. Each attack, each annexation, and every policy of racial persecution finds its justification in the above theory. Hand in hand with the massing of strength in the authority of the state goes the concentration of the same strength in one person, or rather in a group of the chosen or the élite—the future specifically bred caste of lords.

There is no need for further analysis of Nietzsche's conceptions at this juncture. All that is needed is to point out the two factors which have a special bearing on the development of our theory. The first is the psychological source of the craving for power, of the continuous affirmation of one's own strength, and of the contempt for the weak. It is a well-known fact, that Nietzsche himself suffered greatly because of the awareness of his own weakness.⁽⁸⁾ A true schizoid personality, he was extremely sensitive to people and he approached them with great diffidence. The slightest contretemps pushed him back into his isolation and solitude. By way of a characteristic admission, the following passage is quoted: "Philosophers require other means to endure life than do other people, because they suffer in a different way—namely, just as much because of the depth of their contempt for mankind, as because of their love for the latter." At the same time the conviction of his genius must have created an acute awareness of the discrepancy between his desires and the possibility of attaining them. This feeling of inferiority referred solely to the practical possibilities. That is why he all the more sought a hyper-compensation in the desire for power and in dreams of the future superman. "What does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not lent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has mistaken one's self; the fact that one has lost all delicacy of hearing in regard to one's instincts. A man never forgives himself later on, for this waste of genuine egoism."⁽⁹⁾ It is really moving to hear this refined and sensitive intellectual praising" this beast of prey, Borgia and to vituperate against morals as timidity.⁽¹⁰⁾ In conjunction therewith stands the second factor. Nietzsche found his own resentment in others. He developed it considerably, and it played a large part in his theories of morality, and in his attacks on Christianity and socialism. We must consider these attacks as an attempt at freeing himself from his own resentment which resulted from

(8) See A. Herzberg: "Psychologie der Philosophien und der Philosophen."

(9) The will to power.

(10) Beyond good and evil.

his being aware of his inferior position in practical life as well as from the consciousness of his weakness and at the same time of his superiority. "I won't have anything to do with any of you," he shouted, "I condemn your weakness, I gainsay any sympathy for you; I want to be strong among the strong, I want to be bold and ruthless." "The savage in every one of us is acknowledged, even the wild animal. Precisely on that account, philosophers will have a better chance."⁽¹¹⁾

What a mass of compensatory mechanisms in these never-ending and unremitting outcries! How much passion in the wish to obviate any kind of possibility for identifying himself with the weak and the destitute.

Now we come to the socio-psychological part of our problem. Why should a philosopher like Nietzsche appear at exactly that period of history? Or, why should an apologist of the individuality and its absolute rights, like Stirner come at the same time? Why were they accepted by their contemporaries as a representative and popular voice of the intellectual élite?

A deeper study of Nietzsche's relation to his contemporaries reveals his aversion and repugnance for the middle class. He, as a genius and a supersensitive receptacle of the world currents, was forced to develop a new set of reactions and to seek new means of liberation from the middle class society of central Europe and particularly of Germany. He characterized it as a conglomeration of the deluded and underprivileged who combined to make up a hypocritical democracy. Because of the nature of his psychic structure, the new set of reactions could never direct him to a noble identification with the weak and the lowly. He could never fight for their emancipation, nor could he work for the realization of the ideals of social solidarity by which mankind would be improved. Instead, he identified himself with the strong. He vented his own resentment by unmasking the resentment of the masses, and by frustrating their effort for its sublimation (Christianity, socialism, pity). At the same time, his craving for a superman was to compensate for his own feeling of weakness. He also wanted to nip in the bud any attempt by the weak at liberating themselves, and to wipe out any and all traces of his affiliation with them. Thus unlike socialism which moved toward an ideal of classless society. Nietzsche was the propagator of class particularism which at the peak of its de-

(11) The will to power.

velopment would have modeled itself on the pattern of the ancient society whose whole splendor was based on slavery.

To support the validity of our conceptions, we need only to recall the hatred with which Nietzsche referred to the masses and to socialism. "Socialistic tendencies," he says, "have one outstanding symptom. The lower strata of society are treated with too much affability—the forbidden happiness already sharpens their appetite by expectation. But it is not hunger that causes revolutions. People get an appetite while eating."⁽¹²⁾

The reactive character of Nietzsche's thought is illustrated by his anti-humanitarianism. He says, "The demand for humanization, contained in a formula (which is supposed to be the only definition of what is human) constitutes but a hypocrisy applied by a certain type of man who seeks to reach the seat of power, and is really the expression of the herd instinct."⁽¹³⁾

From the point of view of boundless narcissism, all democratic ideas must appear as a lawless assault of the masses on the rights of the select individual. As long as he and his like have the sole right to a full life, the masses must be reduced to the position of Helots.

In Plato's *Theages* the following passage will be found, "Every one of us would like if possible to be master of mankind; if possible a God. This attitude of mind must be reinstated in our midst." The above quotation speaks for itself. In his psychosis, Nietzsche could experience the fulfillment of those phantasies of grandeur.

From the social point of view we can express it as follows: An aristocracy should rule, or else, those who are fit for ruling. Accordingly, let us create a class of lords and let them rule. Psychologically the idea explains itself as: I wish to rule; I'd like to be like the gods, and to forget all my shortcomings, I must also forget that those who do not deserve to be strong are in reality stronger than I.

Traces of the genesis of Nietzsche's ideas which point to the activity of the projective and reactive mechanism, are found in the paragraphs dedicated to his future disciples and to the future ideal of the great man. "The great man who desires to suffer looks differently at cruelty. He would not hold it to be detrimental and wicked in it-

⁽¹²⁾ "Will to power."

⁽¹³⁾ "Will to power."

self."⁽¹⁴⁾ A great man must "win his greatness through colossal and awe-inspiring energy. Since by breeding out or rather by annihilation of millions of the unfit, he brings about the shaping of the future man without perishing himself, despite the suffering which he will create. Such a suffering has not been equalled before."⁽¹⁵⁾ An almost autobiographical characterization of his disciples follows: "The type of disciple with whom I would concern myself is one for whom I would wish suffering, destitution, illness, abuse and humiliation. I would wish him that deep self-contempt, the torture of self-distrust and the distress of the loser. I feel no pity for him, because I wish him the only thing which can prove his worth if he stands firmly."⁽¹⁶⁾ Thus Nietzsche with his will for power and Stirner with his cult of the individual have together become the expression of the European intellectuals who suddenly discovered their psychic and class isolation. They endeavored to be saved by coming into the camp of the powerful and ruthless lords. The slogans and myths which cling to these tendencies are, of course, secondary: Superman, Nation and Race. Their destructive force became manifest in the earliest days and survived up to the present time. Its range is wide—from the age of decadence to the age of national socialism. However, national socialism is but an affliction of a whole nation. It is, as we shall see later, a manifestation of an exaggerated wish to hyper-compensate the feelings of weakness and resentment affecting the entire nation.

Nietzsche's constant struggle with humanitarian tendencies proves that he must have shared them in his own soul. In other words, his aggressiveness coupled with his narcissism led him to oppose these tendencies with the greatest passion. The feeling of his own weakness roused in him a fear of becoming one of the weak and the underprivileged. Because of their reactive and purely personal character, Nietzsche's intentions to save mankind from pessimism and resentment as well as from the so called "morality of slaves" made him instead reject the good with the bad, or in other words, to fight against humanitarianism and truly noble morality. This opened the way to an affirmation of aggressive and destructive drives. "The specific attributes of life, injustice, falsehood, exploitation are most accentuated in great men. To the same extent as their influence was overwhelming, their character was misunderstood and misinterpreted to be good."⁽¹⁶⁾

(14) — (15) "Will to power."

(16) *Vermachtnis*.

Forseeing the rise of future caesarisms, or large groups of people subject to a few, Nietzsche simple desired to be one of the ruling and not one of the ruled. In this desire finds its expression the part played in history by those intellectuals who being unable to fight for social justice, tried instead to indentify themselves with the powerful of the world and in that way paved the road to dictatorship and fascism as well as to the ideology underlying those regimes. "In the future there will be a favorable predisposition for large empires—the kind we have never seen before. But the most important thing is that out of the societies of men, with the purpose of cultivating a race of lords, the future Masters of the Earth will rise. A new, frightful, and self-determined law-making aristocracy. From them will come philosophical men of power and artists of tyranny whose will will last through the centuries." Of the great man he says: "The great man believes that his power over his nation actually depends on his coincidental convergence with a nation and a 1,000 years. The magnified feeling of oneself as the cause and the voluntas is misunderstood as 'Altruism.' Can he not lead—then he goes alone." "I am delighted," confesses the future Superman, "at the military development of Europe, also at the inner anarchial conditions—the period of quietude and 'Chinadom' which Galiani prophesized for this century is now over. Personal and manly capacity, bodily capacity recovers its value. Fine men have once more become possible."⁽¹⁷⁾

The main motives of this social or rather a-social thinking are rooted very deeply in the German mind. Reappearing after Nietzsche in lesser intellects, thes theories recur with all of their passion and scientific trappings in the works of Spengler, the philosopher who wrote *The Fall of the Western World*. His work like that of Müller-Freienfels, was written in the first years of the Weimar Republic. The pretentious and, at times, brilliant synthesis of his historical "morphology" is topped off with a conclusion in the second volume which he draws so cleverly as to make the whole work seem like preparation for same.

First of all we must state that this distinguished intellectual is an admirer of brutal force. He sings its praises in all of its various aspects. When writing of the older conquerors he is extraordinarily convincing. "Their ardent desire for deeds, their *joy in slaughter* and their wish for a heroic death we can not hope to imagine in our own times." (*italics by*

(17) "Will to power."

author). Only the man of deeds lives in the world of reality—the world of political, military and economic problems. “Here a good blow with a sword is worth more than a good syllogism and it is not without a deep reason that the soldier and statesman in all ages and in all times had nothing but contempt for the ink-slinger and the bookworm.”

By means of a false pragmatism, Spengler comes to believe that only those who attain a visible and brutal success are important and their ideas alone are valid. All history is brutal and such brutality must be applauded. In a realistic history of this kind Archimedes played a less important part than the soldier who killed him in the battle of Syracuse.

The struggle for power is closely related to the aggressive and destructive drives and hatreds. War is extolled as the greatest creative force in history. “War is the creator, and hunger is the destroyer of all great things.” War is the only inherent, natural and racial relationship between nations. A fighting man experiences an elation of power which is never experienced by the seeker of truth. A warrior needs no conscience. Here Spengler quotes Goethe, “The man of action is always unscrupulous. None but the contemplator has a conscience.”

Wars between nations are carried to the internal life of a country and become inter-party wars. These battles perforce lead to caesarism via democracy and its inevitable decline. It makes no difference what ideas and ideals lead us into these battles: “Whether one orders the partition of property, as in Syracuse, or whether one carries a book of his making, like Marx, is only of superficial moment. It does not matter what slogans ride with the wind while doors and skulls are being bashed. Annihilation is the true and only drive, and caesarism the only result.”

Historical analysis brings out Spengler's conclusions as analogous with Nietzsche's aphorisms. At another instance a closer study will be made of this law of historical reality which he is trying to formulate. According to his statement, such laws will inevitably lead to the rule of the strong and ruthless individuals, and of the strong and ruthless nations. He concludes as follows: “Imperialism is so inevitable an outcome of each civilization, that it seizes a people by the neck and forces it into the role of Masters even though the people object against acting it.”

In this connection, however, we are interested only in the position the author takes, his relation to occurrences of which he writes and to the laws which he formulates. In this respect too, we find in him a spir-

itual heir to Nietzsche (and we should add—a precursor to Hitler). He takes an affirmative stand and says: The rule of force in all the fields of relationship between people is not the tragic fate of present day mankind, but a healthy and beautiful principle. One must understand it and properly prepare for it. The rule of gold (democracy) is bound to lead to the conquest through blood and iron. We should add that side by side with some extraordinary flashes of brilliant mentality we find in Spengler perfect samples of hazy and autistic thinking based on turbid conceptions and emotional moments. To this category belongs, for instance, the entire “racial” idea which is supposed to be the alpha and omega of historical processes and the factor deciding the destiny of nations and peoples. It is also typical of the German mind to elevate all such ideas to the sphere of things metaphysical. “From an incongruity of this purely metaphysical measure, arose the hate between races as for instance, between the French and the Germans, the German and the Jew, and from the selfsame pulse beat, on the other hand, arose the true love between man and woman, a love so much related to hate.”

SUMMARY

Our brief outline of German psychology as well as of the development of the basic ideas of some German thinkers has shown us certain general governing principles. We are aware that the boundless nationalistic egoism, the lust for power and the worship of brute force are basic traits common to both German statesmen and philosophers. These tendencies are often concealed by an attempt at idealization. The haziness of the German mind provides an appropriate foundation on which to build concepts and theories apparently scientific, yet serving only the purpose of justifying ruthless aggressiveness and fiendish anti-humanitarianism.

It seems as if the German collective mind did not succeed in getting rid of its feudal structure. It did not overcome either its tendency toward submission to the stronger will or its aggressive drive toward subjugation of the weak. Submissiveness and imperiousness remain its principal ideals.

SOME PRIMITIVE TRENDS IN CIVILIZED JUSTICE*

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It is doubtful whether there are many people nowadays who defend the institution of capital punishment with any degree of conviction or force. Those who accept capital punishment are less proponents than passive adherents of the existing order of dealing with capital crimes. They are more afraid to abolish it than they are willing to defend it. Not infrequently when arguments against the death penalty are brought forward one hears the rather anemic retort: "You are right, perhaps, but what would you use in place of it?" The one who puts this rhetorical question to you is not aware that there are certain things which could simply be abolished and not substituted by something else. One does not ask one's self what one should substitute for malaria, yellow fever, or typhus, which everyone wishes to abolish. Yet there appears to be uncertainty in certain minds, as if they say to themselves: In the case of yellow fever we need no substitutes because yellow fever is a disease and it ought therefore to be totally eliminated. These persons might add: But the death penalty is a penalty, the supreme penalty. These persons, as passive adherents of this penalty, are unable to conceive of what good will accrue from abolishing something supreme—and therefore in some way absolute and therefore in some way perfect—and substituting for it something less supreme and therefore less perfect.

There is no doubt that the passive adherent (the active proponent is in the minority and is too convinced to be argued with) gives you the impression that somewhere, somehow he agrees with you that capital punishment is horrible, inhuman, senseless, useless, that it does not prevent capital crimes, that it does not cure the criminal (for you cannot cure a person who has been killed), that it does not effectively frighten the potential murderer. Yet this passive adherent feels that somehow, in some undefined manner, the death penalty performs some function. This feeling, this inarticulate conviction, makes him stubborn and com-

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pels him to bring forward a number of senseless arguments which he himself does not support very well but which he needs to support no matter how actually weak his rather strong feelings.

These feelings are of utmost importance. Unless we achieve a clear understanding of the psychology behind them and unless we learn to articulate them with utmost clarity and—let us say the word—daring, very little will be achieved indeed. For we know all too well that the mere change of the existing formal laws seldom if ever succeeds in changing the substance of man's attitude. And if the substance is not changed little is changed. No matter how desirable it would be to see capital punishment disappear, the mere abolishment of it by law would be of little avail, for the social and cultural substance behind it would reappear among us in some just as horrible a guise.

One wonders whether the purely formal abolition of the death penalty would not be facilitated if the fundamental psychological meaning of this act of justice were better understood by as many people as possible.

Man's proclivity to take an eye for an eye is universal and has existed from time immemorial; it is his psychological tradition. In other words, it is a cultural phenomenon, and a paradoxical one, as many cultural phenomena are. Robbery has always been "cured" (punished) by legal robbery called restitution, or confiscation in favor of the treasury of the chieftian, the king, or the government. We believe that wars are fought to destroy wars and that murders can be abolished by means of legal murder. All this points again to some fundamental trend rather than to a purely intellectual mistake on the part of man.

As we look back, curious and anxious to trace the beginning of this sorry paradox in man's social ethics and in that part which has become formalized into law, we are at once faced with a well nigh insuperable difficulty. As Sir Henry Maine put it, "It is easier to find the origins of lawyers than the origin of Law." But as we try to fathom, no matter how dimly, the past of man's attitude toward murder or severe injuries inflicted by a criminal, the historical and anthropological evidence points to the fact that all law, including the laws governing capital crimes, originated in religious practices and among the primitive priesthood. That is to say, that many of those attitudes which are now part of the formal civil and criminal law were first expressed by the human communities through religious beliefs and practices. Tacitus, for in-

stance, in reporting his observations of a priest sitting in judgment in ancient Germany, remarked: "It has neither the air of vindictive justice, nor of military execution; it is rather a religious sentence inflicted with the sanction of the god."⁽¹⁾

This religious motive underlying the law is all pervading, even though it has become inconspicuous or almost invisible in modern law. Let us recall the first lines of Plato's *Laws*.

The Athenian stranger: "Tell me, gentlemen, is a god or a man supposed to be the author of your laws?"

Clinicus, the Cretan: "A god, Sir, most decidedly. In our case it is Zeus; in that of Lacedaemon, as our Lacedaemonian friend will tell you, I think they say that Apollo is their law giver."

Megeles, the Lacedaemonian: "This is so."

Without going into a detailed review of a great deal of anthropological material available on the subject, or of historical material from the Code of Hammurabi or Manu or the Bible, one is justified in stating that there is considerable uniformity in the cultural history of mankind and in the various religions it has espoused or created, and that as far as capital punishment is concerned its origin is related to certain primitive religious traditions. Frazer was fully justified in asserting that what was at first a religious rite later became a civil function; the sacrifice developed into execution; the priest stepped back and the hangman appeared.⁽²⁾

The religious origin of capital punishment is still reflected in a highly modified form in our Christian civilization. The presence of a priest to minister to the condemned as he is led to the chair or to the gallows seems, to be sure, to be the painful duty of the minister of the Gospel who is there to minister to the soul of one who is about forcibly to depart. But one wonders whether this ministry, humane, devout, and devotional as it undoubtedly is, is not a leftover of a remote and forgotten past. For to reconcile a man to an eternity to which not the Lord but the hand of the executioner is to commit him demonstrates a singular non-resistance to the evil which is being committed by the State, a non-resistance tolerable only perhaps because of the mysterious religious

(1) *Germania*. Quoted by William A. Robson: *Civilisation and the Growth of Law*. New York. The MacMillan Co., 1935, p. 26.

(2) Sir J. G. Frazer: *Psyche's Task*, p. 152.

Quoted by Robson: *Ibid.*, p. 81.

origin of this punishment, and not because the procedure happens to be so well rationalized. Theologically the dichotomy of body and soul may be incontrovertible, but sociologically when a man is killed he ceases functioning body and soul. No minister of the Church would ever think, of course, to come to the scene of a murder if warned in advance by a pious murderer that he wished him to minister to the soul of the prospective victim. Only when the State commits this murder is religious consolation considered acceptable both by the State and the representative of religion. This attitude would have been impossible if it were not for the fact that an execution does seem to be something terribly inevitable, imperative, fatal, absolute, solemn, like an old ritual somehow sanctified.

We must bear in mind that these considerations should be taken only in their descriptive sense, only in the sense of a socio-cultural manifestation of a tradition. There cannot be any questioning of the humane motives and deeply devotional impulses which guide a minister of the Gospel when he performs the exquisitely painful duty of helping a man to pray on his way to the death chair. There is a place, however, for some wonderment as to whether the State would not be considerably weakened in its power to execute a man, if official religion would refuse to recognize the State's right to do so and would therefore resist the temptation to attend non-resistively the State's well-staged performance of forewarned murder.

One wonders whether the Egyptian Pharaohs had not greater qualms of conscience than the modern State when in cases of treason they would permit the culprit to commit suicide instead of compelling him to await execution by the government.

But from a scientific point of view, we really should not rise against the State itself with any undue fervor and admonitions, because this fervor of indignation and admonition, if guided by psychological enlightenment, would better be turned onto man himself, onto the members of our society. The State, no matter how impressed it is with its own importance, is but a blind tool at the hands of man's own prejudices. And man's prejudices with regard to the death penalty are deeply rooted in his primitive psychology, a fact which he at times fails to recognize and which he so frequently explains away only in a manner of unconscious justification of his primitive impulses.

How potent these impulses are we may fathom from the interest the public displays in every execution. Newspapers have at times an

unerring sense of what the public wants, and they never fail to publish the fine details of how Ruth Schneider was hysterical as she went or was carried to the chair, of how Bruno Hauptman looked before the hood was put over his head, of how the Esposito brothers, half-conscious dessicated bags of skin and bones, were dragged to the chair. There is something exciting to the average man about these details. It is partly from the unconscious, sadistic revengefulness of the average man against the criminal that this gruesome, consciously unpleasant excitement springs. It also comes from the almost conscious sense of self-righteousness which this vicarious presence in the execution chamber and this vicarious participation in the execution itself conveys. It is as if we could say: Justice is done—it is right; I am safe, because I am not a criminal; I have no bad impulses in me, since I am against this criminal and vicariously do the job of the law and justice.

How much alive the primitive impulses still are within the man of today may be judged not only by the publication of newspaper accounts of "famous" executions, (which are made famous by a well carried out preliminary campaign on the murderer and his trial) and not only by the fact that executions are still public in certain parts of the world, but also by the fact that even as recently as the eighteenth century animals of all sorts used to be formally convicted to death. "Judgments have been pronounced against bulls, cows, pigs, mules, asses, goats, horses, sheep, dogs, cocks, tortoises, rats, mice, and even worms, grasshoppers, and caterpillars."⁽³⁾ Even inanimate things used to be considered objects upon which our revengeful drives could morally and legally be directed. There used to be a time when carts, boats, weapons, and cauldrons—if they happened to be the more or less direct cause of a man's death—were forfeited to the king "for the appeasing of God's wrath." While we have since learned to be less formally revengeful against guilty dogs and grasshoppers and mismanaged carts and cauldrons, our sense of revenge against man is still too strong. Murder and injury do arouse wrath. It is man's own wrath, but he prefers to ascribe it more conveniently to the Lord or to the law, so that in His or its name man may more righteously give vent to his own sadism.

When the individual's sense of personal responsibility for his deed was not yet fully crystallized, this sense of vengeance expressed itself against anyone related to the murderer. Among the Hupa tribes, any

(3) Robson: *Ibid.*, p. 84. See also footnote 2, p. 84.

member of a murderer's family could be legitimately killed in revenge. The more civilized ancient people practised what is known as "noxal surrender:" that is, they would surrender the guilty member of the family in order to avoid any revengeful attack on the relatives of the criminal. One wonders whether in our present-day society that psychological tradition of noxal surrender is not responsible for our active support or passive tolerance of the institution of capital punishment. One wonders to what extent the members of present-day society vicariously (although unconsciously) participate with deep unconscious satisfaction in the execution of a criminal, because this gives them the reassurance that they have complied with the traditional safety valve of noxal surrender. They have turned over a guilty brother to the law and thus gained emotional, moral safety for themselves: by turning over (vicariously) the murderer to the executioner, they have allayed their own anxiety as to what might happen to them if they did not. This anxiety allayed and uneasy conscience calmed, they can well afford to admit that an execution is really a horrible thing and that it is too bad that our civilization has not found another and better way of dealing with the problem. That is why they can very well afford to indulge in the self-contradictory foolishness of preaching more "humane" executions, of making this performance more easy, more gentle, more kind, more painless—as if you ever could dull the psychic pain of the fear of death. That is why they unwittingly feel that an execution does play a positive role in helping them to construct for themselves another obscure psychological nook of self-deceptive security. That is why they ask so naively: "What would you put in place of capital punishment?" This question, so bafflingly preposterous, has to them a true, inner, logical basis. For without this symbolic noxal surrender—so surreptitiously experienced and so confusingly elaborated in our civilization—they themselves, or any other member of their families, could be struck by the act of legal revenge.

Ancient customs and ancient psychological attitudes have a singular power to persist within us and to guide our behavior in modern times as if through logical, realistic reasons of contemporary daily life. They remain, however, irrational reasons, springing from irrational impulses of an irrational past. To understand these and to understand them well is a prerequisite for the personal realization of the necessity for the abolition of the institution of capital punishment, for the true inner abolition of the death penalty in whatever form it may take within the frame of our modern society.

HYPOCRISY:
ITS IMPLICATIONS IN NEUROSIS AND
CRIMINAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

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I. *The Misconception Underlying the "We-Know-All-About-It"
Attitude*

Goethe remarked once ironically that the greatest difficulty in a problem lay exactly where one did not search for it. That observation holds true especially for all "obvious" human reactions. Layman and scientist alike have first to overcome an inner resistance when confronted with a hidden problem which seems to them no problem at all. "What is there to explain?" is their first reaction. The sceptic of this attitude is immediately accused of complicating matters unnecessarily or of drawing far-fetched conclusions if he points out that "there is more to it than meets the eye."

Let's forget therefore for a short time our prejudice about the self-evident and obvious and ask ourselves whether we know all about so common a psychic reaction as, for instance, hypocrisy. Our first impulse is to pass in review certain of our acquaintances and choose a few outstanding examples of hypocrites who angered or amused us, depending on whether we were victims or onlookers. Looking more closely we will soon discover that what made us so sure that we knew all about a hypocrite was simply the fact that we confused description with underlying reasons for hypocrisy. True, we can describe precisely the hypocrite's behavior—his perversion of the truth, his smiling pseudo-submissiveness, his tendency to "hit below the belt" when giving dis-

torted information to our personal enemies, his malicious cowardice, his ingratitude, his feeling of superiority in succeeding in fooling us with his pseudo-flattery and pseudo-approval. But *why* does he react that way? What are the *unconscious* reasons for his behavior? What differentiates him from the man who tells "white" lies because he is forced to and against his will, while the hypocrite uses deceit voluntarily, even in uncalled-for situations, and with noticeable pleasure?

The naive observer would be even more dumbfounded if he were to know that the unconscious reasons leading to hypocrisy are an important incentive in neurotic *and* criminal actions. We do well, therefore, to "eat humble pie" and to approach the problem without prejudice.

II. *Clinical Examples of the "Mechanism of Hypocrisy"* *in statu nascendi.*

Let's start with three clinical examples of neurotic hypocrisy:

Case I. Fifteen years ago in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Clinic I made the following experiment: I was interested in finding out to what degree of human "stupidity" psychoanalysis was still effective. Since in private practice we deal with persons who are more or less educated, with some degree of intelligence, I wanted to find out whether people with a low I. Q. could still be influenced analytically. With the help of one of my superiors in the Clinic, I selected among 2000 patients on our waiting list a man who appeared mentally the most primitive, one who made his living by means of what even his wife called his "low intelligence." The man was a peddler of soaps, and his customers bought his wares out of pity. On the advice of a physician, he wanted to be treated, without fee, because of erectile impotence, threatening to commit suicide if his condition could not be changed. I felt that even he could be helped provided the analyst took the trouble of explaining, as far as the intellectual part went, the complicated phenomena of an hysterical impotence in a simple, child-like language. I was sure that in the affective, therefore unconscious, level, there would be not the slightest difference between him and intelligent patients. The patient entered analysis, behaved very submissively, but, as expected, started very soon to repeat in the transference-situation his oedipal aggression toward his father, which was for him defense-mechanism against his deeper repressed passivity. By no means could he be brought to admit his inner

aggression and resulting feeling of guilt. After a few months his sexual interest toward his wife improved, and after the typical ebb and flow of success and failure performed normal intercourse one morning for the first time in his life. He did this at exactly 7:30 a. m. At 9 a. m. he had his analytic appointment and was over-enthusiastic about the success, wanted to kiss my hands, and cried from happiness, especially since he was treated without charge. At exactly 2 p. m. of the same day he appeared without previous announcement in the office of my immediate superior in the Clinic, a colleague with whom he had spoken in my presence before being definitely sent to me. There he complained about me. *He did not mention his successful intercourse*, but simply stated that he was wasting his time with me since no improvement was visible. My colleague behaved correctly and told him that if he had resistances he should fight them out with me. The patient implored him not to mention his complaint to me. My colleague, of course, refused to do this; on the contrary, asked him specifically to analyse the whole affair with me on the following day. The next day the patient came for his appointment and started with the question: "Have you seen Dr. X already?" My colleague had not informed me of the incident, considering it simply a typical "acting out" not worth mentioning, but the word "already" was suspicious to me, and I asked the patient why I should have seen him. "Only because you know him well." I insisted on some explanation, and word by word had to be extracted from him until his action of the day before could be reconstructed. I asked him: "Why did you complain on the very same day that you had intercourse successfully for the first time in your life and why did you not mention that fact to my colleague?" At this the patient *smiled hypocritically* and informed me that he had some doubts of a "general" nature. "Is intercourse really so important?" was the tune he repeated. I reminded him that he had threatened to commit suicide if he could not achieve intercourse. At once the patient changed his approach, cried, and accused himself of hypocrisy and ingratitude, and begged for some humiliating work in expiation. After that incident the analysis progressed normally. He was cured and discharged a few months later, and I was repeatedly invited by him to the ritual circumcisions of his sons, who were produced regularly for a number of years.

What was the reason for his queer behavior? That he repeated in the transference his hatred of his father was clear. That he repeated that hatred in self-damaging conditions was also apparent, since his lies could have been detected through a single telephone call. That he mas-

ochistically did not want to be cured was visible, too, since he assumed that I would dismiss him after his insolent act; that we don't react in such a manner in analysis he did not know. All of these facts are unimportant with regard to our problem, the explanation of hypocrisy. I believe that we could observe in this case in *statu nascendi* the re-enactment of the genesis of the hypocritical reaction. The patient repeated in the transference the father-son relation. His father was a severe disciplinarian; he preached authority, especially the orthodox Jewish one. The patient acquired toward him the attitude of deep submission with a defense counter-reaction, pseudo-aggression. Both he repeated with me, despite the fact that I behaved very differently from his father. He simply projected the old pattern upon me. Where his father was authoritative I was friendly, explaining, trying to make him cooperate without coercion. For a long time the discrepancy in his behavior was explained to him without effect. His attitude was that of submissive non-acceptance of interpretations. He was so submissive that he did not even dare to come out with his aggression; only once he accused me of trying to force my interpretations upon him. In other words, he projected upon me the aggressive father who had really forced him to accept his opinions without contradiction. In his objection the patient repeated the feeling of being passively overwhelmed (negative, inverted oedipus complex in feminine identification) and the defense-reaction of pseudo-aggression. I explained to him that his conscious belief or disbelief was unimportant for us in analysis. However, since he projected the father-repetition upon me, he did not accept that. We see in this case the following prerequisites for the "mechanism of hypocrisy": a very weak and frightened ego confronted with an authoritarian educator who enforces acceptance of his dictum without contradiction. The first reaction in some cases seems to be a false submissiveness ("pseudo-submissiveness"). That pretence of submission is one of the indispensable features of hypocrisy.*

After his complaint to my colleague, I was of course interested to see if hypocrisy was a new acquisition of my patient. Of course it was

* Hypocrisy can be observed as a *transitory* phase in *every* analysis before an interpretation is inwardly accepted. Since in analysis a change in the Super Ego takes place, it is understandable that the patient uses the old mechanisms of warding off educational authorities. This interpretation fits well with an unpublished remark of Ferenczi to the effect that hypocrisy seems to be a typical transitory phase of childhood. That remark was made to Miss Anna Freud, who quoted it in the discussion of my paper, "The Psychology of Plagiarism," in the *Vienna Psychoan. So.*, June, 1932. Details are published in that paper, *Psychoan. Bewegung*, 1932.

not; it was only the resuscitation of an old mechanism. His "stupidity," widely publicized in his environment, gave him—only unconsciously, to be sure—a queer feeling of superiority: All of these people were convinced that he was stupid, whereas he was cleverly capitalizing upon their pity. What happened in analysis in this case was the change from an unconscious to a conscious hypocrisy as a transitory phase. The reason was: Once more the patient's Ego was confronted with an inescapable superiority of a person who, in his opinion, wanted to force his opinions upon him as his father had once really done. Naively the patient assumed that if he did not believe *consciously* my interpretations, he simply could not be cured, and persisted in that misconception despite all of my protests. On the other hand, the old situation of pseudo-aggression towards his overpowering father was brought to the fore; that was his *modus vivendi*. His first successful attempt to have intercourse was interpreted by him, not as lessening of his neurosis, but as inner danger. Since he had lost his symptom, he felt that he was overwhelmed by me via interpretation as he had been overpowered by his father. Therefore he was forced exactly on the day of his success to be aggressive toward me in defense, by complaining to my colleague. Since he wanted partly to be punished and partly to be passively overwhelmed, he chose this transparent way of complaining with an easily discernible lie.

All of that explains his actions on that for him fateful day but not his hypocrisy. He was confronted with the fact that he really believed my interpretation; this was his way of explaining his success in coitus. But he could not accept anything in common with his father, since that meant, in his unconscious vocabulary, being overwhelmed once more sexually by him. So he chose once more the outlet of ironic pseudo-acceptance in hypocrisy, giving him the following advantages: He proved to his unconscious conscience (Super Ego) that he made fun of his father without depriving himself of the advantage of accepting the interpretation, that is the loss of his symptom of impotence. That procedure, moreover, gave him the alibi that he was not passively submissive but was aggressive toward his father. That man really "ate his cake" and had it too.

We see, therefore, that the patient's hypocrisy was basically associated with his *inner fight between his unconscious Ego and his Super-Ego*. Secondly he *projected* that conflict upon me. *The actual victim of hypocrisy is comparable to the innocent bystander who is killed during a fight between two rival gangster bands.*

Case II. The second clinical example is of a patient from a completely different milieu. He was the son of an old aristocratic, devoutly Catholic Austrian family. His father was a high dignitary in the court of the emperor and a convinced monarchist. His son, unconsciously to be aggressive toward him and also to prove to himself that he was not passive-submissive but aggressive, had chosen to join the Nazi party. In the last months before the father's death the two had violent scenes; one "Weltanschauung" fought the other without the slightest understanding that they were both fighting, not political and religious, but intrapsychic situations. What made the son especially furious was the fact that his father ridiculed the Nazi party as a "hopeless" one which could never come to power. Since these conflicts took place in the early twenties, at a time when the Nazis in Austria were more of a joke than a real threat, the old man's viewpoint was understandable. A few years later the patient continued his analysis with me, his first attempt with a colleague of mine having been given up after some time. Very soon his anti-semitic tendencies projected upon his previous analyst and myself were used as resistance. I asked him how he could reconcile his Nazi principles with his vountary acceptance of treatment by Jewish physicians. The patient smiled half-ironically, half-hypocritically and answered: "Well, our main argument against Jews consists of the fact that they are *the* destructive element. Since, in analysis, you have only the laudable purpose of destroying my neurosis, which is independent of my being a Nazi, and the destructive tendency is used for a good purpose, there is no objection to it from the racial viewpoint."

That elegant piece of double talk, worthy of a Goebbel's disciple, had a complicated superstructure. All educational rules were given to the patient directly or indirectly by his tyrannic father, who introduced military discipline into his household. As in the case previously discussed, not only were the educational rules given tyrannically but every attempt at opposition was crushed at the start. What the parents asked for in both cases was *lip service, not inner conviction*, since both believed in education by force. The result was pseudo-acceptance and retaliation by the mortified narcissism in the form of hypocrisy toward the tyrant. That pseudo-acceptance thus became a weapon of the Ego against the stern and sadistic parent.

The following episode shows to what an extent the father placed his emphasis on lip-service only. The man found out that his wife was unfaithful to him and achieved annulment of their marriage. The two

children—the patient was 7 at that time—were asked by a servant to see their father in his room. He was seated at a table, before him his army pistol, having just returned from army maneuvers, in which he took part as a reserve officer. He informed the children that their mother, who was absent allegedly to visit friends in the country, would not return home. They were to forget her completely. He was asking now for “absolute loyalty.” Should they not show the allegiance to the degree he expected, he would kill himself with the pistol, which he demonstrated. Needless to say the children promised everything, despite the fact that they could neither understand nor forgive being deprived of their mother, whom they loved.

The patient's conflict in making use of Jewish physicians did not start with my ironic question, but was only culminated by it, since it resuscitated an old pattern of behavior. Of course, for a long time he had feelings of guilt from the “party viewpoint,” fearing that he would be evicted from the Nazi organization were the leader to find out his “unpardonable” crime. A masochistic element was involved, especially in his toying with the idea that he could be found out by his party or that I could be indiscreet. On the other hand, the Nazi fanaticism was in his specific case only a super-imposed feature, since he had constantly to ward off old “aristocratic remnants” in his personality. Consciously he despised himself for that; in reality he caught himself constantly thinking “in the old way.” Austrian aristocrats, as, for instance, his father, were in general not anti-semitic in the Nazi sense. They considered themselves superior to most people—the old emperor, Franz Joseph, for instance, never gave his hand to a non-aristocrat—had a mild irony toward everyone, but did not hate the Jews; indeed, they felt themselves so exalted that they often scoffed at anti-semitism as something “plebian.” Amusingly enough, the patient's choice of Jewish physicians was therefore in conformity with his father's ideas, even a proof of inner submission toward his father, who, were he alive at the time of his analysis, would not have objected to his choice of physician specifically.* Of course, his choice of a Jewish physician was a great sin against his newly-acquired Nazi conscience. Since he used his being

* The patient's choice of Jewish physicians had other unconscious determining factors as well, especially in connection with his castration complex. He unconsciously identified Jews with castration. On the one hand, he consoled himself with the fact that others, who were in his opinion “really” castrated, were even worse off than he. On the other hand, his neurotic fear of Jews was based on the idea that they would castrate him in revenge for their own castration; in other words, masochistic elements were involved.

a Nazi unconsciously only as a defense mechanism against his father, he repeated in it, too, the old pseudo-aggression toward his father. The result was that it was inwardly a pleasure for him to be aggressive also toward his super-imposed Super Ego. He was simply incapable of "accepting" a set of principles in a form other than that of lip-service. His sophistic interpretation of Jews as a "destructive" element used for the good purpose of "destroying" his neurosis was paradigmatic for that attitude. Here he unconsciously made fun of the Nazi principles, simply repeating the old irony and defense mechanisms originally directed against his father; once more, lip service instead of inner acceptance.

Case III. A schizoid student of protestant theology entered analysis because of—to quote him—"personality difficulties, especially shyness, blushing, and occasional fits of violence toward my family." He was a scholar, and one of the first in his theological seminary. A few days after the start of his analysis, the director of his religious academy called upon me to ask my help in "getting rid of that impossible and dangerous man for the Church." He explained that he and his colleagues were exasperated at having to let that pupil pass with high honors because of his scholastic achievements in the theory of theology when they felt reluctant that "such a hypocrite" should be a preacher and represent the Church one day. Said the man, "We cannot prove it, but we feel that he is a hypocrite." I replied that an analyst is hardly the person to solve such a conflict of church dignitaries such as he and his associates, and suggested that he speak to the young man himself. "That is hopeless," answered the professor. "We have explained to him time and again that his personality does not fit into preaching, but he is convinced that it does. He never objects directly but is very stubborn." We compromised on the basis, that, should analysis be successful, the patient would probably accept the reality factors involved. It was conceivable that he would either change or choose some less compromising theologic work, for instance, that of bibliothecary in a foundation. The latter alternative was, by the way, the way in which the patient solved that part of his conflict, despite the fact that external reasons made continuation of analysis impossible after a few months.

In his conscious attitude the patient was extremely subservient and submissive. He raised objections in an extremely polite, never direct manner. At first glance his religious beliefs gave the impression of sincerity. However, it became clear very soon that he used his calling for neurotic reasons. He received deep satisfaction from the fact that his

father did not approve of his decision to become a pastor. He remembered even how he had made his decision to become a pastor at the age of six. One Sunday, during a vacation in the Alps, his father, a very neurotic individual who was a severe and unjust disciplinarian, settled his son's weekly "spanking" account. The man enforced upon his son some complicated and queer point-system, whereby every offense was rated during the week. On Sunday the spanking was executed, the amount of strokes depending upon the points which the father arbitrarily had marked against his son. On this day the man beat the boy mercilessly, without explaining what offense had made him so angry on that specific occasion. He interrupted the punishment only to go to church with the family. There the boy was greatly impressed with the fact that his father, who a few minutes before was so autocratic and cruel, listened with devotion to the pastor. At that moment his decision was made; he wanted to become a minister himself. He could give me no more information; he remembered the facts but could not connect them. On a more conscious level the reason for his decision was that to escape his father's tyranny by becoming an authority which stood even above him. What the patient did not even suspect was his deep masochistic desire to be mistreated by his father. In his calling, he wanted, in the more superficial level, to overcome his father by becoming an untouchable authority, respected even by him. In the deeper level, he wanted to use his calling to be mistreated; he felt clearly that he was not wanted by his superiors, and in addition was tortured continually by an obsessional thought which he concealed in analysis for weeks, that one day in delivering his sermon he would use blasphemous language. Expressed differently, he wanted through his choice of profession to cling to his defense mechanism of aggression toward his father in order to fight his inner wish to be overpowered. His superiors were on the right track in questioning his motives. What they did not understand was that his hypocrisy was an unconscious one and not, as they believed, a conscious one.

The patient was confronted with the fact that he misused religion for neurotic reasons and that his inner convictions were not acknowledged by his superiors. Of course, the accusation of conscious hypocrisy was unjustified and he fought it. During analysis the following incident occurred: All of the pupils of the seminary had to deliver "test" sermons in small churches. The young man did so and seemingly succeeded. However, he used such ambiguous language and quoted religious authorities in such a way that some protest came a few days after

his test. A few of the members of the congregation wrote to the church, asking whether the quotations were correct. As it happened, they were, but the youth had used them in an objectionable manner, mentioning, for instance, the theological dispute during the arianic heresy as to whether God was "homoousios" or "homoiousios" and elaborating at length over the small difference of an "i", "which was responsible for the death of many persons." Without knowing it consciously, the man was making fun of religion, neurotically projecting upon it his conflicts with his father and his defense mechanisms against him. He could not be convinced that he used unconscious hypocrisy, but accepted the post of a bibliothecary because during his sermon he had been so tortured by blasphemous ideas, which he refused to let me analyze.

III. *A Few Theoretical Assumptions*

Our assumptions culminate thus far in the following formulations: Hypocrisy is a mechanism which acts in the *unconscious* Ego. It expresses the result of an inner conflict and has originally no connection with the outerworld victims of the hypocrite. The existence of the pattern of hypocrisy proves that a constant intrapsychic conflict between Ego and inner conscience (Super Ego) does exist. Both the Ego and the Super Ego of the hypocrite are characterized by specific features. The Ego of the hypocrite is weak and on the other hand elastic and cunning, unable to renounce its high-pitched narcissism. The Super Ego of the hypocrite was originally built according to patterns of educators who tyrannically insisted on acceptance of their rules, aggressively enforcing them without regard to whether the acceptance were real or only by lip-service.

In typical circumstances such as that—weak Ego, aggressive Super Ego—the result is submission of the Ego. In the case of the hypocrite exactly the opposite occurs: The Ego tricks the conscience on the basis of *pseudo-submission*. It accepts, in other words, all demands of the conscience only as a formality, accompanied by constant mockery of the "stupid" introjected educator who takes pseudo-acceptance as a real one and lip service as real conviction. From that *outsmarting of the Super Ego* the Ego derives a great deal of hidden narcissistic pleasure.

In the case of the hypocrite the unusual fact is that under the disguise of a victory of the Super Ego takes place a mockery of the Super Ego. The Super Ego is made fun of in its own house, so to speak, thereby reversing the typical role of Ego and Super Ego. In this case the victory of the Super Ego is only a Pyrrhus victory.

That domestic struggle between the different provinces of the personality is secondarily projected upon innocent victims, since the process leading to hypocrisy has the tendency to be generalized and made external. The outerworld victim of the hypocrite is now aggressively dealt with, whereas in reality the inner Super Ego is being fought. The fight is simply projected upon persons in the outer world.

The distinction between "conscious" and "unconscious" hypocrisy is therefore of little avail, since in conscious hypocrisy only the action against the object of the projection is conscious, not that against the original enemy, the Super Ego; the action against the latter is always repressed.

The problem of projection is of decisive importance in the understanding of the "mechanism of hypocrisy." The aggression is diverted and re-directed *four times*, to be exact. First, it is directed toward the real educator (mother-father). Second, after the educator has been internalized and the inner conscience (Super Ego) built up, it is directed toward the Super Ego. Third, it is projected upon people in the outside world who are directly identified unconsciously with the introjected educators. Fourth, the aggression is generalized and projected upon Tom, Dick and Harry. In that fourth step there is also an additional hidden, unconscious irony discernible: "What kind of shabby Super Ego is it that can be materialized upon every idiot in the world!"

The reason for the use of projection in hypocrisy is not specific for hypocrisy itself. Projection has always the same inner purpose—to diminish inner tension by creation of the fiction that our repressed wishes are not inside but outside, belong, not to us, but to other persons, a fiction which also gives us a better opportunity to fight these forbidden wishes. For example, Freud has described a jealous man of a specific type who wants unconsciously to get rid of his wife and "feels" that *she* is unfaithful to him. This "feeling" gives *him* the advantage of lessened inner tension created by the unconscious, repressed wish (aggression toward her), which is counterbalanced by a Super Ego reproach. By projecting his wish upon his wife, he diminishes his feeling of guilt and even creates an alibi for himself, since he fights constantly against his own inner wish, which is, however, externalized.

The whole problem hinges on the pivotal point of the strength of the inner conscience. The problem of the development and working of the Super Ego is still controversial in psychoanalytic literature. A few

facts are clear and more or less accepted. The core of the Super Ego consists of the introjected educational authority (father-mother and their successive representatives), as shown by Freud. What is introjected, however, is not the *real* mother and father but the mother and father *as the child sees them*, a fact stressed especially by English analysts. The child sees them through the spectacles of his own projection. When, therefore, the child projects a great deal of his own aggression on his parents, he later introjects them as cruel and malicious, even though in reality they were mild and benevolent.* That tragi-comedy of education explains its relative unimportance in the subsequent neurosis of the child. That does not mean that a neurotic education could not produce artificially a neurotic product; of course it could. It implies, however, that even the most intelligent education cannot always prevent the development of neurosis.

We have furthermore to distinguish between an "assimilated" and a "non-assimilated" Super Ego. Normally the inner conscience becomes a part of our own personality; it is more or less assimilated. In the case of certain neurotics—as, for instance, hypocrites—exactly the opposite happens. The introjected Super Ego is treated constantly by the Ego as an inner enemy, is fought and made fun of. As long as he lives the hypocrite repeats his fight against the educator, who has been first introjected and then projected. The disguise of mistaken identity is therefore perfect. There is a *constant tendency to show up the projected Super Ego as mean, base, and aggressive*. Thus, the queer phenomenon of the hypocrite's "good conscience" is explainable. First, since the hypocrite always has a feeling comparable to that of a patriotic Frenchman toward the Nazi invaders of his homeland, he has the conviction of always being right and justified in his actions. Second, he seems so undisturbed in his possession of a "good conscience" since *he expects unconsciously to be punished*. He is a perpetual collector of ill will. Third, he is so proud to have proven that he is not passive but aggressive that his successful defense mechanism gives him the feeling of being right, since his inner passivity is the greatest crime of which he accuses himself.

* The whole problem is complicated by the introduction of Freud's Eros-Thanatos theory. See the paper, "Transference and Love," by Jekels and Bergler, *Imago*, 1934, and the author's contribution to the "Symposium on the Theory of Therapeutic Results," *Int. Psychoan. Convention in Marienbad*, 1936, published in *Int. Jour. Psychoan.*, London, 1937.

That constant tendency to fight the inner enemy, the Super Ego, in its outerworld projections explains furthermore why the hypocrite gives the impression of being extremely "aggressive." Unconsciously he is not; indeed, he is just the opposite. His continual fight against the victims of his projections shows only—on a different battlefield—how helpless he is without his perpetual device, the "mechanism of hypocrisy." The old saying, "The lady doth protest too much," is applicable here. The hypocrite is *inwardly a very passive person who fights desperately to disguise his passivity.**

IV. Excerpts from a Typology of Hypocrites

The term "typology" must be taken with a grain of salt as far as hypocrites are concerned. There is, as my clinical experience has taught me, only *one* type of hypocrite with *one* mechanism as *vis a tergo*. But the technic of provocation varies. With that fact in mind, we may describe some of these technics.

Another warning is necessary. Examples taken from history, belles lettres, and casual experience always give the impression at first glance that the hypocrite is very "aggressive." That impression is, as has been explained, erroneous; it takes at face value the defense mechanism, confusing the defense with the drive behind it. History and literature record, furthermore, only the "successful" examples, without mentioning the self-provoked punishment that ensues. That eclectic tendency reminds one of the technic of superstitious persons: They record the chance "successes" of their superstitious guesses and repress the failures.

Since none of the figures in literary and historic examples can be analyzed (They are products of imagination or dead, and cannot even protest), we can only assume by comparing them to clinically accessible people that the same mechanism applies for them, too. True, it cannot be proven in a specific case. We can either dismiss these examples as

* Everyone is fooled by the hypocrite's antics of aggression. I admit that I was, too. In my first attempt to analyse the psychology of the hypocrite (Lecture delivered at the Vienna Psychoan. Soc., May, 1934) I still believed that the hypocrite was attempting to ward off his inner aggression. Interestingly enough, nobody objected to that particular point in the discussion. That the hypocrite harms himself in the end was clear even then; but the basic principle involved is not that of aggression. Even at that time I had the feeling that something was missing and therefore published only a short report of my lecture instead of the whole (Int. Zeitschr. f. Psychoan., 1935, p. 95). That, by the way, is the only published analytic attempt to explain the psychology of hypocrisy.

meaningless or make use of them, realizing these limitations, for one purpose only: to learn a few tricks of their *external* technic. I propose to do the latter.

Having been interested in the problem of hypocrisy for a long time, I collected a great variety of types, 51 to be exact. I don't believe that there is any reason to mention all of these; on the contrary, a small selection is sufficient.

Hypocrisy in the form of a reciprocal compliment as trap. As a first example I shall use one of the classical hypocrites of history, Fouché. Fouché, the traitor on a grand scale of the nineteenth century, was police chief under Napoleon, but "served" and betrayed all French governments from the beginning of the French Revolution until the restoration of the Bourbons. Here is an instance of his technic: After Napoleon's second abdication in 1815 the French Chamber of Deputies elected a provisional government consisting of five men. Carnot received the highest number of votes, 324; Fouché received only 293. Carnot was clearly chosen to preside over that government. At the first meeting of the Council Carnot automatically took the president's seat. Fouché, however, proposed, as if mentioning an obvious procedure, that the Council should *constituate* itself. "What do you mean by that?" asked Carnot in surprise. "Well," answered Fouché innocently, "to elect a secretary and president." And with hypocritical self-denial he added: "Of course, I give my vote to *you* as president of the Council." Carnot did not see the trap and answered politely: "And I give *you* my vote." But two of the five members being "in" with Fouché, he received three votes and Carnot two, and before Carnot understood what had happened to him, Fouché was sitting in the president's chair.

By chance we know some details about Fouché which show us the neurosis of that man. Typical is an episode of his life in which he provoked Napoleon to such a degree that he was dismissed as cabinet member. But after his dismissal Fouché refused to deliver to Napoleon the latter's confidential notes, thus infuriating and frightening the emperor. Fouché fled through half of Europe, attempted to escape to America, became *seasick* on the ship he had hired (he was the son of sailors!), returned, and capitulated. History books describe that episode as a "nervous breakdown," whereas it represents a typical example of acted castration fear under a pseudo-aggressive facade.* Other signs of that fear

* I have had no actual experience in analysing diplomats. I can therefore only guess that diplomats of the old school, who excell in hypocrisy and even make hypocrisy their life business, have a psychic structure similar to that of hypocrites in general. The few details known about their private lives seem to confirm this assumption.

may be found in Fouché's spying on his superiors; as long as he did not know all of the details of the private life of others, he felt insecure. * The power he acquired in that manner had, in addition to external advantages, the internal one of pacifying his fear of the little boy who is a Peeping Tom. Thus, we find, for instance, that Napoleon's first wife and his permanent secretary were Fouché's well-paid spies.

Hypocrisy in the guise of help. Dr. Lecher, the well-known physicist, once asked a 19 year old female medical student during an oral examination to describe the medical fever thermometer. She described it correctly, but added that there were marks also for temperatures below zero. The professor *nodded approvingly*, as if to encourage her, and asked innocently: "What purpose do the marks below zero serve?" "To measure the temperature of dead bodies," was the prompt answer.

Hypocrisy in obeying. Napoleon treated his secretary of state, Talleyrand, contemptuously, never being able to forget that his cabinet member was of aristocratic descent while he himself was a parvenue. Once, so reports F. Blei in his biography of Talleyrand, the emperor asked his cabinet member for a glass of lemonade at a party in Warsaw. Talleyrand obeyed, but placed a napkin under his arm to imitate a waiter and served "his" emperor the lemonade. Talleyrand's despising attitude** was so noticeable that Countess Potocka, who was present on that occasion, mentioned the incident specifically as characteristic of the relation between the two men.

Hypocrisy using the technic of "jokes of overbidding." The technic of a "joke of overbidding" reduces a statement to absurdity by hypocritically accepting it and offering further, exaggerated "proof" of it. For instance: Two newcomers in New York exchange impressions on the amazing tempo of American life. "Yesterday," says the first, "I saw how they build these skyscrapers. In a few hours they finished 100 stories." "Well," answers the second, "that is nothing. A man committed suicide in that building, and during the fall from the 100th floor he saw on the second floor a man reading a newspaper account of his suicide."

* Details of his life can be gathered in Stephan Zweig's "Fouché" and my attempt in interpret that book in "Biography makes concessions to psycho-analysis: one step forward—two steps backward," Psychoan. Bewegung, 1933.

** The intrapsychic reasons which made it possible for Talleyrand to assume this attitude are discussed in my book, "Talleyrand-Napoleon-Stendhal-Grabbe," Psych. Verlag, 1935.

Scientific hypocrisy. In totalitarian countries science is treated in the same fashion as every free opinion in general; it cannot be expressed, or, even worse, must be adapted to the specific use of the specific dictator. One has to think only of the "scientists" who supply Nazis with their "scientific" racial theories. One might say, varying the word of the Russian satirist, Saltykov: "*That brand of "science" is the adaptation to every dirty trick.*"

Hypocrisy in the disguise of optimistic belief in human nature. An old story reports of a "wonder" rabbi who visited a small Chassidic community. The believers decided to honor the famous man by giving him a barrel of wine. The elders prescribed that every member of the community should provide two pints of the finest wine in natura. The bottles received were placed into the big barrel, which was eventually filled—with water. Every believer trusted his neighbors to deliver *real* wine, not believing that they would be so cheap as to cheat the holy man.

"Altruistic" hypocrisy. I asked a patient who entered analysis because of agoraphobia whether he had any complaints regarding his sex life. "Not at all," answered the man convincingly. Asked to elaborate on his statement, he divulged that he had not touched his wife for seven years. "My wife earns our living since I cannot leave the house because of my street-fear. When she comes home I simply don't have the heart to make her undergo the strain of intercourse since the poor darling is so tired . . ."

There are connections between "rationalizations" and hypocrisy. Undoubtedly it was more agreeable for the patient to believe in his goodness of heart than to acknowledge the bitter fact of his impotence.

Hypocrisy in the disguise of faked naiveté. Casanova mentions in his memoirs that someone objected to his assuming the title of "Chevalier de Seingault." Without hesitation the famous cheater replied that the 24 letters of the alphabet were free and that he had chosen with good taste, since his were no better or worse than others.

Hypocrisy on the death bed. In this category belong promises of being mentioned in the will, the falseness of which can be proven after the death of the bestower, threats of non-existing memoirs, and so on. A good example is the following: In the memoirs of Alexander Dumas (vol. V, p. 305) there is to be found a description of the last hours of the former chief of the French Directoire, Paul Barras. Barras was chief of the French government after the execution of Robespierre until Na-

pooleon's coup d'état in 1799. During that time he carried on a compromising correspondence with the Bourbons. After Napoleon's abdication in 1815 the dynasty of the Bourbons was re-established, and the king and his advisors, and later the king's brother, wanted to obtain the correspondence, in vain. On his deathbed Barras was justifiably worried that after his death his papers would be confiscated. To prevent this, he deposited the letters in question with friends. To fool the king, he purchased 30 or 40 very pompous brief cases and dwelt upon the idea that these should be opened in the session of the king's most confidential advisors. "Do you know what they shall find there?" Barras asked his friend Cabarus. "The bills of my laundry woman for the last 35 years . . . and they will have to decipher a great deal, since I have had since the ninth day of Thermidor (Robespierre's execution) a great deal of dirty linen to wash. . . ." "And Barras," adds Dumas, "laughed so heartily about his pun that he succumbed to a new attack. In the evening he was dead, as he had predicted."

Hypocrisy with the alibi of loyalty. Barras mentions in his memoirs that Robespierre was feared to such a degree that a member of the French Revolutionary Convention, being by chance watched by the dictator at a moment in which he meditatively supported his head on his hand, immediately withdrew his hand, giving as excuse, "He could believe otherwise, I think about something."

In a satiric new Russian novel, "Fischbein Conducts War," a Soviet clerk, previously a bourgeois merchant, is described in early 1919 as not knowing where to turn, since it is not clear whether the Bolsheviks will hold Moscow or the counter-revolutionists will be capable of occupying the metropolis. One evening Fischbein comes home and shows his wife an official document strongly warning him to abstain from "counter-revolutionary propaganda in the office." His wife is desperate, since such a warning is usually the first step to the firing squad of the Tsche-ka. Fischbein, however, laughs hypocritically; he himself has swindled the document in order to have an alibi should the white army enter Moscow.

In another new Russian satire, Katajev's "Defraudants", the main character comes to a small Soviet village. There he finds that many places and streets are named for a local hero, Djeduschin. The only remarkable feature about this is that the nameplates also have a strip of cardboard attached changing the name, for instance, from "Square of the Camerade Djeduschin" to "Square of previous camerade Djeduschin."

The visitor asks for an explanation. He learns that Djeduschin was a local boy who had made good. Unfortunately, he had stolen later money belonging to the Soviet, so that he was placed in jail. Since, however, the change of all of the plates would involve too much expense, the Soviet decided simply to put the word "previous" before his title and leave all as it was. . . .

Hypocrisy using seemingly "objective" facts as excuse. A typical example of this is the business of criminal lawyers of a certain type who are expected to be shrewd rather than in love with the truth. The best satire on this type of lawyer is found in W. Rode's "The A.B.C. for Defendants." One story in this, obviously invented for ironic purposes, is of a well-to-do man in a European capital who is surprised with his "girl friend" and a seven year old child in a morally objectionable situation. A famous lawyer takes the case and brings forward the following defense: It is simply ridiculous to assume that his clients were doing something immoral with the child. True, they were caught when the child was fully undressed. But the reason is simple. Both defendants are admirers of the science of eugenics and both are superstitious. The financier's friend, whom he wants to marry, of course, is pregnant, and they were making use of the superstitious tradition that the sight of a healthy body might help to produce a similar one.

Hypocrisy after the shock-experience of loss of confidence. A patient, an hysteric woman, remembered a symptom which started in her fifth year and persisted for many years afterward. She was puritanically educated, and her question regarding the sex relations of dogs which she had observed was sharply answered by the objection that she simply imagined things. A few months later she observed by chance an act of sexual intercourse between a maid and her husband. She repressed this experience but developed the symptom of answering always the opposite of what was obviously expected. Confronted with facts, she would laugh obstinately and reply that her meaning was not the one interpreted. She entered analysis because of frigidity of the hysteric type* and showed in addition many symptoms and signs of a psychopathic personality. She was a pathologic liar, and reacted to disagreeable facts which contradicted her lies with the ironic excuse, "All truth is uncertain."

* See Hitschmann and Bergler, "Frigidity in Women," *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 60*, New York, 1936.

Hypocrisy justified by a "set of inner principles." The classical example of this form of hypocrisy is found in Molière's "Tartuffe." "There are ways," Tartuffe proclaims, "of enlarging one's own conscience" and "He who sins in secrecy does not sin at all." It is obvious that we deal here with rationalizations which obscure the hidden conflict. Tartuffe's device is reminiscent of the "mechanism of the cynic" described by me elsewhere.*

I wonder why, until now, no satiric writer has brought together the three most outstanding literary examples of hypocrites: Molière's Tartuffe in the play of that name, Shakespeare's Gloster in "Richard III", and Dostojewski's Foma Fomitsch in "The Farm Stepantschikovo." These three gentlemen could give some nice advice—on rationalizations of their hidden, unconscious conflicts.

Looking over our secondary or auxiliary material concerning the typology of hypocrites, we find that all of the examples give at first glance the impression of—jokes. That proves, first, that there is some similarity between the results of the "mechanism of hypocrisy" and wit. Both contain aggression toward someone else, but that in wit** seems more original, while that in hypocrisy represents only a defense mechanism. The objection that something that looks like a joke cannot be used for scientific purposes, since science is "serious," boils down to a misunderstanding of the psychology of wit. Every manifestation of wit contains a deep and complicated unconscious mechanism; only the facade is brilliant, as Freud has conclusively shown in his book on wit. Let us also not forget what the humorist, W. Raabe, once said: "Laughter is one of the most serious things in this world."

V. *Applications of the "Mechanism of Hypocrisy" in Criminal Psychopathology and the Fallacy of the "Century of Analogies" in That Science.*

At first glance hypocrites give the impression of being "well adapted" to their environment. Everyone whose ideal is a chameleon ad-

* "The Psychology of the Cynic," Psychoan. Bewegung, 1933.

** Literature Freud, "Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious" (translated by A. A. Brill), "The Basic Writings of S. Freud," Modern Library, N. Y., 1938; Freud, "Humor," Imago, 1928; Brill, "Freud's Theory of Wit," Jour. Abnorm. Psych., 1911; Brill, "The Mechanisms of Wit and Humor in Normal and Psychopathologic States," Psych. Quart. 1940; Hirschmann, "The Psychology of the Jewish Joke," Psychoan. Bewegung, 1930; Reik, "Nechdenkliche Heiterkeit," Int. Psych. Verl., 1933, and "Lust und Leid im Witz," Int. Psych. Verl., 1929; Dooley, L., "A Note on Humor," Psychoan. Rev., 1934; Bergler, "A Clinical Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Humor," Psychoan. Rev., 1937.

mires them. In reality, their device represents a desperate attempt to fight their own inner conscience, might be compared to a clandestine and abortive slave revolt, and has primarily not at all the purpose of better adaptation to reality. The hypocrite wins only hatred and contempt; his secondary advantage of "adaptation" to the authority of *the moment* is outweighed by the fact that no one trusts him. A masochistic provocative factor is always involved. It is senseless to explain an inner necessity—as is the "mechanism of hypocrisy" for its possessor—from the standpoint of the secondary, temporary gain which it sometimes achieves. It reminds one of the "explanation" that the lazy school boy got pneumonia only because he wanted to lie in bed.

The hypocrite is constantly fighting his own conscience. *His favorite inner trick is depreciation of authority.* Amazingly enough, the great French writer, Stendhal (Henry Beyle), understood that fact nearly one hundred years ago. In his last fragmentary novel, "L'Amiele," he describes a puritanically-educated young girl who sells all of her classical books to buy "beautiful forbidden robbery tales."

"That kind of literature is not written in the style of our virtuous century. The French Academy did not yet bother with it; consequently that literature is not yet boring. In short, soon Amiele had nothing else to interest her as much as the heroes of these sheets, whose end took place without exception on a scaffold in the presence of a great mass of spectators, which seemed heroic to our Amiele. 'Didn't they show courage?'"

"One evening Amiele made the mistake of mentioning these great men to her uncle. Terrified, he made the sign of the cross. 'Remember, Amiele, only the Saints are great men!' And Mrs. Hautmare complained: 'Where does she get these terrible thoughts'? . . . Amiele was an intelligent child full of wit and phantasy . . . 'Why doesn't my uncle want me to admire these men'? That was the question she asked herself in her bed. She could not go to sleep. At once the criminal idea occurred to her, 'I would like to know whether Uncle would have given to the poor widow Renvard ten gold pieces, a did the robber Kartusch when the tax collector wanted to confiscate her only black cow and the poor woman was left with only thirteen pennies for herself and her seven children.' Amiele wept for a quarter hour. Finally she said to herself: 'Would my uncle be capable of enduring on the scaffold the blows of the iron hammer with which the executioner crushed

the bones of the robber Mandvin without his complaining? By every little stone which my uncle touches with his gout foot he raves of pain without end!"*

"On that night a great change was performed in Amiele's mind. The following day she sold the old Virgil to the grocer. She refused the sweets he offered her in exchange and asked for a new beautiful, forbidden, dreadful robbery tale."

Before we ask ourselves whether or not the understanding of the described "mechanism of hypocrisy" can help us in understanding certain criminal actions, a few general remarks are necessary. Medical criminal psychopathology is a very young branch of medicine. Every young science works at first with analogies and the instruments of other sciences. Since Freud's psychoanalysis proved that in neuroses unconscious mechanisms are used and since psychoanalysis elucidated the dark continent of neuroses, some authors of papers in the field of criminal psychopathology do apply, in a more or less attenuated form, these discoveries to actual criminals. The procedure is fallacious, since the psychologic *contents* of an action do not explain the actual *motor act* executing the action itself. Let's compare two cases: One is a neurotic who produces hysterically a paralysis of the right arm because his unconscious Id wish is to kill his father or father-representative of the oedipus complex.** His Super Ego protests against his wish, and his unconscious Ego produces as an unconscious compromise the hysteric symptom. The other, seemingly with the same unconscious psychic contents, actually kills a father-representative. We are confronted with the problem of why the pathologic process is absorbed in the first case in a neurosis and in the second case in a criminal action. The psychic contents seem identical; the results are quite different. It is not always possible to use as a simple expedient in explanation the formula that neurosis is a private and "criminosis" a social conflict, even with the acknowledgment that both may function at the expense of society. This expedient does not work too well since a very large group of neurotics use the mechanism of "acting out," that is, dramatization *and* acting of their conflicts in the outer world. The patient in Case I presented before

* What enabled Stendhall to make that intuitive observation cannot be explained here without analysis of his complex personality. See the author's book, "Talleyrand-Napoleon-Stendhal-Grabbe," Psychoan. Biogr. Essays, Psych. Verlag, 1935.

** The example simplifies matters. In a clinical case of that type analysis proved that the superficial aggression was a *defense mechanism* against deeper pre-oedipal passivity. Whether the same holds true for communal actions is a matter of conjecture.

actually did visit my superior and complain; the patient in Case II actually acted out his irony against his political party; the patient in Case III actually delivered his blasphemous talk. Let's imagine that Patient I accused me unjustifiably, not of wasting time, but, for instance, of instigating him to kill his wife; let's assume that Patient II went to a Jewish physician a few years later, during the actual Nazi rule; and let's suppose that Patient III attacked, not his religion under the disguise of discussing the religious Council of Nicea of 325, dealing with arianic heresy, but the "political" Nürenberg Congress of 1937, dealing with racial "laws." Then we would have, not neurotic actions, but actions leading to the concentration camp or to being shot in Nazi lands. Theoretically the borderline seems very slim, especially if one rejects the Nazi "laws," but a distinction does exist in the practical results: It is simply the difference between life and death. As long as we don't find the *additional specific factor in "criminosus" which explains the motor action*, we simply fool ourselves if we believe that finding the unconscious reasons from analogy with a neurosis can explain the criminal act itself. Some modern criminologists seem to regard "criminosus" as a neurosis, despite their constant assertions that they are conscious of the difference between the two. Analogy may be an expedient in the face of our present ignorance of that yet-undiscovered "additional specific factor," but let us state our ignorance *expressis verbis*. We are seemingly still at the beginning of the "Century of Analogies" in criminal psychopathology. Progress is possible in that field only if that fallacy is *inwardly* understood and digested. Conscious assertions of authors are worthless if the opinions expressed in and between the lines of their papers are to the contrary.

Having stated our ignorance of the "additional specific factors" in "criminosus," we can proceed and ask ourselves whether or not the "mechanism of hypocrisy" could have some bearing on *certain groups* of criminal actions. The answer is in the affirmative. Every law-breaking act leads to two reactions, *whether visible on the surface or not*: feeling of guilt and aggression toward the "hypocritical" society who, in the opinion of the law breaker, has no right to pass judgment on him. The feeling of guilt is often repressed or saturated in the expectation of punishment. However, the more or less furious attack against the "hypocrisy" of society is very often directly observable. It is even possible that genetically not only does that attack come post facto, *but the criminal act itself has the purpose of producing such a reductio-ad-absurdum situation masochistically*. We see, therefore, that law breakers of a


certain type use exactly the same mechanism in the projection as did the neurotic hypocrites described previously. It is possible that the same *inner* feeling is *one* of the driving forces for the criminal action itself. That that mechanism in itself does not explain the motor action has been stressed.

Further progress in psychiatric criminal psychopathology is possible in two ways: First, we can find those mysterious "additional specific factors" without which no crime is possible. As a prerequisite of that, hundreds of criminals would have to be actually subjected to psychoanalysis by many dozens of analytically-trained psychiatrists in a mass experiment that has never been attempted. The amount of time (years!), money, and effort involved would be enormous; also, conditions in prisons are unfavorable for psychoanalysis for various technical analytic reasons. Second, we can study the structure of the mechanism by means of which the borderline cases and the cases using the "acting out" tendency appease their inner conscience. It seems to me that the phrase "faulty" or "non-developed" inner conscience is too freely used. No one is without inner conscience, as no human being lives without heart or lungs. There are, however, individuals with a pathologic structure of that inner conscience, who are using complicated means to appease it or to reduce it to absurdity. The described "mechanism of hypocrisy" with its projections seems to me such an example.

There are no doubt many other such mechanisms, partly described, partly still unexplored. Particularly important to me seem to be those which are "obvious"* because everyone uses them in *dosi refracta*. *The more "normal" or "typical" such mechanisms are, the less we know about them.*

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* I personally have been interested in the investigation of *typical* attitudes, and in the last 11 years have published more than a dozen papers concerning the subject. "The Psychology of the Cynic," *Psychoan. Beweg.*, 1933; "Plagiarism," *Psych. Beweg.*, 1932; "On the Psychology of the 'Oral' Pessimist," *Imago*, 1934; "Transference and Love" (in collab. with Dr. L. Jekels), *Imago*, 1934; "Psychoanalysis of the Uncanny," *Int. Jour. of Psychoan.*, London, 1934; "Obscene Words," *Psychoan. Quart.*, 1936; "Psychology of Pathos" (in collab. with Dr. A. v. Winterstein), *Int. Jour. of Psychoan.*, 1936; "The Feeling of Being Right," *Arch. Gen. di Neur. Psychiat. and Psychoan.*, Naples, 1937; "Clinical Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Humor," *Psychoan. Rev.*, 1937; "Psychoanalysis of the Inability to Wait and of Impatience," *Psychoan. Rev.*, 1939; "Psychology of Jealousy," *Int. Zeitsch. f. Psychoan. und Imago*, 1939; "The Psychology of the Gambler," *Imago*, 1936; "The Gambler: A Misunderstood Neurotic," *Jour. of Crim. Psychopath.*, 1943. I hope to collect all of that scattered material some day, with the help of an imaginary scientific publisher, in a book on "Typical Human Characteristics."



A THERAPEUTIC SURVEY OF ONE HUNDRED CONSECUTIVE CASES OF ROBBERY*

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Criminal psychopathology has been investigated from many points of view. Kahn⁽¹⁾ has listed criminal behavior in several of his classifications of personality deviates. Alexander and Staub⁽²⁾ have attempted to go further in explaining the psycho-dynamics of criminal activity by showing that the unsuccessful attempts to resolve unconscious conflicts in these individuals result in alloplastic activity instead of being limited to autoplasic reactions. Healy and his associates^{(3) (4) (5)} have emphasized the individual criminal's reaction to conflict and pointed out the efficacy of classification on a therapeutic basis. Karpman,⁽⁶⁾ with detailed accounts of selected case studies, has added to our understanding of the individual offender. The sociological and statistical factors in the understanding of criminal activity have been clearly discussed in the data presented by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck.^{(7) (8)} In all of these studies there has been emphasis on detailed study of a selected few. But this was essential for the most part in order to bring out the dynamics in the personality development and the selectivity never detracted from the value of the material presented.

Obviously, the practicality and real value of a criminal psychopathologist should lie in his ability to aid the judicial and institutional authorities in segregation and classification of the offender on the basis of therapeutic possibilities, and, in certain instances, to aid directly in the therapeusis. With this in mind, an attempt was made to study a group of legally similar offenders under ordinary prison psychiatric routine; if possible, to classify them along the lines of accepted psychiatric entities in view of possible therapeutic procedures.

* Read before Forensic Section, American Psychiatric Association, Boston, May 18, 1942

Robbery was chosen as the legally defined crime because of the overtly aggressive action expressed in the legal definition. Therefore, a group of 100 consecutive admissions to the Eastern State Penitentiary, having only one constant similarity—the commission of the overtly aggressive crime of robbery—was examined under ordinary conditions at the penitentiary. No specific research atmosphere was set up. Historical and other sociological verifications were made by the Classification Office, and the psychometric studies performed in the office of the Psychologist. Face to face psychiatric interviews were carried out, and the length of time per interview varied directly with the personality and volubility of the inmate. The average interview lasted 45 minutes, and only seven inmates were seen more than once. In other words, an attempt was made to duplicate the routine penitentiary psychiatric classification interview. Unfortunately, the men were examined six months to a year after admission. Most had become prison-wise and wary of all authority. Mechanisms of repressions and rationalization were quite active, and in most cases a real rapport was difficult to establish. Of the entire group of 100, only 10 had been referred to the office of the psychiatrist by the classification board, and only three of these because of any untoward behavior. The other seven were referred because of a record of previous mental hospitalization.

Certain questions arose at the beginning of the study. First, could enough be determined by routine examination of men committed for a similar offense to aid in any therapeutic set-up? The ordinary prison classification would be by sentence, psychometry, and color, unless the individual did not fit into the prison routine. Secondly, would it be possible to determine a psychopathological common denominator in these men, or was the similarity of their offense nothing but a common reaction to individually varying dynamic factors? And lastly, was it possible to fit these individual prisoners into an understandable psychiatric classification? In other words, would routine psychiatric examination of all admissions to the penitentiary be an aid in prison therapeutics?

Upon tabulation of the results of these examinations certain interesting sociological factors were revealed. These were quite consistent, however, with our general knowledge of criminal statistics.^{(9) (10)} Two-thirds of these offenders were under 26 years of age, although the range varied from 18 to 47 years. Eighty-six of the 100 men were recidivists; of these, 29 had committed robbery before and 13 had been convicted

of overtly aggressive crimes other than robbery. The average sentence for all offenders was not less than 6 years and 2 months, to a maximum of 13 years, with a range of from 1 to 2 years to 25 to 50 years. It may be pointed out here that robbery in Pennsylvania is punishable by a maximum sentence of 10 to 20 years on each charge.⁽¹¹⁾ Broken homes and poor school and work records were the rule. Alcoholism was an outstanding symptom in one out of every four. The average I. Q. was 83.4 for all offenders. The ratio of white to colored offenders in this group of 100 corresponded to that in the total prison population, which is about two to one. The age distribution of the colored offender differed in no discernible manner from that of the white prisoner, and the general sociological background of this group of negroes was not exceptional for Eastern Pennsylvania. The one outstanding factor in the colored group was that one-third had an I. Q. below 70. Thus, in tabulating the more objective factors in these 100 examinations, no real aid in therapeutic grouping was revealed that differentiated them from the rank and file of penitentiary inmates. Segregation limited to these factors could be done easily without the aid of a criminal psychopathologist, and although it is a form of classification, no attempt could be made for any real individualization of therapy.

Although some classification of these men could be made on the factors disclosed so far, there would remain large heterogeneous groups that would be unwieldy until they could be broken down into understandable, practical, and functional units. It is true that in psychiatry, as well as in general medicine, our understanding of diseases has become less and less chaotic as our classifications become more sharply demarcated and understandable. The standard American psychiatric classification has not filled all the needs of the general psychiatrist, let alone the criminal psychopathologist, and a more workable grouping has been constantly sought. Among the best offered are those of Alexander and Staub,⁽²⁾ Branham,⁽¹²⁾ and Foxe.⁽¹³⁾

I shall not attempt here to introduce a new method of classification, but only point out that an attempt was made to fit this group of criminals into the standard American psychiatric classification. This was done because of the wide use and acceptance of this classification, and the fact that by its use, definition of terms would be unnecessary. In this manner, three main groups were differentiated. First, 72 of the offenders examined presented personality patterns that were ill-defined and poorly elaborated; but, by splitting hairs, could be divided into two

categories. Forty-nine could be put into the group of psychopathic personalities, although not more than two, or possibility three, would be called typical;^{(14) (15)} 23 were put into a group loosely defined as mixed psychoneuroses. None of this latter group presented symptoms of conscious anxiety, somatic conversions, or obsessive ideas to such a degree as would warrant a conventional diagnosis of a psychoneurosis; but the life story and reactions to environment were more related to a psychoneurotic reaction than to that of the psychopathic personality. Secondly, 16 had intelligence quotients under 70. The reactions to any conflict by a member of this group were greatly colored by their intellectual deficiency. The third group, comprising 12 individuals, fell into more conventional classifications, being divided almost equally into categories of psychasthenias and anxiety hysterias, organic syndromes, and smouldering schizophrenias. Thus, 100 robbers taken consecutively were subjected to this conventional type of classification, with the result that 72 per cent have been thrown into such a large group that they are in reality unclassified.

Before attempting to break down this large group, let us examine the 28 offenders that could be classified into the more clearly understood categories. Special care has been provided for the treatment of the mentally deficient. However, because of limits put on age for admission to institutions for defective delinquents, certain members of this group must be deprived of the advantages derived in an institution of that kind. In those cases, the best plan to follow would be active occupation in the penitentiary, and an attempt to utilize and develop all of the individual's useful capabilities. The psychotic criminal, if recognized, is no problem, for an elaborate machinery has been put into motion for his care, and segregation until transfer to a mental hospital is all that is necessary. The eight having conventional psychoneurotic reactions presented symptoms that were more or less continuous even within the penitentiary. Since these individuals could be easily recognized as suffering from a mental illness, they would naturally come under the care of the psychiatrist, and at least be observed, and if possible be put under an active therapeutic regime. Thus only a little over one-fourth of 100 men examined routinely presented conventional psychiatric syndromes, for which a plan of care and therapy could be outlined. The possibility now occurs that the psychiatrist's part in the classification is ended. The mentally deficient or obviously mentally ill have been differentiated.

There remained, however, 72 men to whom standard classification categories could not be profitably applied. Within the penitentiary they had made good adjustments. They were keeping out of trouble; most of them had regular jobs. To the administration they were just "cons" who were serving out robbery "raps." Some commonplace things were known about them, but not all men of their age-group, race, intelligence, background, color, and descriptive personality are criminals. What is distinctive, then, in these people—these men that look like any group seen in an Army induction center, and whose behavior in prison is inconspicuous? They are social failures, but what is there in their personality that causes social failure, yet which, in most cases, fails to bring them to the psychiatrist, or even to be considered by their intimates as queer?

An important factor in the criminality of this group was their social milieu. To at least one-fourth, criminality was not a deviation from the norm. No guilt or anxiety of any extent was attached to the act, and for the most part, their conduct differed nowise from that of their neighborhood companions. These individuals lived at the cultural level of criminality, where acts of an antisocial nature for our culture were not exceptional. When they wanted something, there was little hesitation before they took it. There was no real value in virtue, but only in getting and having, whether it meant gambling, cheating, stealing or robbing. As Shaw^{(17) (18)} has so ably pointed out, almost every adolescent of a certain slum area could be called a delinquent. The ones who are not are the individualists. Let us call this, then, a form of normal criminality. But, at best, this is a hybrid phrase meaning normal behavior for their culture-trait area, but antisocial for the regional culture. If there were a high wall about these areas of criminal culture, the problem would be mechanically solved, as was attempted with the Thugs of India. It is felt, however, that in the case of these so-called culture criminals, the problem is more one of social significance than purely of psychopathology.

After separating the culture criminal from this large, undifferentiated group, the perplexing problem of psychopathological diagnosis is centered on the man whose crime has no professional coloring and shows little thought of preparation, whose act is purposeless, without real monetary need, and in whom there is a tendency to repeat. He shows very little effort to escape detection, and in the great majority of cases, presents a genuine relief upon being apprehended, and ordinarily displays

unremarkable behavior in prison. Aichorn⁽¹⁹⁾ and Pearson⁽²⁰⁾ have compared this group to the aggressive child who cannot resolve his guilt because of his inability to make positive relationships, and is compelled to perform an act of aggression, only to be apprehended and punished, all of which gives rise to more guilt, and the vicious cycle begins again. This, then, is the group that is our real responsibility. Their psychopathological difficulties escape detection, because they are not constant criminals, but episodic, at periods of greatest psychic stress. The criminal act is the manifestation of their inner conflict, but for the most part their objective, descriptive personality characteristics fall within the wide borders of accepted normal behavior. A brief abstract of a case history at this point serves to demonstrate these factors:

The inmate, a 35 year old white male of Irish-Polish descent, was left fatherless as an infant. The mother, an illiterate Polish immigrant, remarried, after working as a housekeeper, when the boy was five years old. An older brother and sister died in childhood. The stepfather, a chronic alcoholic, was antagonistic in all relations with the inmate. The patient, however, was greatly attached to his mother, but a little ashamed of her illiteracy and dependency upon him. The school history is significant. He had no difficulty with his studies; however, two episodes stand out to reveal his turmoil in making an emotional adjustment at this time. In the fourth grade in parochial school he was accused of lying about an absence. Insisting he was telling the truth, he was threatened with disciplinary action, and he persuaded his mother to allow him to transfer to a public school. There he apparently made an excellent adjustment, but at the age of 12 had begun a hobby of collecting parts or models of offensive weapons. Once he got hold of a loaded revolver, was apprehended by the police, and the gun was confiscated. The eighth grade was completed at 13 years, and he found a job immediately in a print shop. He advanced rapidly, and by seventeen was holding a responsible position. No sooner did prosperity come when he quit work and traveled about the country during the summer with some friends. By September his money gave out. He came home, but was too proud to ask for his old job, and took irregular and less lucrative work thereafter. When he was nineteen his stepfather left home, following a quarrel. The mother found work and tried to keep a home for the son. The inmate was becoming more restless, and finally, accompanied by a friend, stole an automobile. He became anxious, was afraid to go home, slept in the car, and was arrested. After a year in the State reformatory, he decided he couldn't go straight, and within a month was behind bars on

a larceny charge. While he was in prison his mother developed a chronic disease, and was confined to the City Hospital, where she died some years later. When, in two years, he was discharged from prison, he felt a relief from all of his former tension and resolved to "go straight." He found a job, rented a room, and took out a girl for the first time in many years. He became promiscuously active heterosexually, was a heavy social drinker, held many and varied jobs, and finally, when twenty-eight, married a girl who had a child by a former relationship. This marriage was doomed from the beginning, and after a year of constant quarreling, including an arrest for assault and battery upon one of his wife's lovers, the marriage was dissolved. He quickly reverted to his former pattern of living. Within three years he had become quite friendly with a male drinking partner. This man was constantly bemoaning his financial plight and the inmate helped regularly with small loans. Finally a robbery was contemplated, performed successfully, and over \$1200 was divided between them. Following this, the inmate began drinking heavily, and finally confessed the entire episode to a girl friend, who, after a petty quarrel, told the police. He is now serving the 2 to 10 year sentence for robbery.

Throughout the interview, he was arrogant, self-assured, cool, and glibly evasive, talked peripherally, and had to be constantly reminded of his goal ideas. He admitted that he was definitely relieved following his confession and sentence. In the institution he has made a good work adjustment, and is quite expansive about his parole possibilities and future non-criminal career. His I. Q. is 122.

The picture he presented was that of a cool, superficially adjusted man who was considered normal and a victim of circumstances by the psychometric department and the prison personnel. From the examination of the history and personality reactions it would seem that early emotional traumata, including loss of father and subsequent rejection by stepfather, plus a dependency by an inadequacy of the mother, contributed to his delinquency. His early reactions were those of aggression, probably on the basis of strong feelings of insecurity. He received little or no emotional support during those periods of perplexity and anxiety over his ego strength, and the resulting doubts made it possible to accept the more responsible and lucrative vocational position at the age of seventeen. His lack of mature personality differentiation was further emphasized by his inability to try the same job again. The subsequent searching for, but inability to establish positive relationships, with the

subsequent aggressive behavior, suggested further undifferentiated relationships with and dependency upon the mother. The marriage and its failure is typical of this reaction. It is interesting and perhaps revealing that his one positive relationship was with a dependent male, which ended in the performance of a robbery resulting in strong feelings of guilt and search for punishment. These few highlights of the inmate's career and personality reactions point to the possibility that we are dealing with an infantile type of person whose psychological growth has been definitely impaired, and the resulting anxiety has given rise to reactions of hostility and aggression that seemed self-destructive in the futile attempt to compensate for strong feelings of guilt.

This picture is quite typical of the large group of poorly classified offenders who, because of their excellent adjustment in the penitentiary, are seldom seen by the psychiatrist. At the time of examination in this series they presented no definite psychopathological syndromes. The cool evasiveness, arrogance, and little depth of emotional reactions during the interview, with a history of a series of alloplastic activities suggested the diagnosis of psychopathic personality.⁽¹⁴⁾ This is a poor wastebasket, however, and is apt to result in therapeutic nihilism. It is more important to note that in most of the histories we see evidences of psychological dwarfism that may well be the result of emotional traumata.

The value of widespread but individual therapeutic procedures in these cases is unknown. Some program of short form therapy should be adopted, but the establishment of a real therapeutic relationship will remain questionable as long as the psychiatrist, in the inmate's eyes, is a part of prison authority, and there is little real anxiety on the part of the patient.

It is important that over half of this series was arrested for the first time while in the juvenile age group. It is then that they all should have the advantage of a psychiatric examination. It is then that the courts recognize probation as the therapy of choice, and it is then that a thorough program of psychiatric therapy could be arranged.

In this survey of 100 robbers in prison, some important revelations have appeared. It is apparent that on a routine psychiatric examination, which should be done as soon as possible after admission, certain clinical and historical factors come to light that aid in grouping the individual offender into gross psychiatric classifications. The majority of these

offenders, however, do not present so-called psychiatric entities. About one-fourth appear to be primarily sociological problems because of the strong cultural background to their criminality. The other three-quarters, which in this series consisted of 54 individuals, or more than half of the total examined, fall into a group that is poorly classified as psychiatric entities, but in which the individual's criminal activity is nonetheless a reaction to inner psychic conflict. It is because this criminal activity is not constant but episodic that these individuals escape psychiatric investigation and subsequent therapy, which in many of the cases would be profitable to some degree. It is further pointed out that even with one interview enough of a history and examination can be obtained to give clues to the underlying emotional difficulties.

Based on these results, no new or enlightened classification can be offered, but it can be pointed out that classification is important, especially when it differentiates the offenders as to their therapeutic possibilities. In other words, therapy should be our primary aim in classification. As has already been stated, the majority of cases in this series has fallen into a group for which at the present time the only real therapeutic agent is the penitentiary. It is obvious that for some, the penitentiary or corrective institution with segregation of first offenders and with its program of rehabilitation must be the only therapy, but for others it is all important that an understanding psychiatric therapeutic routine be instituted. This can be done most effectively through the Juvenile Court,⁽⁴⁾ while the offender is on probation, or, in a non-regimenting institution.⁽⁵⁾ It seems likely that even in the high security penitentiary the psychological growth of the offender can be promoted by a real therapeutic experience.⁽²²⁾ In most of these cases the patient is met with hostility or indifference in his relationship with his environment, to which his reaction then has been one of aggression. It is our problem not to discipline, or what is even worse, to tolerate or be kind to him, but it is essential to show him a warmth of understanding and to give him an opportunity to react with real feeling toward us, and in this therapeutic relationship, help him to gain a greater degree of psychological maturation.^{(23) (24)}

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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CRIME*

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The Id, the conscious Ego, and the ever-watchful, integrating censor of these, the Superego form the three psychic strata of the personality. The Id, which contains all the potential drives of the instinctive life and which is concerned only with the primary and simple *pleasure-pain principle*, constitutes the Unconscious. In some critical circumstances we retreat into the Unconscious, in other circumstances we cannot free ourselves from it. When there is such a return to or regression to an earlier, lower form, it is because some spring was unloosed as dream, neurosis or delinquency. Topical or chronological regressions result corresponding to infantile or archaic patterns. That supreme censor, the Superego, whose very archaism holds the personality in check on a level on which it is overshadowed and excelled by the free instincts, renders the *Ego* incapable of bringing its sustained motives to consciousness. Harmony is therefore necessary among the three strata. This harmony is disrupted in normal people during a dramatic conflict and in abnormal people when there is a strong stimulus of some instinct, or even when this stimulus is not excessively vigorous and the Ego has received little anchorage from the *Superego*. Crime or neurosis are the two aberrations which may quickly follow when the right path is blocked. In this sense, one becomes the psychic equivalent of the other. Freud expressed it well when he said, "neurosis is the negative of perversion."

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Before all we must understand what is crime.

According to Hugo Conti it is a legal violation, defined by law and adjudged according to law. It is clear that the law and its postulates change in meaning according to the varying social conditions of a period such as its liberality, education, political regime, etc. and establish ethical postulates derived from social experience, which are then converted into juridical norms.

Since these postulates are the consequence of the old and new notions of good and evil, more or less valid empirical judgments arise as to what is harmful or beneficial in human action. Those collective beliefs (ethics) possess the common characteristic of all psychobiological manifestation, innate in life itself, its unstable character.

The agreeable and the useful, the good, honest, and permissible are derived from the pleasure principle. The disagreeable and the harmful, the bad, forbidden and criminal are derived from the pain principle. Fundamentally, ethics is born from instinct with its pleasure-pain principle. That concept, through its adoption by the *Superego* is advanced, hierarchized, made available, and given value. It is then elevated and idealized and finally converted to ethical dogma. It must be nurtured in this new condition to prevent an archaic return to its instinctive source.

Laws, which delimit the instinctive tendencies, try, with or without result, to translate the predominant moral tone of the age and thereby blocking occurs. The humanist Vincenzo Lanza was wont to say that "any event which violates our moral feelings" is crime. Therefore all human actions prohibited by law and tolerated by ethics, must disappear from their privileged place in the legal codes.

What, before all, is that instinct, which is so powerful an actor that its countenance becomes visible through obscurity, yet behind the scenes performs a colossal task which it jealously guards from the toils of civilization? What is that instinct, which with the terrible egotism of a father or mother does not blanch at some tragedy triumphing in its turmoil in secretly withdrawing its children like an obstinate monkey resistant to the progress of life's circus?

To *Numberg*, "it (instinct) represents a continual biological excitation which induces the organism to react in pre-determined forms," and which develops tensions "extended throughout the whole organism,

and possessing a character which is at once constraining, invincible and incessantly repeated." This task, almost always intermittent, at times rhythmic, is demonstrated to us as man unfolds, passing "from repose to repose through anxiety as though the instinctive life were subjected to enforced repetition."

To Cuatrecasas, in his excellent general Psychobiology of instinct, the instincts are: "biological forces of unknown nature whose manifestations impose their delimitation. Just as the physicist speaks of gravity, the biologist accepts the instinctive forces." Bergson, the intuitive philosopher, thinks that intelligence "is characterized by a natural incomprehension of life. Instinct, on the contrary, is modelled after the matrix of life itself."

According to Freud, we understand by that term, only "psychic power of excitative origin, flowing incessantly and intrasomatic in origin, changing with each 'stimulus' and produced by isolated excitations proceeding from the exterior." And further, "instinct is, therefore, one of the points of divergence between the psychic and the physical." From another instance in his work which takes under consideration the manner in which the instinctual life is connected with the obsessional repeat pattern, he expresses the view that "an *instinct* would be but a natural tendency of the living organism to reconstruct a previous condition, which it had to abandon under the power of external disturbing forces, or if you will, a *manifestation of inertia in organic life*. . . ."

Whatever that power may be, blind and headstrong, vigorous yet sane, charged with tremendous potentials for guarding our primitive and animal self, the truth is that it influences the entire mental system, comprising all reasoning and concept formation, because it is the *fons et origo* of our initial élan. This vital power, more or less modified throughout life in its genotypical configuration or pattern, would then become what James called *habit*, a reactional system or groove almost predetermined in its functioning.

We behave in accordance with the decision of our instincts. It could almost be said that we live our instincts. Cuatrecasas says, "mental synthesis is an act of complex integration that also possesses elements which are not analyzable." Is not conduct perhaps the ultimate outcome of a conditioned reflex?

Acts which we call voluntary are so only because it is we who do or do not give the final order for their execution. It is equivalent to

saying that the commander of a platoon voluntarily gives the order to shoot. "Human freedom of action of which man has become so proud is," according to *Spinoza*, "nothing more than the awareness of his own will and the ignorance of the causes which determine it."

In 1809 *Lamarck* already declared that "in reality the will is never free. Reason is nothing more than a greater degree of development and of comparison of judgments." If for some minds who are addicted to formulae, this concept may seem sweeping, for others it would not. Although this may disturb our equanimity a little, it need not deter us from the task of improving on these basic inherent elements, with the object of enhancing their usefulness in order to eliminate their unwarranted blocking so as to direct them into more useful compensatory channels when the successful completion of their action is deflected or serves no useful purpose. It makes no difference to the transformed psycho-organism whether we consider instinct as not inborn but rather acquired hereditarily after having been converted into fixed habit over innumerable generations, as *Lamarck* himself considers it, or whether as others would have it, instinct became habit as a result of conscious acts which later became stereotyped. It is a fact that instinctive dynamics exist which make possible the perfecting of human conduct, and in that lies the value of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalytically, therefore, the behavior of man depends more on the unconscious than on the conscious life. Instinct—although fundamentally we can only speak of modified instinct—can be likened to the hidden puppeteer pulling the wires of the puppets which act on the stage as though they wished to perform in one way or another. This psychic activity may tolerate the influx of the subconscious wishes and the wishes blocked by the higher utilitarian censorship or ideal, feelings which dare not be expressed and those which are contrary to our unconscious instinctive self, the *Id*; all of which we could not or would not bring to consciousness. In a word, this psychic activity would be the purely instinctual and hereditary life with its own experience to lend fervor and motivation, dynamism and directive force. Then, as its final outcome, action results, our conduct good or bad, according to its capitulation to or mastery of the weakness of the conscious ego. We see that this genetic theory separates us definitely from any idea as to freedom of the will with its implication of moral responsibility, and takes us toward determinism from which concept we also deviate a little because in such psychological and dynamic determinism, there is less room

for fatality. In this interpretation, there is hope for the value and effectiveness of education in the larger sense.

Even if everybody maintains—as does *Le Dantec*—that instinctively we should be egoists, still the friendly instincts of the Ego come first and there is also the instinct of collaboration and association which must necessarily be capable of perfection if we wish to make something better and truly great of humanity.

“The delinquent as a whole must be psychoanalyzed. Thus, in certain cases, we would be able to explain crimes, transgressions of the law and anti-social reactions which would otherwise be incomprehensible,” says *Ruiz Maya*.

Genil Perrin, in his controversial but extremely valuable work much under fire by the psychoanalysts, at the 17th Congress of Legal Medicine of the French-speaking Peoples, states: “Let us remember that when psychoanalysis can recover its faith in the power of education as properly within its orbit, we shall have set foot on the true domains of psychoanalysis.” He then adds, “All tactics for combating crime follow this principle: first prophylaxis; then therapeutics.”

In order better to remember and fix these basic concepts in our minds even though I assume that they are already well understood by my readers, let us recall with *Freud* that “the mental and organic power of a desire when its repression has broken down is much greater while it is still unconscious than when it has become conscious, so that with its elevation to consciousness its psychosomatic power only becomes weaker. The unconscious wish cannot be influenced, and endures independently of all circumstances, whilst the conscious wish is curbed by all that is equally conscious and contradictory to it. The psychoanalytic task thus enters into the situation as an advantageous substitute for the destroyed repression and in the service of the higher and more valuable aspirations of civilization.”

Now let us, as briefly as possible, say something about the motivations of anti-social and criminal behavior. It will be better to eliminate from our discussion all reference to the psychoses. Let us agree with *Claude*, that psychoanalysis has pre-eminent importance as applied to so-called crimes of passion—more precisely *affective* crimes. It can be best applied in the understanding of the instinctively perverse. (Under this heading we will record the category of the moral imbecile of *Pritchard*, the degenerate with instinctive perversions, the congenital case

and those who have developed perverse tendency through certain illnesses, particularly encephalitis.) Psychoanalysis is also of importance in the treatment of those criminals suffering from impulsive obsessions, those with affective conflicts or sexual conflicts and those so-called normal subjects who commit occasional crimes with apparently cryptic motivation.

Above all we might say that, in general, there is postulated here a predominantly exogenous criminological theory, crime being considered a phenomenon of social non-adaptation. That non-adaptation can depend in great part on the failure to realize normally the evolution of the distinct developmental stages that man passes through. Sometimes, *introjection*, the basic mode of the Superego, fails to mature or is never realized in a fixed paternal image, to be incorporated and identified with the Ego—(vide Mira López). That image of the father representing perfection, authority, and sexual realization in the Oedipus Complex, gives social value to repression. At times, certain crimes result from displacement of the parricide tendency and have symbolic significance. The child, for the same reason, is an asocial creature, a potential criminal. (Here Freud agrees with Lombroso though he deviates from Rousseau.) As long as he has not satisfied the instinctive mandates, he is a maladjusted being, a dangerous person. His maladjustment becomes less and less as he proceeds to satisfy his instinctual urgencies in well-recognized stages of development. In such defect, his education could be aided by psychoanalysis which, at an early stage, would orient the loose instinctive forces towards a sense of genuine social usefulness.

The Oedipus Complex. The Oedipus Complex is perhaps the very basis of our concept of crime. The archaic tendency in the male would be to eliminate the father in order to possess the female (the mother) and inherit the power of the father, as represented by the leadership of the tribe, clan, or family. As long as this complex is not resolved, there remains the greatest danger as already stated. Freud says, "Each individual, on arriving into the world, is confronted with the mission of resolving the Oedipus Complex." He adds, "I have no objection to affirming that men always have had a consciousness that they possessed a primitive father and that they had put him to death." That feeling of inherited guilt, which becomes real and seeks punishment, appears to be one of the most important motivations in crime, especially as introjection does not complete the cycle. According to Freud it would be the antecedent and creator of the offense.

Specific guilt feeling, which is subconscious, becomes fixated and, dependent on other social and physical circumstances such as constitution, psychosomatic equilibrium, etc., would or would not lead to crisis. It could objectify the latent offense or nurture it in the depths of the unconscious, as a constantly present difficulty. There is something which impresses itself upon us in many ways, namely, what Bela Szeke-ly and others drew attention to, the infantility of the criminal. The child, as we have already seen, is an asocial little animal, a potential criminal. The adult criminal succeeds in remaining a child through his psychic incompleteness precisely because he has not outgrown the primitive erotic stages. The castration complex and consciousness of guilt, plus masochistic persistence with "all the passive attitudes with respect to the erotic life and the sexual object" (Freud), would signify inverted sadism and from the sexual point of view, would signify auto-eroticism and feminine passivity. Almost always there is an *ambivalent situation* of sadomasochism with one or the other predominant. In this way are determined types of crime such as homicide and suicide, equivocal crimes, homicide out of love or out of love converted into hate, also cruelties and bloody sexual crimes, etc. The feeling of self-accusation seeks punishment. We might mention certain melancholy individuals who *create* for themselves a delinquent animus to secure deserved punishment. So many times these unfortunates end by killing themselves, thereby rationalizing their guilt and punishing self in a single act.

Even when the stages from sadism to masochism have been weathered, there remain opportunities for flight, the dream, neurosis or certain manifestations in psychosis, through which repressed criminality makes its escape. We assert, anti-social types result according to the degree of prolongation of oral or anal stages of development.

Sphincter morality as used by Ferenczi may be the origin of all ethics. When we have mastered the sphincters, the corresponding instinctive tendencies are dominated, and there results the internal inhibition necessary to assert the *fiat of the will*. The really difficult periods would be that between 4 and 6 years and also the period of adolescence. Alexander and Staub say, "The development of the law-abiding individual and that of the criminal are parallel up to this time." They add that while the criminal transforms his socially maladjusted instincts into anti-social actions comparable to the child's if he were capable of them, "By contrast, the ordinary person has conventional escapes for his repressed criminality such as dreams, phantasies, and neurotic symptoms.

Besides there are some transitory forms of satisfaction, distinctly less innocent, such as the duel, boxing matches, bull fights, wrestling matches, and lastly the unchaining of latent criminality in the name of patriotism which constitutes aggressive war." As further examples, I would add all other forms of power and cruelty such as a certain type of administration, certain police methods, a certain type of magistracy and, above all the dictator's way of exercising power which is a true manifestation of undeveloped libido or, better, an affirmation of perverted libido. In fact, Lombroso goes even further. He would make no further distinction between the criminal and the non-criminal than on the question of mastery of instinct in its crude criminal strength. He who masters or deflects his instincts, will not turn to crime or perversion. If his nervous system permits, he will sublimate, if not, neurosis will overtake the nervous system and beneath the neurosis, the old and primitive motivation will sprout again, establish itself and flourish. Fear of punishment and hope of reward, are perhaps, the most important and strongest incentives in the subjection and fixation of the Superego, but as has already been said, the principle of pain and pleasure is inherent in instinct, represented by these other two. On such accommodation between conscious Ego (formed by the instinctive tendencies and the inhibitive requirements of the Superego) and the Superego depends stable equilibrium and conduct adequate to social necessity. The psychological tension theory of Janet has to do with this concept. When conscious dissociation occurs, there results either crime or neurosis. The pieces have entered into a bargain with themselves and each partner goes in the direction of its own interests.

The classical dichotomy, good and evil, altruistic and egoistic, normal and criminal, is not always self-existent in nature. According to Alexander and Staub, "Reality never presents these problematic extremes but rather intermediate graduations of them. The majority of our civilization belong to these middle grades in which the personality does not present a homogeneous unity but instead a compromise between the primeval part and the civilized part of the mental apparatus."

And that, gentlemen, is what we are witnessing in the great laboratory of the world in which two antithetical tendencies are in constant interaction: on the one side, the instinctive primordial *Id*, full of drives; opposing it, the vigilant and repressive Superego, the overseer, representing the spiritual matrices of perfection. But that does not console us in the terrible hour of damning evidence. Only our courage is renewed

that way. If "the feeling of guilt has not been developed as a *consequence* of the committed crime, but rather the crime has been realized as a consequence of the instinct of guilt," then it could all be explained and set aright.

RESPONSIBILITY AND CULPABILITY

The problem under consideration is a weighty and extensive one and it is not possible to touch on an additional topic, at the present time, except to outline it, because of the character of this contribution and the necessity to be as clear and precise as possible and to limit myself to the psychoanalytic concept.

In general, we have the following resultants of the spiritual activity of the individual (comprising and including all that we call moral):

(a) *Moral Culpability*—could be treated here as a relationship between the act and its perpetrator. In a word, it is a quality of all action to be attributed to some determinate agent. In reality, it would be a *property* of the action itself.

(b) *Responsibility*, on the other hand is considered the inalienable attribute of the agent, since he is definitely identified with the results of his action freely undertaken, desired and executed. An action can be imputed to an agent, we might say fastened on to him, but that gives us no reason to hold the agent responsible, since it is also necessary to prove the act to have been executed in a conscious and deliberate manner. The freedom of the will of the classical school implied moral responsibility and moral culpability. The jurist of the classical school, Francisco Carrara, would say he is not concerned with such philosophic questions. He would accept the established doctrine of freedom of the will and of moral imputableness of man and likewise the science of criminality built on such basis.

But, new speculations, at least in theory, have modified these concepts and their philosophical basis, such as the determinism of the new positivistic school which substitutes the criterion of social responsibility for that of moral responsibility. Man is pre-destined by anthropological, social, and physical causes to violate the law and by the very act of living in society, is a harmful creature or, still better, a dangerous being—responsible to the law but only as part of a greater social responsibility. He ought not to answer for the consequences of his action as a moral

whole but rather as a member of society. Von Liszt also takes exception to the concept of freedom of the will and, in his search for the proper methods of dealing with crime after it is committed, advocates criminal prophylaxis and therefore seeks for the deeper motivations of that crime. Von Liszt states that criminal police methods are "a systematic mass of principles, based on scientific investigation of the causes of crime and the efficacy of punishment, by which the State has to undertake the fight against crime by means of punishment and similar institutions." But Jiménez de Asua simultaneously supports the concept of imputableness and the modern concept of the *dangerous potentiality* of man. An interesting item for our discussion is his teleological concept of punishment which makes it possible for this pragmatic school to fit in with psychoanalysis in its effective struggle against crime. The idea of responsibility from the *psychological* point of view is the central core of the psychoanalytical school of thought and thereby differs from the positivistic in that it does not accept an anthropological, physical, or social determinism but rather a *purely psychological determinism*. Alexander and Staub express this by saying, "We will avoid the traditional confusion on this question, of the philosophico-religious problems of freedom of the will in order the better to grasp the meaning of responsibility from a purely psychological perspective." The same authors state, "The psychoanalytic conception considers the mental apparatus of man as a system which is completely determined by psychological and biological causes. From this point of view, the philosophico-religious concept of freedom of the will loses its cogency."

As we already know fully by virtue of our familiarity with various schools from the positivistic to the psychoanalytic, the motivation for human action is complex. Our freedom of choice is, in reality, nothing more than freedom of realization of our instincts, because the choice of path is not conditioned as the classical authors believed, but rather comes as the result of the compromise between two components, good and evil, for which we substitute conscious and unconscious motivation.

As we have already shown and as is now generally accepted, the determination of human action involves the integration of three psychological systems (shall we call them strata?) that of the Id, the Ego, and the Superego.

Which of these is held responsible for transgressions of the law from the jurist's point of view? It is the Ego, of course, which is held responsible.

If the conscious Ego contains within itself the elements for transforming the instincts and adapting their reactions to the necessities of the social milieu, it restrains them through the threat of efficient and inevitable punishment. For these instincts cannot be educated in any other way.

Alexander and Staub offer a facile analogy. The Superego corresponds to the Minister of Government—among us the Minister of Interior—which holds the Ego responsible—the chief of police—for any urban traffic violation. "In the same sense does the Ego govern all our conduct."

Freud would also want us to be responsible for our subconscious to the end that its relations with the conscious Ego should remain normal. In other words we should have a constant awareness of our unconscious.

"The empirical concept of responsibility is therefore replaced," say these authors, "by the purely *scientific* concept of the degree and quality of *participation* of the *Ego in the act*. In our treatment of the delinquent, it is imperative that the proportion and mode of participation of the conscious Ego in the act of delinquency be ascertained. A person should be held responsible according to the degree in which his conscious Ego aided and abetted in his crime. This implies the possibility of achieving a perfected technique of punishment by virtue of warnings and threats for the future directed to the conscious Ego in proportion to the degree to which it has influenced conduct."

If we take into consideration the present complex peno-correctional system utilizing rather teleological psychiatric criteria, in the immediate future, we will be concerned neither with the discussion of nor the use of the terms—responsible criminals, irresponsible criminals and semi-responsible criminals, but will be concerned instead with the more humane scientific concepts and terms—*tractable* cases, *intractable* cases and *semi-tractable* cases.

In this system of treatment, there will be substituted for the repressive machinery of the present system, medical psychiatrists, neuro-endocrinologists and even psychoanalysts.

THE CRIMINAL COMPLEX IN AN HONEST MAN

(Case Study)

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I. INTRODUCTION

In two earlier articles, "Neuroses and Crime"⁽¹⁾ and "The Criminal Complex in Compulsion Neuroses"⁽²⁾ I discussed, mainly from a theoretical viewpoint, the criminal complex in neuroses, its frequent underestimation, the fact that it often occupies the central position in the neurotic structure and, in many cases, shows a close relationship to the so-called current conflict. In the following pages, based on a case observation, I hope to give a practical illustration of some of the aspects of this question.

May I now introduce the patient, Fred P., 40, of Nordic ancestry, manager of a small-town bank. In his first session he handed over a piece of paper on which he had jotted the following list of complaints: "Unable to meet new people without terrible struggle; fear of any new person coming into office; fear of telephone calls; desire to run home. For the last ten years or so have lived a very restricted life, dodging people, having trouble leaving home. Many anxiety sweats. Climax seemed to be reached when the war was declared. Fear that air-raids would keep me from coming home. Find it difficult to stick it out in the office. Soon everyone will find out. At times I can hardly walk, feel dizzy. Can not eat away from home. Hands and feet continuously sweating. Great resistance to go to see Dr. G. A few days ago wife called on telephone and I almost collapsed—could hardly make home—wanted to ask policeman to take me to R--- (local mental institution). Unable to work . . . feeling hopeless."

(1) *Neuroses and Crime*, *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*, 2:444-454, April 1941.

(2) *Criminal Complex in Compulsion Neuroses*, *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*, 3:253-271, October, 1941.

He said that two automobile accidents in which he had been injured, one occurring when he was twenty-four, and the other when he was twenty-five, brought on his illness. His symptoms at the time became so serious that he consulted a psychiatrist who treated him with apparently good effect.

II. CASE HISTORY

Superiors and Inferiors

His earliest recollection bears on the ardent hero-worship he had for his ancestors. At the age of three he had seen his father, a stern, puritanical man, humbling himself in tears before old family portraits. Though in actuality his ancestors had been people of modest station, small-town artisans, farmers with a few acres, proprietors of little corner grocery stores, the patient, visualizing them from the proudly-spoken words of his father, thought of them as mighty supermen and saga-like heroes. He was eager to fulfill his father's desire that he emulate them. And, as he was a scrawney child frequently taunted by playmates, he felt a need for the personal support which the thought of his "powerful" forebearers gave him.

However, most members of his family seemed to take advantage of his weakness. He became the errand boy of the house, and even his brothers-in-law treated him disrespectfully. When he was twelve, he said to a brother-in-law: "Someday I'll pay you back." His father forced him to do many things against his will. For one thing he had to take a regular walk each day "for good health." Everything his family told him to do seemed to be advanced in the spirit of *must*. He felt that he was being treated unjustly, deplored his puny build and helplessness which prevented him from effectively resisting all the imperatives. Hence early in life he became a hater who was often afflicted with spells of jealousy and rage. Many of the sweating spells from which he suffered in later years proved to be expressions of rage rather than of fear. And the idea that he might go berserk and in blind rage destroy his adversaries was contained in many of the anxieties in his adult life.

When Fred was seventeen his father died, but four years passed before the young man, who was now twenty-one, learned of the stipulation in his father's will that the considerable estate should be divided

evenly among the children after the mother's death. He recalls thinking at the time of the injustice this clause would cause, since "outsiders," that is, the brothers-in-law, would benefit from the estate.

Once when Fred was seven he was asked to accompany his parents on a visit to some relatives. He thought the people would be uninteresting and the trip without fun, so he refused to go. His parents were insistent. The boy then grabbed a knife and threatened to kill himself if they tried to force him to go along. This was the first instance we ascertained of an explosive aggression turned against the patient's own ego. Later this masochistic mechanism obtained a dominant place in his neurosis.

His mother, through all the years she was with him, insisted on treating him as a baby. She bathed and washed him until he was well along in his school years. While washing his penis she indulged in particularly elaborate ceremonials. He distinctly recalls the feeling of deep regret which troubled him when she ceased this pleasurable practice about the time he was eleven.

At seven he slept with his sister Hilda, and while in bed the pair engaged in games of thinly-veiled sexual character. The rather strong fixation he developed towards this sister was manifested in his sixteenth year, shortly after her marriage, for at this time he began to masturbate and continued doing so sporadically until he was twenty-one.

He was circumcised at the age of three, and this act imbedded itself in his memory as the first case where adults had overpowered him, taken advantage of his helplessness. Later he was unable to tolerate anything which in any way might mean that someone was taking advantage of him (castration complex). A person who bothered him unduly about some detail connected with the bank's business, a loquacious neighbor, a circumstantial barber,—anyone who "pinned him down," caused him to express resentment and often to release hate reactions.

Likewise the idea of having to be host to anyone (especially to members of his family) filled him with apprehension and anticipations of unpleasantness. Thus he unconsciously reproduced the traumatic childhood situation in which he was overpowered, and he augmented it with strong reactions of defense and resentment which were absent during the original scene.

While he was attending college he heard that circumcision was a customary practice among Jews. He had been brought up as a Protes-

tant, but now he feared that he might be taken for a Jew and suffer discrimination in social life. One of the reasons he abstained from sport activities was his dread of being exposed to the eyes of other athletes while he would be in the shower room.

Money

Fred's father was a hard-working man who spent all his life preparing for a comfortable old age. He believed that a man had to "kill himself" toiling while young so as to be able to retire in later years and to enjoy the fruits of his work. In reality he just killed himself working and never had the chance to enjoy the leisure for which he had prepared. From his father Fred got the idea of long-range planning. He never enjoyed the weekly allowance he received from his father every Saturday because the father persuaded the boy to put the money in a piggy bank and to keep it there for a "rainy day." Thus money lost its value as a means of satisfying immediate desires and was used symbolically for building dream castles. The patient reported in analysis how much he hated his father for depriving him in this way of the little pleasures of childhood.

The father accumulated a large sum. Mother was left in charge of the estate after he passed away. However, as she was without experience in handling money she entrusted the financial transactions to Fred who was very well versed in banking procedure. The money was invested in bonds, stocks and securities, and it was Fred's duty to operate with the estate and to protect it.

Upon receiving power of attorney to deal with the money, he was tremendously tempted to use it for personal business transactions. He was particularly tempted at times when stocks were firm and speculation seemed promising. However, he usually succeeded in mastering his desire.

His mother, who had never before been permitted to participate in the family's business affairs, found herself a wealthy and influential woman after her husband's death. Being a dominating type and fully aware of the added power the money gave her, she began to consider her family as a group of dependents whom she could control by offering to them or withholding from them monetary advantages.

Her children felt this dependence painfully. In our patient's mind fantasies and dreams appeared in which he visualized his mother's death

and his becoming free. However, in reality he was afraid to hurt his mother and to lose her good will.

Florence

His attitude towards his mother and his sister Hilda was distinctly bipolar. On the one hand he felt his fixation upon them. On the other hand he wanted to free himself from this infantile dependence at any cost, even if he had to destroy his love objects. For he had not yet overcome the struggle against masturbation which had seriously disturbed his adolescent days. He was now a handsome six-footer, but so shy and self-conscious in the presence of women that his contacts with the female sex were rare.

His inability to be free around girls depressed him, as he persistently craved sexual contact. His mother, a dominating person, supervised him so closely that even if he had been able to carry on normally with girls, she would have prevented him from finding time and opportunity to establish friendships. He had heard that in Europe men find it easier to win the attention of girls, so he was enthusiastic when his mother told him that she planned to take him with her on a voyage to Europe. He was now twenty-four, and, at last, he felt, his chance had come. But the trip was a disappointment. His mother clung constantly to his side. He returned with his depression intensified by the distinct feeling that his mother fixation was responsible for many of his difficulties.

He soon took a position as lifeguard at a seashore summer resort. He had a clearly complex-tainted love for the water and for swimming, derived from the pleasantly dramatized bathing experiences his mother had provided. In his neurosis he often reconstructed these scenes when, bathed in perspiration, he was craving for a loving hand to wipe his body dry.

His mother was also fond of the sea, and owned a beach cottage which they occupied during the warm season. Fred always felt healthiest while beside the ocean, and often his fantasies, including those of sexual situations, had seaside locales. *To rescue a drowning woman* was his most recurrent and favorite day-dream. The seashore was where he met his few female friends, and foremost among these was Florence whom he called "The Lady from the Sea."

The full bearing of his relationship with Florence remained obscure almost to the end of the treatment. This first—and last—great pre-marital

love experience proved to be a pivotal point of his life, and yet, in the course of his talks with psychiatrists, he mentioned it only casually. It was the appearance of Florence in his dreams which finally led to the analytical exploration of the problems connected with her.

The girl, a gay and frolicsome beach beauty, dazed Fred with happiness by giving him her attention. As he had been for many years ready to fall in love at the slightest incentive, he now was firmly convinced that the girl was in love with him. Although she was constantly surrounded by other young men and caused him to suffer the torment of jealousy, Fred began to assert himself.

However, from the very onset, the affair did not develop smoothly. In the course of time the girl's coquettish manner became sharply irritating to Fred. He felt that he could not continue this relationship. Sometimes he drank when he was particularly perturbed by her. At a late stage of the treatment he pointed out that he had his first automobile accident when he was driving while intoxicated because of his brooding over Florence. A few months later, in a restaurant, he had his first anxiety spell.

A closer study showed that this spell was an exaggerated copy of a state of nervousness he had once experienced when he was riding in a train to meet Florence. It was to be an important rendezvous that would decide the fate of their relationship. A restaurant was selected as the meeting place. As the train raced towards the destination, Fred sat tensely, heart pounding, and perspiration oozing so copiously that despite his all-important main object he was embarrassed by the presence of his fellow passengers. Suddenly the train stopped between stations, on the open road, and for a moment he was sure that "something had happened." The train experience apparently disappeared very soon, but later it was utilized as a pattern for his panic states.

As the first anxiety spell had ensued in a restaurant, it soon became impossible for Fred to dine in public. Not fear of panic, but fear of the thought (Florence) that might bring on panic was later the cause of his neurotic attitude toward restaurants. Even at home his dining became an ordeal of perspiration, nervousness, and anxiety. As the perspiration was an outward manifestation of his inner, tabooed cravings, it became increasingly embarrassing.

In this mood and in the face of these difficulties he underwent his first psychiatric treatment. As a result of this treatment, Fred, who,

because of his neurosis, up to that time had been unable to engage in any occupation, took employment in various lines and proved himself honest, industrious and capable. At the age of twenty-nine he received a letter from Florence in which she complained how unhappy she was in her marriage. She implored him to be her "life saver" and to rescue her from her matrimonial misery. Fred, who at that time was under the supervision of his analyst, recognized the selfish character of this request; with this in mind, and owing to the fact that he had already met the girl he was to marry, he explained to Florence that he was not in a position to comply with her request.

He accepted a job in the bank a short time later, and is at present a quite successful manager. Year after year he worked steadily, trying to fight off his remaining neurotic symptoms. It was not until 1941 that he came under my observation.

His wife was devoted and understanding, and through her constant love helped him neutralize a part of his neurotic hatred reactions. At the same time, however, she involuntarily increased his inner conflicts because her devotion made it hard for him to indulge in ideas of adultery. Thus her love for him fanned his feeling of guilt and his need for self-punishment.

The strength of his cravings for Florence was derived from the necessity of replacing his mother-and-sister fixation. In analysis it came out that Florence showed a remarkable resemblance to Hilda. Thus her person was very suitable as a symbol of the tabooed incestuous object.

In one dream he saw himself preparing for intercourse with Florence. He felt nervous because he knew that her sister, Polly, was outside and wanted to come in.

Polly, as Florence's sister, represents through displacement and condensation the patient's own sister Hilda. The thought of his own sister threatens to enter his mind (enter the room) while he is longing for Florence.

In some of his dreams *he had affairs with Polly* (who was not actually attractive to him). The following dream brings interesting details with regard to the above-mentioned complex. It runs as follows: *"On a train. I notice Polly on the seat in front of me. I do not know whether to say hello to her, but just before we reach the station I go,*

over to her and she is surprised. It seems that she has married a Jew, but his name is Quinn—that is a very unusual name for a Jew. Now I seem to be in a bedroom with Polly. Her husband comes in and seems to be annoyed to see me there."

Fear of riding trains takes an important place among the patient's symptoms. All train rides remind him of the anxiety experience he had while en route on a train to meet Florence. In addition to that, fantasies later appeared which dealt with the idea of escaping to foreign countries (criminal root).

In the above dream he meets Polly-Florence in the train. In this way he fulfills an old wishdream; for the patient has been fostering the idea of meeting Florence while in a train. The dream describes his undecidedness as to how he should behave in such a case. Florence did not marry a Jew as the dream maintains; however, the patient's sister Hilda married a half-Jew, a fact which was particularly consternating to the patient, who, himself, as was pointed out above, had a Jew complex because of his circumcision. The last passage in which the dreamer sees himself in the woman's bedroom and the remark that her husband seemed annoyed by him are self-explanatory. Presenting Florence's husband as a Jew is designed to decrease the value of her marriage and to raise the possibility of her turning her affection to him, a personification of male Nordic beauty. In this way he tries belatedly to revoke his decision not to marry Florence.

While his conscious thought apparently was not concerned with Florence at all, many of his dreams reproduced every-day scenes in which life with Florence was portrayed: speaking to her mother, a scene in a market place, and the like.

Life Plan

One of the outstanding features of this case was the patient's inability to wait. He was impatient, restless, easily annoyed by delays. This symptom also had a close connection with his criminal day-dreaming. Fred had the fantasy that as he was the youngest in the family he would outlive and outwait the other members of the family and thus have the estate for himself. The idea of outwaiting others played a great part in his life. It applied to Florence. He confessed that when Florence appealed to him for help in her unhappy marriage, he refused to marry her because she had lived with someone else. And yet almost

simultaneously he had the idea that he would be united with her after her husband's death. He actually did marry a widow.

He also wanted to outwait his brothers-in-law whose death he wished and expected. He hated them, and his mind was full of wish-dreams dealing with their death through all manner of catastrophes.

One type of dream contained the wish for the death of all his relatives except his mother. He fancied that *his whole family died and he lived with his mother, enjoying an income without working, and enjoying incestuous relations with her.* In his unconscious, "mother" and "estate" fused into a symbol of coveted possession.

His waiting for the death of people manifested itself also in his abnormal interest in obituaries. He studied the newspapers very eagerly. "Who is it this time?" was his impatient query. He hoped to find a few names of relatives and even those of his psychiatrists.

Gradually we were able to reconstruct the patient's secret neurotic plan. It was his idea to avail himself of the family's money and to escape with Florence to a foreign country where he would live an independent life. It became clear that Florence was occupying the patient's unconscious almost uninterruptedly, and that thoughts of her and of the intended crime were causing a split in his thinking process, bringing on absent-mindedness, anxiety and depression; for, in reality, he was a married man, an honest employee, a dutiful son, determined to maintain his social position and his peaceful home life.

The next dream illuminates this problem. *"I am at my present home in the dining room. It seems that I have a problem: I am engaged to Florence and find that Dotty N. loves me. How can I be engaged to two at one time? Two rings? — Then I think that perhaps my ring will not keep Florence from having dates with other men. But it will surely keep her from giving herself to other men. There are two red roses and I arrange them on two candelabras so that they give the appearance of a crucifix."*

In this dream he expresses his deepest feelings for Florence. His life is split because of the coexistence of two emotional allegiances. One for his wife, and one for Florence. The fact that in the dream he sees himself engaged proves that he annuls the reality of his marriage. Of importance is the ring. Both in reality and in the dream it represents a symbol of a sacred bond. Although in the dream Fred is rather liberal

as far as Florence's conduct is concerned, we see that he expects her to remain sexually faithful to him. He continues to be spiritually faithful to her. He suffers from frustration and from his sinful longing for her. His neurosis is the crucifix on which he nails himself because of his double allegiance (two women—two rings—two roses).

Fred's fantasies of getting hold of the family's estate, leaving town with Florence and starting a new life under an assumed name, were responsible for a number of neurotic reactions. His superego made him renounce all three intentions. He had inhibitions in handling the estate and was often unable to go to his office. He suffered from states of anxiety, and developed a paralysis-like numbness in his legs when he walked towards the bank. But he succeeded in maintaining an air of anonymity and in withdrawing from public life. He dreaded to be confronted by members of the draft board as they would ask him personal questions. He hated to drink alcohol to excess because he feared he might become too talkative. He was unable to stay in crowded places, disliked mentioning his name to anyone or having his name called in public; he dreaded the idea of being invited to participate in a radio quiz or of being interviewed on the street by radio or newspaper reporters. In his daydreams traveling played a prominent part. Yet in reality, he was unable to travel because of the accompanying anxiety states. He was forced to stay at home. We mentioned before that he was frightened whenever new people entered his office. But he also hated to meet neighbors or friends on a street or elsewhere. He dreaded being spoken to, being tapped on the shoulder, or having to answer casual conversational questions. He reacted in such instances with flurries of perspiration. He was convinced that people noticed his flustered state, and he once brought me a clipping from a newspaper comic page portraying a man in a condition of embarrassment, drops of perspiration flying in all directions from his face. This, he said, was like a picture of himself. He began to sweat whenever he faced a new person, for, as was indicated in his dreams, he suspected that everyone he met was a detective. We observed that in his neurotic behaviour he not only committed crimes but also acted as though he were a fugitive from justice.

Of course, if one could read his unconscious, his perspiration would give him away. It was as if by means of perspiration he was proclaiming his guilt, confessing his crime, and suffering his punishment.

It was typical for our patient that he considered endurance as the paramount masculine virtue. Christ, Gandhi, any man who was able to

suppress pain while being tortured—these were his ideals. It was not difficult to discover here the patient's masochistic component which manifested itself as a glorification of the victim who achieved a moral victory over his oppressor. As was shown by Stekel,⁽¹⁾ the masochistic fantasy has a "silent" part, an act that is played behind drawn curtains; and in this act the masochist discharges his dammed up aggression.⁽²⁾ Endurance of pain secures the patient's moral victory over his opponent, and at the same time it justifies his intended anti-social act.

Fred found himself frequently day-dreaming of defending himself against fictitious accusations, such as the charge of being a draft-dodger, an embezzler, and so on. Of course, the patient's super-ego played its part here. The alleged accusations were projections of his feelings of guilt. In his fantasy by constantly repeating the accusations and vigorously defending his honor he succeeded not only in deriving masochistic pleasure from the alleged ill-treatment but also in rationalizing and then discharging a part of his accumulated hatred. This neurotic behaviour, slightly resembling paranoid reactions, was all the more interesting from the standpoint of psychodynamics as several cases of manifest paranoia were present in the patient's family.

When in his fantasies the charge of being a draft-dodger appeared, we found he feared being drafted. His brothers-in-law happened to be exempt and he visualized with horror the possibility of being killed in action and of his relatives taking possession of his father's money.

Fred's need for self-punishment was so great that it took him a long time before he was able to visualize life without symptoms and without neurosis.

In his neurosis he was able to carry out symbolically what criminals carry out in reality. His unconscious life plan rejected the idea of hard and honest work. He wanted to retire some day; but the thought of accumulating money by thrift and self-deprivation was connected with the annoying realization that his father "killed himself" by accumulating money which he was never able to enjoy, and that he himself was deprived of the little pleasures of his childhood by his father's insistence on saving the weekly allowance. The patient's idea of a short-cut to

(1) "Sadism and Masochism," Liveright, New York, 1929.

(2) Recently Reik emphasized that in masochism the aggression is anteposed and discharged on the patient's own terms, as it were, that is, in an attenuated form. ("Masochism in Modern Man," Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1941).

prosperity thus seemed very attractive. Therefore he envied everyone who was leading a life of "leisure." In his office there was a co-worker, Lewis, who, though he had inherited a large sum of money, continued to work at the bank. Fred felt an uncontrollable hatred toward Lewis and tried to make the job as unpleasant as possible for him.

To him money meant power. His adolescent years, and particularly the time after his father's death, seemed to verify his conviction that to be wealthy was to be powerful. Because of his Jew complex he disregarded the possibility of obtaining influence in any other way than by economic means. Although he wanted to get wealthy the easy way, his neurosis rendered him unable to forego the principle of working "by the sweat of his brow."

His considerable expenses for medical treatment acted as a steady drain on his financial resources. Notwithstanding this, it is truly remarkable how persistently and enthusiastically he carried out his prolonged treatments and met every financial obligation punctiliously.

III. DISCUSSION

At the present time a general tendency prevails among analysts to consider the manifest criminal as a neurotic (Karpman,⁽¹⁾ Alexander⁽²⁾ et al.) On the other hand, the disposition to criminality is recognized as congenital. Thirty years ago Stekel augmented Freud's statement that the child is endowed with a "polymorphous perversion" by saying that it is also endowed with a "universal criminality." Stekel also repeatedly called the neurotic "a criminal without the courage to commit a crime."

Why didn't our patient carry out any of his criminal tendencies? We are used to thinking that the kind of society in which one lives contributes to the fate of anti-moral and anti-social tendencies. Our patient lived in a well-organized, morally well-supervised and protected society, among people who were drawing their ethical strength from idealized images of their ancestors. This was, I presume, the contribution of the family towards the establishment of Fred's strict and unrelenting super-ego and of barriers against any attempt on his part to discharge hatred by way of the motor apparatus. If—as in the knife incident when as a

(1) Ben Karpman: "Case Studies in the Psychopathology of Crime," Mental Science Publishing Co., 1935.

(2) Alexander and Staub: "The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public" Macmillan, 1931.

boy he threatened to kill himself—the tension grew intolerable, the aggression showed a tendency to be turned against the patient himself.

Fred developed spells of rage when he was forced to follow parental imperatives such as those regarding physical exercise. Later these primary manifestations of protest turned into a more steady undercurrent of hatred, and as time went by, they were rationalized, and received more and more a defensive character. However, Fred suffered an acute exacerbation of his criminal tendencies when his greed for his father's money concurred with his sexual frustration. His night-dreams offered a safety valve for these desires, while his day-dreams with their hallucinated aggressions offered an opportunity to discharge hatred in a more manifest way.

His anxiety was based upon fear lest his anti-moral and anti-social thoughts break through. The automobile accident was looked upon as a serious warning. It had shown Fred what might happen if one lost control of one's self. He thought constantly of the circumstances which had accompanied the accident, especially how the police car chased him while he drove at suicidal speed until his machine skidded on a curve and crashed into an embankment.

In analysis he confessed that he had been in a suicidal mood during the wild ride. A year later he was again deeply impressed with the thought that man lives close to death, for while riding in the car of a friend as a passenger he was in another accident. The car was far-exceeding the official speed limit. Transgressions, he felt, are followed by punishment. This corresponds to the pattern of his childhood days when his father had disciplined him for every transgression.

Analysis revealed that in the patient's mind the problem of Florence remained unsolved. We were able to observe a contrast between his real life and the attitude expressed in his fantasies. While he rejected the real Florence, he kept on craving for the Florence of his fantasy who, as we know, represented an early childhood love object. He annulled the rejection and behaved as if Florence were still inaccessible and he had to court her, conquer her, elope with her. By selecting Florence as his love object he displayed a characteristic behavior of a neurotic who wishes to escape his infantile fixations but goes about it in such a way that he finally arrives back at the starting point ("Circular flight reflex").

The sexual question was closely linked with the patient's criminal complex. He had an unconscious plan according to which his neurosis shaped his life. Not enough attention is paid by psychiatrists to this feature of neurosis. In our zest for discovering the *causality* in the psycho-dynamics of neurosis we often overlook the *finality*, the purposefulness of the patient's symptoms which reveals him as an actor in a drama; in that drama his main life conflicts are being displayed and solved in effigy. Fred played the part of a hunted man. He was constantly fleeing from something, and was able to enter public places only if he was sure that an avenue of escape was present. This means that in his fantasy he had already committed the crime. It may be recognized without difficulty that the "crime" from which the patient was running away (the destruction of his competitors and the acquisition of his family's estate) was over-determined, and that tendencies derived from the Oedipus situation found their expression in his neurotic behaviour. But this layer of his personality was entirely unconscious. It was in keeping with our experience that the criminal complex was closer to the patient's consciousness than the underlying sexual constellation. It was as if the generosity of the superego censorship was exhausted by the ascension to the consciousness of the patient's criminal desires so that his sexual cravings were forced to remain unconscious.

The patient's criminal impulses were to a high degree reactions of defiance towards the authoritarian system of his upbringing. At the same time they were expressions of his bipolar attitude towards his family; in destroying his family through the magic of his wishful thinking he hoped to liberate himself from the fixation to them. Sublimation of criminal ideas and over-compensation of guilt feelings were seen in the patient's activity as lifeguard on the seashore. He was employed to save the life of his fellowmen, but in fantasy he was frequently taking lives. This gave him a feeling of omnipotence, for he was as the Lord who "gave and—hath taken away."


SUMMARY

From an extensive analysis the author has selected and presented an abstract with the view of illustrating the specific points of this article.

A man whose moral integrity is beyond doubt was shown committing criminal acts in his fantasy. His neurosis, though it blocked the

way to an overt anti-social act, charged him with an overwhelming feeling of guilt. His symptoms received an additional psychological meaning in his involuntary copying of manifest criminal behaviour. In his every-day life he experienced the torment of a hunted man. His neurosis took over the expression of guilt, confession and self-condemnation.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF CRIME

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From the days when Diogenes and his flickering lamp were a familiar sight to the people of Athens, in his search for an honest man, the problems pertaining to honesty and crime have, and still do, baffle the minds of those who are interested. Criminologists and penologists, cynics and philosophers, jurists and psychiatrists, as well as others who are students of these interrelated subjects have been theorizing and discussing without a uniform conclusion. Yet, few have viewed the matter from the standpoint of the causes—fundamental and contributory—that have brought on the effects with which all of us are attempting to grapple.

Despite the fact that humanity has had at its disposal the utilization of ethical and religious principles inculcated into its unconscious mechanism from the period of Confucius down to Felix Adler, and in numerous schools of humanism, the instinctive forces, with their ramified impulses, still hold sway. Incompatibility and ego conflicts in marriage, triangles, jealousies, revenge, "the soup being cold," and the like, have been enough cause for some to commit second-degree murder. Even love affairs, when unrequited, have contributed their share toward maiming or slaying a beloved. Alcoholism, or the abuse of liquor, has brought about the hasty destruction of innocent lives for the minutest provocation. Hasty accusations regarding infidelity, quarrels while gambling, not paying a debt, insulting remarks, teasing, all have had their share in engendering hatred, mental aberrations, and the taking of human life.

Society's retaliation, motivated and sponsored by what may be termed "legal anger," has had its come-back by means of the rack, the whip, the fagot, the thumb-screw, starvation, filth, incarceration, humiliation, the dungeon, hard and exhausting labor, and numerous forms

of severe penalties and lengthy sentences. With what consequences? On the one hand, an ever-increasing list of potential and actual crimes being committed, with jails being over-crowded, and new ones being built as fast as appropriations can be secured. On the other hand, many who are turned out of the jails and penitentiaries are crushed in spirit, with weakened morale and will, and with indignant and retaliative mental attitudes.

Analogies regarding crime may be taken from war. It is universally conceded that war is horrifying and devastating in its nature and consequences. Gruesome and destructive as war is, certain beneficial social changes sometimes accrue to mankind as a result. However, the war of Crime on the part of Criminals against Society, is so unbeneficial to everyone concerned (including the criminal) that the tragic effects are vicious, tormenting and never-ending. Wars, as a rule, are fought in open combat, giving each combatant a chance to meet on the battlefield to fight it out. Such could not be said of the Criminal, who surreptitiously and relentlessly springs upon his prey in the dark without warning, or chance for defense or help. Crime not only has no ending, or point of termination, but is so steeped in the mire and debris of its own mephitic tentacles that it does not even think of an Armistice, thus promulgating and perpetuating the law of the Jungle. To be more exact, it is on an increase, its subterranean and treacherous machinations will resort to the most vile and cunning methods in order to accomplish its aims. Worse still, it will defile the sacred memories of the dead, shed the blood and tears of motherhood, destroy childhood, bribe officials and even exploit science and scientific acumen in its madness and sadistic campaigns to destroy. In a sense, it is Satan incarnate. The Crime of Crimes seems to be rooted in that civic listlessness or ethical coma amounting to the equivalent of what may be termed encephalitis lethargica or "mental sleeping sickness."

If we are to give credence to pessimistic conclusions that man is innately dishonest and point the finger of scorn at humanity's feeble efforts toward the Sun, then, of course, we might as well give up every hope, every search, and every effort toward humanizing humanity and civilizing civilization toward higher planes of evolvement. On the other hand, when we stop to think that man's climb from prehistoric periods up to the present time has been crowned with marvelous achievements, despite the elements themselves, in addition to the handicaps of ignorance, constant insecurity, and home patterns that have often been mentally, emo-

tionally and physically retarding, and sometimes devastating, man is not only to be congratulated upon his survival, but upon his dawning consciousness that he should be his brother's keeper, thus coordinating social usefulness and personal tranquillity.

To discuss Crime, the Criminal and Society adequately from the numerous standpoints that the probing mind can conceive would imply the writing of at least one volume. To discuss the numerous aspects of Crime from a psychiatric or psychologic standpoint alone would mean the writing of a treatise so all-embracing that it would be too exhaustive for the usual study and time allotted. Further, if to this thought should be added other subjects in an effort to inquire as to the how, why, where, when and wherefore of Crime, it would necessitate consulting the ramified knowledge of such subjects as anatomy, physiology, chemistry, biology, general psychology, domestic psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, neurology, genetics, logosophy, anthropology, phylogenesis, ontogenesis, philology, sociology, economics, law, medical jurisprudence or forensic medicine, and many others.

A CRIME QUESTIONNAIRE

What is crime? What is a criminal? What are the direct causes of crime? What are the indirect and contributory factors of crime? What is the relationship of the Criminal to Society, and Society to the Criminal? Do genetic or hereditary factors predispose toward crime? Is there such a thing as a born criminal? Does the procreative instinct play a role in the commissions of crime? What are the economic and sociologic aspects of crime? What are the psychologic and psychiatric factors in the production of Crime? As to the variety, nature and consequences of crime, how could they be classified? What is the effect of crime on heredity, reproduction and eugenics? What is the effect of crime on traffic hazards? When is Crime a cause and when an effect? When does Crime make for alcoholism and when does alcoholism make for crime? Is Capital Punishment on the part of the State a justifiable Crime, a civilized method of avenging the crime committed by a criminal, or what is it? To what extent are international narcotic intrigues, narcotic rings and peddling productive of crime? Could so-called hardened criminals be reformed? If so, when and how? If not, why not? Are hardened criminals mentally ill? Are hardened criminals ever the result of lengthy incarcerations, prison associations and prison discipline? Can the application of the principles of psychiatry, psychoanalysis and

domestic psychology prevent or cure criminal tendencies and crime itself? Does the present system of prison housing make for homosexuality? To what extent do unsegregated or distributive houses of ill fame produce crime? To what extent does unemployment during normal peacetimes make for crime? To what extent do occupational misfits and vocational unguidance make for deficiencies, maladjustment and disregard for authority? To what extent does self-indulgence and pampering a child during the early plastic years of children plant the seed of juvenile delinquency, misdemeanors and eventual major crimes or felonies? Does not juvenile delinquency imply parental delinquency? Would it not be a practical plan to establish reform schools for parents who have been derelict in their fundamental duties? Should not every couple contemplating marriage, particularly women, be required to have a practical, realistic knowledge of child psychology?

These are but a few of the many questions which present themselves in the scientific study and analysis of crime, with its numerous complexities and ramifications. Although the author has given many years to the study of this momentous, wide-spread problem from economic, biologic, psychologic, genetic and other standpoints, nevertheless the immensity of it is such as to preclude the possibilities of any one person adequately presenting a thesis commensurate with its importance. However, it is hoped that this humble crime questionnaire and dissertation will help to stimulate further thinking on the subject and hasten the bringing about of a social consciousness toward practical, corrective measures.

STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A.

At a national penological congress which convened in New York City only a few years ago, two of the most startling statistics submitted for study were the following:

- (1) A major crime is committed in the United States every 22 seconds.
- (2) Over 500,000 arrests are recorded annually.

B.

After a diligent research in the domain of statistics, in addition to other legal data, it seems reasonable that a conservative estimate as to

the cost of crime to society, is between twelve and fifteen billions of dollars annually. This includes the cost of apprehending the criminal, trials, including jury service, recordings, regular and special police service, transportation, incarceration, food, litigation, appeals, damage and destruction to property, loss of productive power, illness, board meetings, parole meetings, bookkeeping, and hundreds of other specified and unspecified items, which make up the colossal and staggering cost.

When one stops to do some comparative thinking, he cannot help but conclude that about three-fourths of this vast sum spent on crime is useless, insofar as productivity in the field of *prevention* is concerned. It becomes largely a case of "catering to the galleries" and resorting to the line of least resistance insofar as curative or rectifying agencies are concerned on a permanent basis.

C.

Dr. Paul E. Bowers, Medical Superintendent of the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals made a study of 100 prisoners, each of whom had been convicted not fewer than four times, and found that 45 of them were insane or feeble-minded, and in every instance the mental defectiveness bore a direct casual relation to their crimes. Although these figures are not of recent date, nevertheless the principles back of them are applicable now as they have been for the past three or four decades. These 45 defectives were tried, sentenced and punished as if they were absolutely and totally responsible for their actions. It has been estimated that these 45 defectives had had altogether 180 trials. It cost on an average of \$1,000 to convict a prisoner. Thus, at least \$180,000 was spent in getting those poor mental cripples into a prison, when they really should have gone to a hospital.

D.

Among the different groups of statistics before me as to the relationship of hereditary and acquired psychopathic diseases and mental derangements, one brief quotation typifies the gamut of statistics by saying that out of 34 cases, criminals of different degrees, seven had insane fathers; two had epileptic fathers; four had insane mothers; while the others had insanity in different branches of the family.

E.

About one-half of all court trials deal with criminal cases in one form or another. Despite the fact that such a large number of cases are

of a criminal nature, yet little, if any scientific and corrective attention is paid to the criminal, or to the real causes that make for crime. What is being done in the name of human welfare and the principles of law and order is to devote a great deal of time, effort and expense to the legal classification of crime, and to the numerous modes of punishments, which as a rule, have at best, little deterrent effect.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PREVENTIVES

1. Couples contemplating marriage and desiring a family, should, as a condition precedent to marriage, prove by certificate from a practicing physician that they are free from every form of venereal disease.

2. Every couple contemplating marriage, as condition precedent to marriage, should declare under oath that they are free from every form of recognizable mental disease, and that they have never been an inmate of any insane asylum or psychopathic hospital, or in any institution or hospital where mentally aberrated persons are treated. If they have been discharged as well from any aforementioned places, or have been paroled, such discharge statements should be made in the application to marry, with the certificate or parole attached. It shall then be the duty of the clerk in the marriage license bureau to immediately make a definite, systematic and comprehensive, as well as complete investigation, so that the truthfulness of the applicant's application shall be ascertained prior to the issuing of the final license.

3. If, instead of tyrannizing or brutalizing children into obeying promptly because "Father said so," or "Mother said so," they would learn to do what their parents suggest through the wand of love, reason and because it is right, it would tend toward developing greater respect for parents, elders, those in authority, and for justice and "fair play." Children should not be made weaklings by needless pampering or over-indulgence, when self-reliance and self-sufficiency should be the order of the day. Children should be reared by encouragement and meritorious praise when something is done that is good or worthy. Among the numerous psychological factors that parents should understand is that of dealing with growing children as though they were adults, rather than talking "at" them as though they were infants and *non compos mentis*. Children should be taught principles that are socially correct and conducive to adaptation and constant adjustment to their environment, which may seem to be at times hostile.

4. There are numerous environmental factors that make for crime. These may range from physiological disturbances during infancy and early childhood to those of bad companionship and undisciplined tempers. The usual disturbing agencies which make for criminal tendencies or crime, are: Abject poverty; the home pattern, especially one in which crime, gambling, alcoholism, tactless conversational haggling, swearing and cursing, pampering on the one hand and tyrannizing on the other is the customary routine; bad neighborhoods; insufficient recreational facilities, such as playgrounds and parks; lack of properly supervised play for children, including the pubescent and adolescent periods; juvenile gangs; schooling not based upon the natural inclinations, nor upon the child's mental development, and which do not qualify grown children for usefulness (occupationally). Further, the fact that the school itself, is as yet not prepared to teach young people the art of dealing with other children and the art of living with another person later.

5. As a condition precedent to entering school for every child, a certificate should be presented from a physician setting forth that the child is free from venereal and other disease such as tuberculosis and the like. A similar certificate should be presented before entering high school or matriculating in any college or university. Further a board consisting of teachers and principles of schools should study and recommend means and methods for safeguarding and promoting the mental welfare of pupils.

6. All schools should have as part of their curriculum the teaching of such subjects as: The history and fundamental principles of Americanism; pre-vocational and vocational training; human relations, including domestic relations; respect for elders, teachers and those in authority, and the psychology of conversation, or the significance and far-reaching consequences of the Spoken Word, embracing, as it does, tactfulness and good manners. The elementary principles of law should be taught in high schools and all colleges, as a matter of better understanding and appreciation of government, as well as social welfare. Other studies than law which would lead to the understanding and prevention of crime should be part of the curriculum of all schools. This would include such studies as anthropology, history and evolution of law, psychology, psychiatry, genetics and sociology.

7. The board of education should have on its staff a superintendent of guidance and counselling for children and young men and

women, ranging from public school, high school and junior college age. Part of the duties of this superintendent should be to employ experts, such as psychiatrists, psychiatrically-minded physicians (provided they are interested in juvenile and adolescent girls and boys), also attorneys, ministers, psychologists, social welfare workers, parent-teacher officers, and others to give a series of lectures definitely arranged ahead of time as part of a systematic program. The aim of this diversified and intelligently organized series of educational lectures and fireside talks to growing girls and boys should be so constructive and timely from biological, physiological, psychological and sociological standpoints that the great majority of them should develop more nerve stamina, ethical consciousness, self-reliance, self-sufficiency, greater respect for parents, teachers and those in authority. In addition, this service should tend toward a broad and wholesome outlook as to the relationship between themselves and society, and society to themselves that they are bound to be better adults and citizens.

8. Parent-teacher organizations should enlarge their scope to the extent that they may embrace round-table discussions, open-forum meetings, including symposiums, debates and lectures on all subjects pertaining to infant and child welfare. Further, their attitude and educational program should make for better understanding and greater mutuality of interest between parent, child and teacher.

9. Boys' and girls' clubs with proper supervision should be encouraged during the teen-age period, thus promoting regard for order, parliamentary procedure, self-discipline, the art of being sociable, and abiding by majority rule.

10. Every community in the country having as part of its population, ten children or more, should employ human relations experts, psychologists, or others who know the basic principles of child psychology, and child welfare. This would assist parents, as well as teachers and the officers of the community to coordinate their interests in the progress and development of the child on every frontier by consulting these experts at any time they need advice or counsel.

11. Boys and girls should not be permitted to drink alcoholic beverages, dance, jitterbug, smoke, or in any other way act licentiously, promiscuously or unbecomingly on any school premises without receiving direct consent of parents or legally authorized guardians.

12. Children under the age of 16 should not be permitted on the streets of any city after 10 o'clock at night unless they are accompanied by a parent, legally authorized guardian, or possess a letter authorizing same under certain circumstances.

13. Public libraries, circulating libraries and bookshops of every description should be prohibited by law from lending or selling books or any other printed matter to boys and girls under sixteen years of age, which deal with crime or sex, unless prescribed by a practicing physician, attorney, minister, or a teacher of any credited school.

14. Children under the age of sixteen should not be permitted entrance to theatres, moving picture houses and the like, where war scenes and the commission of crime, as well as mystery stories, are shown.

15. Dance halls, whether public or private, should not permit the entrance of boys or girls under the age of 16. However, youths between the ages of 16 and 18 may be admitted if accompanied by either parent or legally authorized guardian, or if they have a letter of consent from such.

16. Children under the age of 18 should not be permitted to be on the streets of any city after 11 o'clock at night unless they are accompanied by parent, legally authorized guardian, or possess a letter authorizing same under certain circumstances.

17. No child under the age of 18 should be taken for a ride on public streets, highway, nor to anyone's home, or building of any kind, at any time, unless they are accompanied by their parents, legitimate guardians, or have a letter from any of these authorizing same. Violations of this, as well as every law pertaining to child welfare, should be rigidly enforced.

18. Children under the age of 18 should not be admitted in any hotel or lodging house as a guest without being accompanied by parent, legally authorized guardian or unless they can show an authoritative certificate from either of the former, or from a Travelers' Aid Society and the like.

19. Dance halls, skating rinks or any private or public place of amusement should not permit minors under 18 to play slot machines or any other machines used in every form of gambling, including lotteries and raffles.

20. Minors under 18 should be prohibited from entering horse-race tracks, or any of its premises in any capacity whatsoever, including visiting proprietors or friends, seeking employment, or in any other way, nor should they be permitted entrance in any bookie establishment.

21. Children under 18 years should not be permitted to be gainfully employed in any capacity after nine o'clock in the evening, thus preventing night prowling, temptations and crimes.

22. There should be municipally organized planned recreational centers for young girls, particularly those who are transients in any city, and for those who are permanent residents of the city, as well. The programs should be so carefully planned that those who will attend will not only be recreated in the full sense of the term, but be instructed as well, and so well that they will be anxious to come again.

23. Hotels, boarding houses, guest houses, rooming houses, auto courts, lake resorts, camp resorts, river resorts, vacation resorts, yacht pleasure trips, fishing trips, steam bath places, springs, massage parlors, these and other places usually designated for health, recreation, human need and facility—but easily transferred into vice, corruption and ill-fame should be under strict legal regulations, with an aim in view of preventing the numerous pitfalls of young boys and girls, particularly girls.

24. Every parent with whom a juvenile delinquent resides should be compelled by law to attend an educational course, especially prescribed and arranged for parents who are grossly negligent or derelict in their duties. In this course, part of the curriculum should consist of subjects dealing with elementary principles of pre-natal care for mothers, post-natal care for mothers, including infant welfare, child culture, elementary principles of psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, neurology, genetics, physiology, hygiene, sociology, domestic psychology or domestic relations, and other subjects theoretical and practical which pertain to wholesome parenthood and childhood.

25. Instead of building so many reform schools for problem children, it might be equally wise to build a reform school for parents who have repeatedly failed to comply with legal requests to give their children the fundamental necessities, care, attention, interest and other efforts in keeping with elementary principles of intelligent and decent parenthood.

26. In cities with a population of over 10,000, there should be juvenile courts with judges presiding continuously. These judges should be well-compensated during their tenure in office. Further, there should be attached to the courts a number of experts to give their findings and recommendations to the court. The judge, in turn, should analyze the meritorious and corrective points submitted by these experts and utilize as much as is feasible as part of his own decisions. These experts—depending on circumstances—should consist of physicians who do psychiatric or psycho-analytic work exclusively, or who do it as part of their practice. Where it is impossible to have the services of physicians who have some basic knowledge of psychiatry, psychoanalysis and the like, then psychologists, social welfare workers and others should be employed, provided they have a knowledge of the subjects, and are eugenically-minded.

OCCUPATIONAL INFLUENCES AS APPLIED TO CRIME PREVENTION

1. Every adult man and woman desirous of working or rendering useful services should be gainfully employed.
2. Every man and woman gainfully employed should receive the maximum wage or salary in keeping with the importance and responsibility of the job or position.
3. Reasonable hours of employment, illumination, ventilation, hygienic facilities and comfortable surroundings should be part of the established order of things.
4. Lunch periods and one or two brief rest or relaxation periods, together with periodic recreational programs would make work more pleasurable, and be productive of greater tranquility, as well as productivity.
5. As much as may be reasonable to expect under certain circumstances, men and women should be employed in keeping with their natural abilities and inclinations, thus preventing occupational misfits or industrial and economic round-pegs in square holes.
6. No person employed in industry during normal peacetimes should be permitted to work overtime, or to the extent of reaching a stage of fatigue.
7. Every man and woman employed where large numbers of individuals are working should be permitted employment only if they are found to be free from venereal and communicable diseases.

CRIME PREVENTIVES—MISCELLANEOUS

1. The handling of crime and the criminal should be first considered in what may be termed a crime-assorting clearing house. The consulting staff, in addition to administrative officers, and direct workers, should consist of a number of experts and those who are qualified to render service in a practical, judicial and scientific way. This staff should include judges and psychiatrists, or physicians who are psychiatrically-minded. Later, they should be handled by experts in accordance with the specific needs of the criminal or the one who has committed the crime. Some may have to be handled exclusively by such experts as psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, psychologists, neurologists, physicians in general practice, ministers of the gospel who are able and interested in the subject, social welfare workers, domestic psychologists, geneticists, human counsellors and others. This is based on the assumption that many alleged criminals, and those who have actually committed crimes are biologically, constitutionally, sociologically or mentally pathologic or psycho-pathic. As for the comparatively normal person, the law should be administered in the usual way.

2. We should have a thoroughly organized state, inter-state or national (and, as much as possible, international) unified crime information exchange so that all authorized governmental authorities, having police power, may have at their disposal, all available and timely data, information and knowledge pertaining to crime, the criminal, prevention and curative measures, as well as punishment (if and when necessary).

3. Every telephone number called by transient guests in hotels should be kept on file, with the date and time of call, for no less than one year, and made accessible to the police department if and when called upon, in suspicious cases, and by due process of law.

4. The selling of newspapers, magazines and periodicals of different kinds dealing with crime, and licentious subjects, with their common, lascivious pictures should be prohibited by law.

5. In order to prevent homicides, robberies, thefts, personal violence, and the like, to those driving motor or other vehicles on the public highways, nobody should be legally allowed to ask for a "lift," or give a "lift," unless the person desiring such can prove in writing by a certificate of identification and character from a Travelers' Aid Society, certain authorized officers of the law, or recognized fraternal organizations.

6. From time to time there should be official inspections made of every dwelling to ascertain the condition of inflammable substances, such as gasoline, cords, plugs, electric wiring and all equipment used in cooking and the like, thus preventing fire hazards. Further, this effort would also prevent in a measure pyromania and thefts during and immediately after fires.

7. The sale of firearms should be prohibited by law, except when a special license or permit is granted to those who can prove legitimate need for such. This license should be given for limited periods, and should be presented to the seller whose counter-signature should appear upon the invoice or bill of purchase. These signatures should be prima facie evidence that they read and understood the clauses and provisions of the law governing the section which deals with the buying and selling of firearms and ammunition in every form, and at all times.

8. It should be prohibited by law to purchase ammunition or arms in any form and at any time unless the seller can prove by receipt of purchase or otherwise that the prospective or actual seller is the bona fida owner of the ammunition at the time of selling of such article. The sale of ammunition or firearms to any person who cannot prove that they have had reasonable experience in the use of such, should be a federal or statutory offense.

9. Strict attention to the manufacture of firearms against defectiveness, also legal regulatory measures as to storage and caution in transportation should be included in the laws.

10. Any sale to pawn shops, remedial agencies, loan organizations and the like, amounting to \$5.00 or more, must be accompanied by a photograph of the article sold, or upon which money is loaned, with specific notations as to serial numbers and identification marks, together with an additional photograph of the individual who does the selling. These photographs and personal identification mediums are to be returned to the owners when the articles are redeemed. Further, in the case of men or women who cannot establish their legal identity or an established residence for no less a period than six months, and where any reasonable suspicion does, may or could exist at the time or later, the seller should be fingerprinted on two or more fingerprint cards, unless the purchaser is willing to assume all responsibilities.

11. In order to prevent private and secret lotteries or sweepstakes, and the subsidiary activities from fleecing the unsuspecting pub-

lic, each city and state, as well as the nation, should periodically hold its own legitimate, publicly announced and well-organized lottery program, out of which should be given thousands of dollars worth of cash and merchandise prizes, which were purchased from local merchants in a uniform equitable way by authorized agents. This would result in the income of many millions of dollars to city, state and federal agencies toward their bonds or other important necessities. Further, in addition to human service, it would wholesomely release the gambling spirit.

12. As much as possible with consideration to state, adjoining state and regional state's rights, the major or broad-in-scope outlook and trend should be toward federalizing the major crime legislation, particularly homicides, kidnapping and the like. This would not only facilitate extradition, but would prevent needless expense on the part of the states, municipalities, federal government; prevent cost of litigation, time consumed and other ramified disturbances that former methods entailed.

13. We should have greater federal and state coordinated regulations and supervision regarding the listings, publication, sales, and every other transaction regarding bonds, stocks and other securities. Every sale of securities—listed or unlisted—should contain a printed authorized statement as to the financial history and other important factors pertaining to that particular bond, stock or other financial asset, such as rights and the like.

14. Since it is authoritatively claimed that about 60% of all crime is perpetrated by means of fraud and deceit, protective regional federal business bureaus should be established to disseminate knowledge. These informative organizations would give personal information to those who desire it, on all business transactions.

PRISONS AND PRISON REFORMS

1. Irrespective of the element of sympathy or pity for prisoners that may exist on the part of many of us, the glaring fact remains that it would be good business policy on the part of society itself to do everything in its power to rehabilitate those who are amenable to treatment and care; thus their usefulness and productivity to society would be somewhat compensatory, in addition to the humane aspect of permitting every human being under healthy and favorable circumstances to live out his expectancy, by fulfilling his niche in life's drama. Those

who have committed crimes and received punishment should be classified in a manner which would indicate the nature of the crime, its causes, hereditary aspects, if any, its chronicity, including numerous details, such as health, disposition, temperament, mental attitude, intelligence and the like, in order to ascertain the varied facts about the personality of the individual. The object of such human assortment, or the evaluating of human emotions, including present and potential capacities for improvement, and social readjustment, as much as possible, under the circumstances should be to prevent crime and determine the *modus operandi*, or ways of handling the prisoner to the best advantage of the state, the prison-personnel, and the prisoner himself. Too great emphasis cannot be placed upon the suggestion that prisoners should not be pampered on the one hand, nor treated like galley slaves as in the days of yore, merely because they happen to be prisoners. Despite the fact that they are incarcerated and kept away from society, nevertheless they should be treated with humane and scientific consideration in every way.

2. Viewed from psychiatric and sociologic standpoints, most criminals are a hapless lot of weak, sick, mentally or emotionally defective and helpless individuals, possessing a lack of responsibility, with little or no social consciousness. As our knowledge of the causes of crime increases, and as our knowledge of scientific remedies becomes more numerous and widespread, together with our aroused interest, and the spirit of being our "Brother's keeper," prisons will gradually become not only places for incarceration, but mental hospitals and schools as well. Psychopathic and neurologic cases should be segregated in special hospitals where they could be studied, treated and cured, instead of being thrown into a dungeon, or a padlocked cell which may breed an aggravated socio-pathological and psycho-pathological case, including numerous forms of emotional disintegration, hatred, and a feeling of revenge. This scientific procedure would not in the least prevent proper placement and supervision of psychopathic and mentally aberrated delinquents. It should embrace numerous departmental or specifically indicated approaches, medical, psychiatric and psychoanalytic departments, vocational guidance and occupational therapy departments, and the like. Prisons would then not only protect society from the prisoner, and cure, but it would do more. It would tend to educate the prisoner to not only understand himself and society, but to realize a number of things, including the following:

A. Instead of the criminal breaking the law, the law may break the criminal.

B. That the normal, intelligent, humane and worthwhile attitude is to do everything in our power for, and with the welfare of society, instead of against it.

3. Since 85% of those confined to penal institutions eventually are to be returned to society, it behooves us to give them the kind of training in these institutions that will make for self-sufficiency, self-reliance, self-discipline and the like, in addition to an environment that is in keeping with the principles of robust health, fine will-power, emotional stamina and mental integrity, which, together may be said to be a human symphony. Prisoners, whether in city or county jails, reform schools, state prisons, penitentiaries or elsewhere, should do something useful while incarcerated. When properly classified, they should be placed in occupations in keeping with health, previous experience and potentialities, taking into consideration a number of things, including the length of time they are to remain there.

4. Prisoners who are to be returned back to society should definitely receive a small compensation as an incentive for good services, promptness, courtesy and the like; thus enabling them to have a reasonable fund accumulated in the prison bank upon leaving. This amount is to be withdrawn by the prisoner periodically, such as weekly, monthly and yearly, one-quarter at the time of leaving, and three-quarters at other monthly installments within a period of one year. In the event the prisoner does not withdraw in person, or write for it on prescribed dates, it should revert back to the state or the prison fund for benefiting the prisoners in various ways while there.

5. Wardens, assistant wardens, other officers and officials of the prison, including prison commissioners and those who oversee, manage or direct should receive their positions by virtue of meritorious qualifications, and not by political influence, as has been the case to a certain extent in the past.

6. As recent as 1935, the Department of Commerce reported that 10% of all persons sent to State Prisons in the State of California were guilty of sex offenses. Most of these, in all probability, were caused by some form of gonad disturbance. If prison reforms are to be effective, they should include the ascertaining of the biological and hereditary causes or factors which, to a great extent, produce the crimes we are

anxious to prevent. Hence, a knowledge of endocrinology—the study of the glands of internal secretion—should be one of the studies known by those who participate in helping to salvage human beings back to the social fold.

7. Physicians who are psychiatrically-minded because of disposition, intelligence, study and experience, and physicians who practice psychiatry only, also psychoanalysts, psychologists and sociologists, should, at stated intervals, analyze prisoners with an aim of establishing their mental, emotional and physical status and ascertaining other factors, including progress made for the better, and then gradual fitness for the outside world, if and when they will be ready and able to be turned back into society. Parole should be based upon justifiable grounds, such as probabilities of rehabilitation of the individual, adaptation and adjustment.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. There should be a pre-court bureau in every large community where men and women may submit their complaints, or defense, in order to prevent litigation overburdening judges with clogged calendars. It would also prevent needless and humiliating publicity to men of prominence in the business world, prominent artists and others who are exploited or fleeced quite often by unscrupulous casual acquaintances.

2. A bureau of family relations should be inaugurated in every county under the supervision of the District Attorney's Office (with medical, psychiatric and social counselling), the object being to prevent needless humiliation and litigation. Its object in addition should be that of friendly counselling and adjustment of problems arising out of family difficulties, including support of minor children, prevention of indiscriminate alimony and other conflicts resulting from disharmony.

3. There should be a greater understanding between the legislative, judicial, administrative and police departments of government. This should embrace among other programs, periodic meetings between these bodies to discuss unification and coordination of purpose among these four branches of governmental and authoritative agencies. Further, representatives of organized labor, industry, chambers of commerce, medical, scientific and other representative groups of the community should be invited as participants to discuss in round-table and forum style preventive and curative measures from their own respective standpoints. Thus, a crystallized synthesis of opinion would be formed,

enabling everyone concerned to better understand the thoughts and needs of the other. The object would be greater harmony and greater dispatch in the administration of justice, along modern scientific lines, based upon anthropology, genetics, medicine, neurology, psychiatry, and the like.

4. If the medical profession is to be socialized, also why not socialize the legal profession. Every attorney who has passed the bar examination, and is in active practice should be an officer of the state. His salary should be not less than ten thousand dollars annually, payable in monthly installments, and never contingent upon clients. There should be a graduated scale of salaries paid to attorneys every five years, thus recognizing experience and seniority. This would create sufficient incentive for some attorneys to render service as officers of the court, guardians of the law, and individuals who desire justice to be done, rather than the mere winning of a case; or, the convicting of an individual in order to gain notoriety, political prestige or fame.

5. Instead of having 134 legal-aid societies in the United States, it would be more in keeping with scientific efficiency and human welfare to have one legal aid society in the capital of each state, with branches in every county seat, and in large municipalities. Every person should be able to seek and receive legal information prior to the transacting of any business, or the making of agreements, contracts and the like. The fee for such service to rich or poor should at all times be the same, namely, nothing.

6. Laws that are archaic in their genesis and now useless, should be replaced by improved laws by an intelligently minded law-making body, thus humanizing and civilizing our comprehension and technique of dealing with the causation, prevention, treatment, cure and punishment of criminals, as well as the handling of the entire crime situation in every phase from "A" to "Z".

7. One-half of the number of men and women on a jury, especially in criminal, domestic relations and other cases than civil matters, should consist of paid experts such as physicians, attorneys, psychiatrists, anthropologists, sociologists and others. In unusual cases, experts only should be employed for jury duty. A jury consisting of experts would seldom become confused, befuddled, or influenced one way or other by eloquence, outbursts, banging on the table and other legal gymnastics or quibbling which may confuse the lay jurymen.

8. Policemen should be selected and found to be healthy, fearless, of high integrity, good education and students of human welfare. The salary should be much higher than it usually is, commensurate with the responsibilities of the position, rank and seniority. This would show appreciation for experience and loyalty, as well as the elimination of any incentive toward extra-official financial incomes.

LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

1. Laws pertaining to extortion (or any form of racketeering) in the name of "protecting" manufacturers or others, (usually done by economic pressure, boycotts, threats of being expelled from organizations and the like) should be rigidly enforced by making it a felony for any threatened person to consent or agree to any such unlawful action.

2. Congress should pass a law prohibiting membership in any organization which assumes extra-legal powers and making it a felony to teach, preach, or incite men and women against any race, nationality or creed.

3. The crime of doling out of indiscriminate alimony in the name of law and justice should be prohibited by law. Taxation without representation is a principle for which our forefathers fought, but as yet, has not been accomplished. If an equitable financial settlement has not been made out of court prior to instituting divorce proceedings, and if the woman is not the guilty person, then alimony should be given under the following circumstances:

A. If the woman is physically or mentally incapacitated from earning her own livelihood, and with the termination of alimony upon her full recovery and ability to be self-supporting in a comfortable way.

B. If she has minor children requiring her full time, attention and effort.

SCIENCE AND CRIME

Crime today is being investigated and studied with scientific precision, more than ever before. This includes the aid of microscopy, chirography, chemistry, toxicology, the age or chronisity of ink impressions, including apparent indelibility. The F. B. I. deserves a great deal of credit. They have installed laboratories with experts who are

capable of ascertaining valuable data not only from fingerprints, but by the study of the pigmentation of hair, texture and chemical composition of cloth, and other material used for wearing apparel, so that those who think they could break the law will find eventually that the law will break them. The utilization of plastics in modelling and reconstructing certain objects and things destroyed is of great benefit.

CONCLUSION

An impartial survey of the subject, historically, scientifically, politically and otherwise leads us to conclude: (1) Ignorance of the subject on the part of the great majority of the people may be classified as Public Enemy No. 1. (2) Ignorance on the part of some members of the legal profession on this gigantic and momentous problem constitutes Public Enemy No. 2. (3) Ignorance on the part of some of the judiciary, from the lowest to the highest courts, is Public Enemy No. 3. (4) The political mess and mesh with which appointments to public office are frequently made, rather than upon adequate knowledge of the subject, understanding and interest, is Public Enemy No. 4.

We already know enough about crime prevention, treatment, cure and the emotional and mental reconstructing and rehabilitating of the criminal to accomplish the maximum good for the benefit of society, as well as the criminal, (or the one accused of crime). However, this knowledge is not as yet fully put into practice. Why? Simply because of established precedents, mental lethargy on the part of the public itself, politics, graft, corruption and money. Therefore, crime, the criminal and the relationship of society to both, becomes not only an economic and sociologic question, but a problem of psychology, biology and honesty on the part of everyone who claims to be interested in this gigantic subject.

A PROPOSED FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR⁽¹⁾

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The ultimate aim of this study is to discover to what extent it is possible to develop a typology of criminal behavior for practical use in diagnosis and correctional treatment.

I

The history of the development of many of the scientific specialties is marked with a certain amount of "fad-ism;" that is, they have gone through periods when a large number of practitioners were devoted to some particular explanatory theory of therapeutic technique in favor at the moment which eventually faded and was replaced by another. Certain people, for instance, are fond of pointing a not-unkindly-but-wagging finger at the tonsil-taking era of pediatrics. And elsewhere, psychiatrists are heard to chaff certain of their colleagues about the narrow Freudianism of their interpretations. Criminology is no exception; in fact, its structure seems even more marked by the scars and bumps left from contact with earlier fadistic theories.

Today the interest of an increasingly large number of criminologists and penologists seems to be centered around a procedure known as *classification*. Perusal of the *Proceedings of the American Prison Association* for the last five years reveals a noticeable increase in the use of the term. But although it has been frequently used, there is considerable evidence that it has no precise or fixed meaning. In one place it denotes the type of housing required for safe custody of the prisoner; in another, his degree of reformability; and in a third, the nature of the individual

(1) A portion of a paper presented before the American Sociological Association meeting December 27, 1941, at New York City.

treatment program.⁽²⁾ Adding to the general confusion is its definition as a sorting of criminal symptomata into a systematic scheme of criminal types. A great part of this confusion probably stems from classification's bastard origin. It had an academic father and a practical mother, a situation usually known to produce a conflict. The first three of these definitions come from penal practice and clinical casework; and the last, from the academic culture. But even thus pinned down on paper, there is no guarantee that the student will find these definitions followed in practice. Classification, like the famous "Cardiff Devil" of Jersey's Juke-country, is often talked about but very seldom seen in the flesh.

A short time ago the writer sat in on the weekly meeting of the Classification Board of a prison in a state noted for its progressive work in this field. Seated around a long table in a bare and rather dreary room near the warden's office were: the warden's secretary (here acting as secretary to the Board), the psychologist, a psychological interne, two guards (who were visiting the meeting as an educational experience), the deputy warden (who acted as chairman), the mail censor, the director of education, the work supervisor, a visiting parole officer (who was in to see about some recently returned violators), and the chaplain (who had no voice at this meeting, reporting only on whether or not the inmate in question attended church regularly). The physician's report was read in absentia by the psychologist, as was the social history which was sent in by the district parole officer.

The procedure, the writer was informed, was first the detailed study of each inmate during the first month he spent in the institution. The members of the professional staff each examine the inmate at least once during that time, and then write their reports for the classification meeting. The decisions made at this first hearing concern the place for confining the particular prisoner (i. e., either cell assignment in this prison or transfer to another state institution), orders for his special treatment (i. e., physical treatment, psychotherapy, recreation or occupational therapy, further social investigation, etc.), and finally his date of release or his next hearing. The aim was said to be the "scientific analysis of each inmate's problem and the intelligent specialized treatment of it."

(2) Klein defines it as "essentially a process of dividing an undifferentiated mass into smaller units homogeneous within themselves and different from the other units; such a division into unit groups for the purpose of more effectively dealing with each individual by means of homogeneous unit groups." Philip Klein, *Prison Methods in New York State*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1920, p. 55.

To an external observer, the actual practice bore a somewhat limited resemblance to the announced plan. The deputy warden called the meeting to order by reading in a loud voice the number and name of the inmate being examined. This was followed by the Discipline report on the inmate and the various contributions of the assembled above-mentioned personnel. Usually these were given in routine order with no interruption. Occasionally, however, a discussion would occur, of which this is one sample:

The Psychologist: . . . and the boy tells me he was getting to like the tire repair business pretty well when he was caught. I suggest that we recognize his request and place him with Mr. (auto repair shop) so's he can learn the trade—

The Parole Officer: . . . you do that and you'll only equip him all the better for work with that tire-stealing gang he's been seen with. No sir! He's able to learn any routine job. Put him in the carpenter shop; then we can find a job for him as a helper when he comes out.

The Work Supervisor: . . . Mr. asked me to look for some strong boys for the farm detail. Them oats in the north field should be brought in soon. Let me have him out in the fresh air for a while before you coop him up in the shop for the winter.

Deputy Warden: . . . I don't like to put a new boy on the farm so soon. Besides, Officer reports he overheard Joe say to another boy that "there was a way of crack-in' any joint" . . . Didn't I hear you say that four boys were leaving the laundry gang next week? We'll put him where he can be watched for a while and then try him in the auto shop, if he still wants it, later. Agreed? . . . Call 5-2-6-6-3 . . . Joe, the Classification Board has decided it would be best for you to start in at the laundry, then if you want to show us how well you can work we might be able to fit you into the auto shop when there's a vacancy. You're to see Dr. once a week for your eyes. And then we'll see you up here again in six months. Now, read your manual carefully and behave yourself and you'll get along alright. Do you want to say anything?

Joe: (quietly) . . . Thank you, sir.

Deputy Warden: . . . That's all now.

There is but little indication in the above tableau of a working system of etiological diagnosis. Contributing factors are mentioned, but one gets the impression that it is the institution's maintenance rather than scientific treatment that commands the program. In the presence of an adequate diagnostic scheme, the classifications of the board resolve themselves into routine job placements. Situations similar to this have been observed by the writer in several correctional institutions, so that this is not to be understood as a "horrible example." Certainly it is time we

examined what is being committed in the name of classification.⁽³⁾ What are the operating theories and purposes underlying this penological phenomenon? What are its aims? These are our problems here.

II

Earlier Classifications and Their Underlying Purposes

Any given mass of material may be sorted in a variety of ways according to the purpose of the sorter. For example, as Professor Henry Pratt Fairchild once pointed out to the writer, a bushel of mixed apples can be sorted in at least four different ways: a horticulturist will pick them out according to botanical class; a cook, according to their flavor or cooking properties; a grocer, according to their size or selling qualities; and an artist, according to their color and beauty. Although shying away from any trite analogies between rotten apples and criminals, it may be observed that criminals have likewise been classified according to certain explicit purposes. Parsons notes that "different societies and different groups within societies have made classifications of crimes (and criminals) on the basis of their own needs and interests. Law-makers . . . have given us the classification of crimes found in the state and national codes. Policemen and detectives classify . . . on the basis of the nature of the act. Criminals classify themselves and their crimes . . . on the basis of method (and also on the basis of social caste). The newspapers and the public employ a singular mixture of these which serves fairly well as long as we do not attach too much importance to it."⁽⁴⁾

Space will not permit the inclusion here of a review of the historical background and contemporary development of these various classification systems and their underlying purposes. The writer examined twenty-five systems published between 1862 and 1941 and grouped them into the following "classification of classifications" on the basis of purpose. This will give some clue as to the range of classificatory attempts.

⁽³⁾ Recently demands for a functional classification system have appeared in the literature. The *Advanced School Digest* of Teacher's College, Columbia University (Vol. III, 1, p. 6) lists "A study of the purposes for which prisoners need to be classified" as one of the important problems of correctional research. H. W. Dunham, in his book review of Carr's *Delinquency Control* (*American Sociological Review*, VI, 5, p. 765), criticizes Carr's discussion of types of delinquents as being inadequate for scientific purposes and indicates that a workable scheme is necessary before treatment methods can be satisfactorily differentiated.

⁽⁴⁾ Philip Parsons, *Crime and the Criminal*, New York, 1926, p. 154.

Classification concerning the offense:

Type A₁—Descriptive of the offense

Type A₂—Descriptive of the method of committing the offense

Classifications concerning the nature of the offender:

Type B₁—Descriptive of the predominant etiology

Type B₂—Descriptive of the extent of the criminality

Type B₃—Descriptive of the motivational process involved

Classifications concerning the institutional care of offenders:

Type C₁—Descriptive of security required or of institutional progress or adjustment

Type C₂—Descriptive of treatment needed

Type C₃—Miscellaneous groups for convenience of institutional operation⁽⁵⁾

III

It would be presumptuous of the writer to suggest that he found none of the 25 classifications adequate for the present needs, yet the specialized purpose underlying many of them renders them inappropriate for use in criminal diagnostics. This is true of the Type A, or "offense" classifications; and the Type C, or "institutional" classifications are limited in effectiveness to the institutional setting. They are created primarily for the safe custody of offenders and are useful analytically only in revealing the degree of aggression or degree of institutionalization of the individual inmate. The treatment classifications are likewise unsatisfactory because they are usually based either on the immediately apparent or precipitating condition and are limited by the extent of treatment facilities of the institution. This leaves the Type B, or "nature of offender" classifications for our critical appraisal.

Various well-qualified students of this subject have critized the purpose and process of etiological classification. Healy, in his earlier report⁽⁶⁾ on delinquency causation, remarked that his findings did not fit in with the earlier preconceived classifications, that the crude methods of "the elders" left their conclusions gravely open to question, that the out-

⁽⁵⁾ A mimeographed copy of these twenty-five systems organized in the above fashion, and the historical background of classification may be had from the writer.

⁽⁶⁾ William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, Boston, 1924, pp. 16-18.

come of his study revealed "combined types of causations and individual peculiarities which often fit the criminal into no system," that "any classification according to theories of epileptoidism, of atavism, of other biological causation, would end in the mere giving of a name . . ." He therefore suggested that classification be patterned more directly after the medical process of clinical study: examination, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, thus making each individual a "class."

This recommendation brings out a criticism of the process of classification or diagnosis made by another, but later, worker in the field of delinquency. Carl Rogers,⁽⁷⁾ in his book, contends that there are three levels of diagnosis: a method of description and classification, a classification plus an indication of the extent of the condition, and a statement of the relationship between symptom and cause. This third level gives a highly individualized picture of the motivational process in the case at hand. Rogers indicates that anything short of this level of diagnosis is interesting but of little use to the caseworker whose problem is the correction or adjustment of the person before him.

Parmalee,⁽⁸⁾ on the other hand, would seem to recognize that such individualization as that recommended by Healy is worthwhile, but he also sees that in prison "there is a practical limit to the extent to which the individualization of punishment can be carried. It is therefore necessary to establish a more or less detailed classification based upon (the origin, type, and intensity of the criminality) . . ." Earlier in his book he condemns all existing classifications of criminality as being unsatisfactory because . . . "they all contain grave biological and psychological fallacies, no one of them is entirely self-consistent, and no one of them is sufficiently systematic and comprehensive."⁽⁹⁾ He then points out that classification "should be based in the main upon the causation of criminality, for the principal use of such a classification is to aid in planning the treatment of criminals . . ." (This is of course not an inconsistency but a recognition of the necessity for the two types of classification previously mentioned.)

One more criticism which should be mentioned here is that Edwin Powers made of the "Scamp" system in his report for the Bureau of Social Hygiene:

(7) Carl Rogers, *The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child*, New York, 1939, p. 16f.

(8) Maurice Parmalee, *Criminology*, New York, 1926, p. 394.

(9) *Ibid*, p. 195.

We have found it wholly inadequate in practice, though it played a large part in the deliberations of the Case Work Department. It was not a logical classification for it had no common basis of division; it was no wholly psychological for it dealt with other than psychological concepts; its definitions were not only vague and confusing but changing from time to time. Little agreement could be found among those who attempted to use it; members of the Case Work Department could not always agree as to the formulation of its definitions or as to whether it was a diagnostic or a treatment classification, or both. * * * Classification did not actually direct treatment. It had, practically speaking, *no functional value*. (Not italicized in original) * * * We suppose that the trouble lay in the fact that it was too much of an *a priori* classification. Eventually, enough might be learned about actual treatment to enable one to formulate a useful classification. (But why classify? — a question often propounded by the writer, though never satisfactorily answered.)⁽¹⁰⁾

Without going into a detailed evaluation of the preceding schemes, one is tempted to conclude that Powers is right. None seems foolproof. However, there is another way of looking at it. That there is value in a working classification scheme of typology may be inferred from the progress of the medical and psychiatric professions in understanding disease. This is only made possible by first breaking down the "genus illness" into acceptable divisions and then examining each disease in minute detail. One may quarrel with the bases for the break-down, but the value of it should be evident. We at least have something small enough to grasp.

In the case of criminal behavior, perhaps our trouble exists in this basis for breakdown. It is evident that it is the behavior of the offender in which we are primarily interested. The type of offense and the manner of committing it are merely symptoms, so that schemes made on these bases are inadequate for our purpose.

In considering causation as a basis for classification we come to an important point. It may be noted that most of the classifications of this type thus far devised have been built on the concept of *the single most important factor operative in the life history of the individual inmate*. American criminology is well in the process of graduating from the unitary cause notion of criminogenics, yet this vestige of it still remains in our typology. Reckless,⁽¹¹⁾ among others, has ably pointed out that causative factors are as inextricably individual as the offense itself, that a known crime-producing condition in one person is not that in another, nor does this same condition always produce the same effect in the same

⁽¹⁰⁾ Commons, Yahkub and Powers, *The Development of Penological Treatment at Norfolk Prison Colony in Massachusetts*, New York, 1940, p. 224, fu. 6.

⁽¹¹⁾ Walter Reckless, *Criminal Behavior*, New York, 1940, 163-178.

individual. Criminality, thus, cannot soundly be classified entirely as to causative factors.

The second series of the B type classifications are based on the extent of the criminality. These are useful in indicating the degree of severity of the behavior and the degree of intensity of the treatment required, but it provides us with nothing indicative of the nature of the difficulty or the type of treatment required, and hence is of limited value. We are now left to consider only the classifications based on the motivational process involved.

IV

When we try to understand why *this* individual behaved in *this* manner, our immediate concern is for the pattern of causality. The identity of the items in the causal chain pales before the significance of the roles they play. Thus, mental deficiency is only important if it can be shown that it was instrumental in bringing about the delinquent act, in either an immediate fashion (i. e., inability to think quickly or clearly enough to get out of a "jam") or in a remote fashion (i. e., compensation for inability to maintain intellectual par with one's associates over a long period of time). Without knowing the process by which this "factor" worked, a therapist would be unable to treat intelligently. To be sure, the fact of deficient mentality must be considered in the treatment program, but its importance in understanding or diagnosing the problem is not as great as the knowledge of the process. If our classification is to be an aid to treatment, then the importance of the pattern of criminogenics is evident.

Psychologists have arrived at a fairly clear understanding of the motivating drives of mankind. These, it is declared, vary in strength with each individual and are also influenced by conscious and unconscious social conditioning of many kinds. The process by which the drive is altered by the conditioning force is termed "adjustment;" and the mode of adjustment, the "mechanism." We will be considering, therefore, the adjustment mechanisms of mankind. These are classified by Shaffer⁽¹²⁾ as follows: (1) adjustment by defense, (2) adjustment by withdrawing, (3) adjustments involving fear and repression, (4) adjustment by ailments, (5) persistent nonadjustive reactions. This, he admits, is an arbitrary classification, based on perusal of seven recent books

(12) L. F. Shaffer, *Psychology of Adjustment*, New York, 1936, Part two.

in the field, because there is little agreement on the names of the mechanisms. However, in most cases a series of definite behavior syndromes is recognized.

It is not this writer's intention to suggest that criminology take over this classification "lock, stock and barrel;" rather it is suggested that we might approach our problem of differentiating between types of criminal behavior patterns in the same manner. Following the precedent established by the august "elders" of criminology, after having first indicated the inadequacies of existing systems, the writer offers the following scheme based on the theory that criminality is a form of behavior adjustment, which, because it runs counter to the socially acceptable adjustments, is usually termed mal-adjustment. This negative form should be as susceptible of classification as is the positive.⁽¹³⁾ Many of the categories including will be recognized as coming from certain of the previously reviewed schemes. Others are borrowed from the practices of certain contemporary prisons.

In devising a new system one is forced to recognize the requirements of those who will be using it. Today our general classification needs are of two kinds. First, we need a system whereby our convicted offenders can be safely and correctly quarantined in accordance with their individually different requirements (see Types C₁ and C₃). The second need grows out of the first; in order to treat more correctly we must understand more thoroughly the varied etiological processes which bring about the social phenomenon we call crime. For the latter we need a functional or diagnostic classification, based on clinical findings, and not academic supposition, which will enable us to build, through the recognized processes of experimental research, a sound body of knowledge regarding the most effective treatment for individual types of criminal behavior. Although our first need of safe custody is now being satisfactorily met in many of our contemporary institutions, our second need still gives us pain—a social pain which can be measured by the rate of recidivism and persistent localized delinquency.

To reiterate, the staff members of correctional institutions are concerned with the degree of maladjustment or severity of the criminality of the individual prisoner in order that they may provide sufficient, but

⁽¹³⁾ The case material which this scheme is based upon was collected by me during my contacts with inmates at the following institutions: the County Jails of Connecticut (primarily New Haven), New York State Training School for Boys (Watkins), and Woodbourne (N. Y.) State Institution for Defective Delinquents.

not too much, supervision; and for purposes of therapeutic efficiency, they are also concerned with the prisoner's prognosis, or treatability. Lastly, they wish to know what form of criminality he is suffering from and what manner of treatment he should be given.⁽¹⁴⁾ Therefore, a functional classification must be threefold: diagnostic, prognostic, and custodial. The terms used are not important. If and when an acceptable nosology is finally developed it may be more convenient to follow the usual practice and create symbols from Latin or Greek roots.

The Diagnostic Classification, composed of motivational syndromes.

Class 1. Compensatory Syndrome: Criminal or delinquent behavior characterized by this type of motivation stems from a combination of: (1) feelings of inadequate satisfaction of a normal need, i. e., sustenance needs, expressive needs, recognition, and development (new experience) needs.⁽¹⁵⁾ (For example: Young Smith, wishing to gain recognition in the eyes of a young lady steals a fine suit of clothes which he cannot afford.) Other sources of inadequacy feelings: intellectual subnormality, physical handicaps and inferiority, lack of social status, immaturity. (2) perverted feelings of inadequate need satisfaction. (For example: Due to habits of excessive spending or expensive tastes, Jones finds he is unable—unwilling—to moderate his appetite commensurate with his income and eventually he becomes a criminal to support it.) (3) external frustration of legitimate need satisfaction. (For example: Finding that girls are repulsed by his physical appearance, a misshapen farmhand commits rape upon a neighbor girl.)

a. *Aggressive Behavior:* The suggestion may take a variety of forms: overt physical violence, intellectual hate and vituperation or indecency, amassing quantities of useless commodities, bullying and braggadocio, fast driving, etc.

b. *Attention-getting Behavior:* This rarely results in a serious form of crime unless it is particularly difficult to gain attention of the interest-object, then it is unpredictable. Children and emotionally unstable adults have been known to commit a murder of an atrocious sort under

(14) I am partially indebted for this suggestion to Dr. Richard Jenkins, formerly psychiatrist at the Warwick State Training School for Boys, who suggested the multiple classification of etiology, type of offense, security needed and general type of treatment needed. The multiple recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' classification program also follows this idea.

(15) This is an adaptation of W. I. Thomas' famous "four wishes." See Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Boston, 1924. See discussion of them in Reckless, *op cit.*, p. 216f.

such motivation. When one finds the reason for the need for the abnormal amount of attention, treatment is relatively simple:

c. *Rationalized Behavior*, in which responsibility is projected upon a convenient cause. This has been noted as a common characteristic of criminals. A desire to have a certain object is suppressed until a satisfactory reason is found for taking it illegally. Once a crime is committed, the original motivation, even if known, is quickly overlaid with a firm camouflage of rationalization. Cause for the crime is projected on a drinking father, upbringing in slum areas, serious head injuries, bad companions, etc.—anything except the real reason. Well-meaning but sentimental-minded people often contribute freely to the rationalizations of these scoundrels.

d. *Imitative Behavior*: Another mechanism for adjusting to inferiority is the imitation of and thus the identification with a stronger or more adequate personality. This may be someone acquainted with the individual, or someone he has read about or seen in the cinema whom he has adopted as his ego—ideal or hero. Many boys in certain areas of our cities imbibed the "Cagney accent" and inflection as well as the Cagney hit-first-and-talk-later technique to quench their parched egos. This group may be combined with 2b below.

Class 2. Associative-learning Syndrome. It is good sociology to attribute certain peculiarities of individual behavior to the effect of living in a particular culture. It is good psychology to call this learning by (and from) association.

a. *Learned from the Primary Group.* Prison inmates are wont, as was stated above, to attribute their criminality to their upbringing. Often this is a rationalization, but many times it is also true. When it can be shown by the social investigation that the behavior of the offender is typical of that of the other members of his family or of other associates in the neighborhood in which he grew up, then we may safely assume that correctional work must take a path of re-education along more socially acceptable lines. This earlier criminalistic education may have been conducted by a family of professional criminals who consider it their duty to teach their offspring the trade (cf., the novel *February Hill*). But often it is a result of inadequate or incorrect methods of child-care and rearing which have either permitted the young to wander or have driven them from the home in pursuit of more satisfactory sur-

roundings. The youth often falls in with other groups as the next sub-head indicates.

b. *Learned from Secondary Groups.* This is the type of criminality which is picked up wherever the receptive personality chances to find it: in the gang, with occasional acquaintances, in the cinema, over the radio, in the newspapers or through other forms of educational contact (See Id). Usually this receptivity to crimino-educational factors in our culture is brought on by the non-satisfaction of certain needs. Yet many boys whose major needs are fairly satisfactorily met are often corrupted by continuous contact with a criminalitic group.

Class 3. Situationally-provoked Syndrome. Among the inmates of our county jails one frequently finds individuals convicted of petty crimes who, had they been more affluent or been permitted more time, might have worked out their problem to the greater satisfaction of all concerned. Sometimes their crimes are more serious and they get into our state prisons. But essentially they evidence the same type of criminality: behavior provoked by a frustrating social situation or combination of situations, such as:

a. *Environment Consistently Inadequate.* These are the "Jean Valjeans" of our criminal world. They turn to crime as a last resort. Although this submission to temptation may be complicated by vocational inadequacy, lack of proper training in self-control, or marked defectiveness, it is the more or less unforeseen pathological social situation which has contributed mostly to their condition. The recent depression furnished many example of these men.

b. *Complicated Social Crisis.* This group differs from that above primarily in the speed with which the situation closes in about the individual. Where the former carries the connotation of the "last straw" this may be alluded to as a crescendo of social complications. Repressions and frustrations "gang up" on this individual suddenly and he breaks into crime in almost an escapist panic. Embezzlers who seek this form of temporary relief from problems of intemperate living, mounting expenses, increasing demands, threats of discovery, family worries *ad infinitum* are a good example.

c. *Behavior Instigation by Another (sometimes the victim),* which the offender is induced to commit. Von Hentig⁽¹⁶⁾ has recently pointed

(16) Hans Von Hentig, Remarks on the Interaction of Perpetrator and Victim, *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, XXXI, (Sept. - Oct., 1940).

out that the perpetrator is often charged with the full responsibility for a crime which was essentially induced by another. He cites an example of an emotionally unbalanced, nagging wife who so taunted her husband that he finally murdered her, and then attempted suicide. Immature people are often induced (or seduced) by another party to commit an illegal act which the inducer wishes done but is unwilling to do himself. Close examination should be made, however, of the offender's reasons for committing the act before diagnosing him thus.

Class 4. Syndrome of Inadequate Behavior Controls. In this group one finds all those who have difficulty controlling or adapting their behavior sufficiently because of some individual defect, such as:

a. *Due to Mental Deficiency.* Although the borderline defectives may be classified in the first syndrome, we have here those whose deficiency of *social intelligence* is such that they do not seem to be able to comprehend wrong except of a very obvious kind. Or even if they can be taught what is wrong, their inhibitions are easily surmounted by an attractive desire.

b. *Due to Psychopathology.* The psychotics cannot, of course, be held responsible for their erratic or total lack of behavior control, but the psychopathic personalities retain too much semblance of normality to be excused. Yet this group is noticeably deficient in behavior control. A further breakdown of this group is currently being attempted by Karpman⁽¹⁷⁾ and others.

c. *Due to Immature Judgment.* This last of the defectively controlled sub-groups contains a large portion of youthful offenders, for in this group one finds those whose ability to think in an emergency is inadequate, who are unable to resist sudden impulse although they seem able to control those which come upon them more slowly. Whether it is emotional instability or what Pauline Young⁽¹⁸⁾ defines as deficient "social intelligence," which is the source of the inadequate behavior control, we have yet to learn.

d. *Due to Compulsion.* Criminality which is dictated by a severe fear or phobia.

(17) Ben Karpman, On the Need of Separating Psychopathy into Two Distinct Clinical Types, *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*, III (July 1941) 112.

(18) Pauline Young, Defective Social Intelligence as a Factor in Crime, *American Sociological Review*, 3, 2, (1938).

Class 5. Accidental Syndrome. Provision is made for this group solely to fill out the classification. These are not criminals, but their behavior has been such that Society, in the person of some tightminded judge, who required that somebody must pay for every offense, has passed sentence on them. Today there are relatively few genuine examples of this type in prison, although many will try to join their ranks through rationalization. These are the persons whose usual behavior is within the law. Some of them have been caught in an offense we all frequently commit and get away with: traffic violations, or criminal negligence due to procrastination. Others are guilty of an offense about which they knew nothing, nor did they intentionally break the law. They are in jail because they had one idea of lawful behavior but the law said another. They are not accidental offenders, they accidentally got caught. (This group also includes those who are imprisoned on a framed-up offense. But as there may also be called political criminals, it is probably useless to try to diagnose them as suffering from any of the foregoing forms of criminality.)

The Prognostic Classification.

Class 1. Poor: those inmates whose bad past record, advanced age, marked physical or mental incapacity or deep embitterment renders them "inoperable."

Class 2. Doubtful: those whose social adjustment is poor but who may respond to long treatment. Of those to be given treatment, this is the most questionable group. Their behavior pattern is deeply ingrained but there seem to be some chinks in their armor which treatment might penetrate.

Class 3. Hopeful: those who require intensive treatment and are able to profit by it. Willing subjects for study. Fair adjustment prospects.

Class 4. Excellent: occasionally one finds a prisoner whose adjustment is satisfactory, who apparently needs no special treatment except an occasional check-up, who was probably committed to prison to satisfy the community's punitive demands. These should not be confused with glib "professional" or "institution-wise" prisoners who are essentially doubtful material.

Class 5. Unknown: those whose prognosis is undeterminable because of erratic behavior and mixed reactions to institutional stimuli. The group which presents a constant challenge to the diagnostician.

The Custodial Classification: supervisory and housing recommendations.

Class 1. *Disciplinary*: maximum security under heavy watch, liberty restricted to cell or single room. (For mentally healthy cases undergoing punitive treatment for serious infraction of institution rules.)

Class 2. *Supervisory*: maximum supervision by trained officer, limited participation in small group activities, sleep solitarily. (For fractious cases whose mental health is questioned, occasionally trial discipline or protective custody.)

Class 3. *Limited Normal*: participation in any supervised phase of institutional work or recreational program, group (a) or individual (b) housing depending upon room available and inmate's behavior. (For those of the working group who require watching.)


Class 4. *Normal*: participation in any phase of program in accordance with inmate's abilities and wishes, minimum supervision, housing dependent upon available room and inmate's wishes. (For the bulk of the working population.)

Class 5. *Special*: not hospitalized or restricted but segregated individually or in groups for special treatment, training or research purpose, liberty according to individual recommendation.

Class 6. *Honor*: minimum supervision, placement in individual work often of an administrative nature, housing as available and desired but provision made for part-time privacy. (For those whose behavior and ability rate a special privilege.)

* * * *

This completes the proposed functional classification. The next step is the test of its applicability to an institutional population. Should it prove sound, then we can begin on the construction of a differential nosology, with elaborate treatment recommendations to replace the costly hodge-podge of individualized study and mass punishment we now call correction.



PSYCHOSES IN CRIMINALS A STUDY OF FIVE HUNDRED PSYCHOTIC PRISONERS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The records of 500 male psychotic prisoners were studied to gain insight into the following questions: are psychotic prisoners as a group distinguishable in their pre-psychotic histories from other prisoners and do psychoses in prisoners differ from those in non-prisoners. These 500 psychotics were consecutively admitted to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners from January 1, 1937 to January 1, 1941. The Medical Center is a general and psychiatric prison hospital that receives for treatment male prisoners from all Federal penal institutions; the majority come of course from the larger penitentiaries. Since the answer to the present problem involved chiefly sociologic and criminologic data, to be presented elsewhere, only the findings pertinent to a rounded psychiatric picture are included here. The diagnoses, symptoms and the onsets and outcomes of the 500 psychoses are presented and discussed in this communication.

There have been comparatively few psychiatric studies⁽¹⁻¹¹⁾ made on psychoses among prisoners. Yet the incidence of psychosis in prison repeatedly has been found high⁽¹²⁾: from 3% to Gluecks' classic⁽¹³⁾ study of reformatory inmates to 12% in Bernard Glueck's early investigation⁽¹⁴⁾ of Sing Sing prisoners. When it is recalled that approximately 0.3% of the general population are in mental institutions^(15a) it is obvious, even if this figure were to be doubled, that the frequency of psychoses in prison population is significantly greater than that in the general population. Unfortunately in this study the frequency cannot be

* From the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri.

estimated* due to the fact that all psychotics in the Federal penal system do not become patients at the Medical Center. Only those who are unable to adjust to regular penal life or whose psychoses seem to be more than transitory blowups are transferred to this institution.

II. PRISONERS, PSYCHOTIC AND NON-PSYCHOTIC

Findings, relative to the levels of inmate intelligence, have differed widely: the distribution curves found by others ranged from more dull normal and feeble-minded⁽¹⁶⁾ to more superior intelligences⁽¹⁷⁾ than the average population. The weight of evidence, at least in Federal prisoners,^(18a) points to a higher percentage of lower intelligences; the psychotics in this series had a similar distribution. The psychotics like nearly all (90%) of Federal prisoners were native-born. On the other hand, although over 20% of Federal prisoners are colored, only 12% of the psychotics at the Medical Center were negro. The Gluecks found that prisoners were commonly from socially and psychiatrically unhealthy homes; poverty-stricken, broken by death, divorce or absence of parents, and influenced by family immorality, cruelty and insanity. In the Medical Center psychotics such unfavorable environmental factors were even more common; 90% of homes were poor and 60% "unhealthy." Maladjustment of prisoners, beginning early in life, was common in the Gluecks study; many were behavior-problem children and many were retarded in school. Likewise in this series of patients 40% had a history of early abnormality (89% of those diagnosed as psychopathic personalities and 30% of those with other diagnoses) and the educational achievement was below that of other Federal prisoners—just one-third completed or went above grade-school. In adulthood Glueck found a high percentage of abnormalities; occupational and residential instability, drunkenness, addiction, neuroticism, etc. The same was true to a greater degree with this group of psychotics; hardly 10% could be considered normal. Marital instability is common in criminals and significantly more common in these patients; only 17% were able to achieve a stable marital relationship. About 18% of the patients had previous hospitalizations for mental disease and another 12% demonstrated psychotic symptomatology prior to the commission of the offense. The crimes committed by the psychotics and the sentences received were similar to those of all Federal prisoners. About 50% of all

* The 500 cases represent approximately 1% of male Federal prisoners in the 4 year period covered.

Federal prisoners are recidivists and 77% of the patients studied had previous criminal records.

In summarizing, the psychotic prisoners were not distinguishable qualitatively from the non-psychotic prisoners. Quantitatively their early environment was less favorable and their adjustments both in childhood and adulthood marked by more deviations from the normal.

III. DIAGNOSES

It is sometimes assumed that "prison psychosis" is a distinct entity seen frequently and only in prison populations. While certainly it is true that incarceration has a profound effect on many individuals and may through varying mechanisms precipitate a psychosis, the type of character of this psychosis seems to be determined largely by pre-psychotic personality factors. The same may be said about "situational psychosis." These terms, then, were not used in the classification given in Table I. However, whenever the situational elements appeared to be the most important factors in determining the type of psychosis these (except for the psychopathic personalities) were listed under the specific disorders as a sub-type (e. g. Paranoid State, Situational).

Table I gives the nosologic breakdown for the 500 consecutive cases together with the percentages for the various diagnostic groups derived from the Census report on first male admission to State Hospitals.^(15b) The high incidence of schizophrenia or dementia praecox (here used synonymously) in psychotic prisoners, 43.4% of this series* compared to 20.5% of State Hospital admissions, is striking. This is similar to figures published in previous studies: Pinto de Toledo⁽⁶⁾ found 40.3% in 152 cases, Martin⁽⁷⁾ 41.7% in 103 and Webster⁽⁸⁾ 41.2% in 250. The fact that dementia praecox occurs twice as frequently in criminal psychotics as in non-criminal and comprises almost half of the psychoses among the former, deserved careful consideration.

The question of whether criminalism itself could be an integral part of a schizophrenic behavior pattern was studied. It seemed important to differentiate the following possible relationships in each case. (1) criminalism as a symptom of schizophrenic withdrawal or flight with gradual decompensation into frank psychosis or with sudden pre-

* To this figure some observers might add the 31 cases (6.2%) that were classified under psychosis with Psychopathic Personality; the reasons for not having done so are stated later on.

cipitation into psychosis after incarceration; (2) criminalism as an expression of uncontrolled hostility with psychosis resulting from the attempt to deny or project this unacceptable hostility; (3) isolated criminal acts in response to schizophrenic thinking or delusional ideas (criminal intent may or may not have been present) and (4) crimes or criminalism apparently unrelated to the subsequent psychosis or to the pre-psychotic personality but related more to other factors such as economic duress, community or business mores, criminal environment, etc. A preponderance of cases in the first two categories would tend to indicate that criminalism attracted to its ranks proportionately more developing schizophrenics than did non-criminal modes of behavior; a preponderance in the third category would suggest that our legal apparatus was faulty in its efforts to eliminate from conviction those "not responsible" for their behavior; a majority in the fourth group where the psychosis is not related to the criminalism would point to the prison environment as the more responsible factor in the high frequency of schizophrenia. It was found that in over 50% criminalism (not isolated acts) could be considered part of the schizophrenic picture. The following cases were chosen to illustrate the categories given in Table II.

Case I—Criminalism as schizophrenic withdrawal and gradual decompensation.

Case II—Criminalism as schizophrenic withdrawal and sudden precipitation.

Case III—Criminalism as pre-psychotic hostility.

Case IV—Isolated criminal behavior in response to delusion (or schizophrenic thinking).

Case V—Criminalism unrelated to schizophrenia; psychosis precipitated by incarceration.

Case VI—Criminalism unrelated to schizophrenia; psychosis precipitated by homosexual conflict.

Case VII—Criminalism unrelated to schizophrenia; psychosis precipitated by excess guilt feelings.

Case VIII—Criminalism unrelated to schizophrenia; psychosis precipitated by prison situation.

By no means can the conclusion be drawn that criminality is always a schizophrenic symptom. But it is not difficult to see how it

becomes part of the schizophrenic process. Criminality serves as a mode of withdrawal from unfriendly reality, a release from family, social and heterosexual responsibility, a retreat during incarceration to a secure and protected environment with no compulsion to make important decisions or exert initiative; or with other criminalism serves as an avenue for the discharge of excessive hostilities—an avenue acceptable to the ego prior to decompensation into psychosis. How this particular "criminality symptom" develops rather than other symptoms (modes of living), of course, is not explained; the answer must be sought not only in sociologic and other data but also in the psychodynamics of each individual case.

Psychosis with Psychopathic Personality (here considered synonymous with Psychosis with Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority), with a frequency of 15% compared to 1.5% in State Hospitals, presents itself as the second most important diagnostic group. Others have reported even higher frequencies: Webster⁽⁸⁾ found 34.4% and Pinto de Toledo⁽⁶⁾ 32.6% "paraphrenia" (apparently his designation for this type of psychosis). Perhaps the lower incidence found in this study is due to the characteristic transiency of symptoms, too brief at the referring institution to warrant transfer to the Medical Center. It is not difficult to find explanation for the prevalence of psychoses with psychopathic personality among prisoners. Psychopathic personalities are narcissistic, immature, unrepessed and lacking in regard to society. It is expected that not only do they come in frequent conflict with the law but, due to their poor frustration tolerance, are easily precipitated into psychosis.

It is notable that almost one half of the psychopathic personality cases exhibited schizophrenic symptomatology; also one third of the schizophrenic cases had pre-psychotic histories suggestive of psychopathic personality. No attempt will be made to discuss the relationship between the two disorders, which has been noted by others,⁽¹⁹⁾ however the differentiating criteria used will be presented. Whenever the symptomatology observed or described was typically schizophrenic, i. e., with disturbances of affect, association, attention, and contact,⁽²⁰⁾ regardless of previous personality and outcome, the psychosis was considered dementia praecox. On the other hand, whenever the symptomatology was atypically schizophrenic or the motivating force consciously determined (e. g., to be removed from disciplinary difficulties) with a disappearance of the schizophreniform episode on removal of stimulus⁽²¹⁾ the psychosis was deemed to fall in the category of psychopathic personality—pro-

viding of course that previous personality and behavior were in accord with that diagnosis. Several varieties of these schizophreniform syndromes, illustrated below by case histories, were observed: (1) an atypical syndrome with alteration of affect and thinking but with normal contact and attention, (2) transient symptoms later described by the patient as an "act" (usually regarded by the staff as an half-truth) and (3) schizophrenic symptoms accompanied by confusional features all of which disappear on arrival at the Medical Center.

Case IX—Atypical psychotic syndrome in a psychopathic personality.

Case X—The psychopathic "act" psychosis.

Case XI—The schizophreniform psychosis in a psychopathic personality.

Other psychotic reactions observed in psychopathic personalities were (1) the "pure" exaggerated temper tantrum often with paranoid projections and transient confusion, (2) the prolonged behavior abnormalities and (3) the "affective" types that bear a close resemblance to reactive depressions. Illustrative cases are cited.

Case XII—The temper tantrum psychosis.

Case XIII—The prolonged behavior psychosis.

Case XIV—The affective psychopathic psychosis.

Psychoses with mental deficiencies were twice as frequent as in non-prison psychoses,—an unexpected relationship in view of the relatively high frequency of mental deficiency among prisoners. Paranoid conditions were encountered three times as often as in non-criminals. Nearly one-third (often colored) were clearly reactions to prison environment and another third were paranoid states developing in criminals who previously could be considered psychopathic personalities. Two such cases are included at the end of this section. Affective psychoses and all organic and toxic psychoses were relatively less common than in civilian population. Perhaps the "organic" were to incapacitated to indulge in crime and were more easily weeded out before commission of crimes or conviction. There was no adequate explanation for the infrequency of manic-depressive psychosis, 1.8%; this fact has been reported by others.⁽⁷⁾ Perhaps it may be said that manic-depressives are

essentially non-antisocial; their hostility is either denied or internally directed. In the undiagnosed psychosis group, cases were included in which the question of the existence of psychosis was doubtful (severe neuroses, borderline symptoms that never progressed to open psychosis, *eac.*), cases in which the suspicion of organic or toxic elements existed, and those in which odd bizarre atypical symptomatology was encountered. An example of the last type is included below:

Case XV—Paranoid state, situational.

Case XVI—Paranoid state in a psychopathic personality.

Case XVII—Undiagnosed psychosis.

IV. SYMPTOMATOLOGY

Symptoms in prisoner psychoses have been thoroughly described by previous investigators. Though the content is quite naturally influenced by criminal experiences and prison environment, very few symptoms are actually peculiar to inmate psychoses. The incidence of the various symptoms, however, differs from that seen in civilian psychoses. The frequencies are given in Table III.

Paranoid delusions (including grandiosity) were the most common abnormal phenomena encountered (80%). It was the most frequent (aside from paranoid conditions) in schizophrenics—92%. This is not unexpected. Prison is a repressive and frustrating environment that can easily arouse hostile feelings. Furthermore, it has already been suggested that many of these patients before incarceration possess excessive hostility which becomes projected into paranoid delusions. The most common specific type of delusion is persecution by poisoning—food, gas, medication, etc. Grandiosity was relatively infrequent (78 or 15.6%) and without persecutory ideas rare (15 or 3%). Persecution involving “informers,” though uncommon (4%), is a form of paranoid projection probably specific to prison environment (*cf.* case XVIII).

Homosexuality, in the form of openly expressed conflict (delusions) or in the form of overt behavior, did not appear prominent in the general symptomatology. This does not detract, of course, from the importance of unconscious homosexual conflict as a potent psychodynamic factor. Overt homosexuality, according to Pescor and Wilson,^(18b) occurs in about 10% of all prisoners; 8% of these psychotics exhibited perverse activity, a comparable percentage. Perversion is common

among mental defective prisoners;^(18c) 37% of the mental defective psychotics engaged in homosexual practices.

Depression and/or apathy are the common emotional reactions; either occurs in almost one-half of the patients. As might be expected, apathy occurred more often in schizophrenics (74%) and depression in affective psychotics (90%). Suicidal attempts were made by 24% of all patients; only 4 of the 121 attempts were successful. On the other hand euphoria was uncommon; 72 exhibited an elevated mood, only 42 (8.4%) without at some other time being depressed. Apprehension was the dominant mood at the onset (not later) of 20.6% of psychoses. Most often it was in response to delusions of being killed, poisoned, or attacked; less commonly, undefined fear or fear of "blowing their tops," failing health, etc.

Perceptual defects are common; over half were hallucinated (78% of schizophrenics) and two-fifths confused and disoriented. Volitional abnormalities were less frequent, but the high number of assaultive patients (110) was significant and indicative of the hostility harbored.

The severity and duration of psychotic symptoms are tabulated according to diagnosis in Table IV. Minimal symptoms were seen in 38 (7.6%) patients and transient symptoms in 80 (16.0%). The mildest symptomatology occurred in psychoses with psychopathic personality and the severest in dementia praecox, affective psychoses, paranoid conditions and senile and arteriosclerotic psychoses.

V. ONSET OF PSYCHOSIS AND AGE AT ADMISSION

It is very difficult to designate an onset of psychosis prior to the commission of the offense when lay pre-sentence reports have to be interpreted in accordance with later developments. Therefore, onsets before commission of the current crime were divided into definite and probable groups. The onset of psychosis may be after the offense was committed but before incarceration (during the trial interval); these cases, since all prisoners admitted to Federal institutions are examined shortly after arrival, would be detected at incarceration. But after admission, all prisoners are under psychiatric surveillance and the onsets subsequent to incarceration are more accurately determined.

Table V is an analysis of onset in the 500 cases. Only 7.4% could be considered definitely psychotic before the offense and another 4.8% probably psychotic—a total of 12.2%. Add to this group of patients

first known to be psychotic at incarceration (78 or 15.6%), and the percentage is a little more than one-fourth (27.8%) of patients. Compared with the 1.5% of criminals that Bromberg and Thompson⁽²²⁾ found psychotic before their incarceration, the number is insignificant and represents 0.3% of those committed to Federal institutions during the four year period studied. The crime was intimately associated with the psychotic symptomatology in only 16 (3.2%). Of those psychotic before the offense 66% were schizophrenic and 18% paretic; 55% of alcoholic psychotics and none of the psychopathic personality psychotics were diagnosed as ill before experiencing penitentiary life.

The majority of patients (51.8%) decompensated into psychosis by the end of the first year of penal life, 37.4% before six months and the remaining 14.4% between six months and one year. This left 20.4% whose onsets occurred after one year of penal life. Thus the material on onsets suggest that prison life itself cannot be considered a causative factor in the psychoses. If prison life itself were the principle factor the onsets should be gradual and noted more often after the first year in prison. The precipitating factor appears to be the psychological significance that imprisonment has for the individual; some of the many mechanisms involved, e. g. frustrations in incarceration, loss of community standing, homosexual conflicts, excess guilt, were suggested by Cases V, VIII. But once the impact of incarceration has been weathered, relatively few become psychotic. Mental defective (73%), affective (56%) and senile and arteriosclerotic (53%) psychoses exhibited the most frequent breakdowns during the first six months of prison life. On the other hand 45% of paranoid conditions developed after long incarceration.

Figure 1 gives the age distribution curve according to the decade of life on admission to the Medical Center. The peak occurred in the fourth decade and the mean age was 33.6 years. Schizophrenia and psychosis with psychopathic personality occurred more often in younger individuals, with the peak in the third decade and a mean age of about 30.

VI. RESULTS

As long as a prisoner is psychotic he remains under Federal Custody until his maximum sentence has been served. Upon release he is sent to his home community for hospitalization. If he recovers he is eligible for discharge on parole or conditional release or may be transferred to a regular penal institution, etc. Patients were followed, when possible, up to July 1, 1941 and their status at this time is reported in Table VI. Since

information is lacking on the majority of those discharged the status reported (except for six who were known to relapse immediately) is that upon release from the Medical Center. The terms used are those generally accepted in the literature; *remission* signifies absence of psychotic symptomatology, although insight may be defective, and *greatly improved*, the absence of major symptomatology (these patients would be paroled if in State Hospitals). The sum of these two, "Socially Recovered," has no significance in relation to anti-social behavior. The remaining patients, those unimproved or slightly improved, required continuous institutional care. An analysis of the 15 deaths is also included in Table VI.

Contrary to the impression that psychotic prisoners are "hopeless," 42.6% of all cases recovered. However it is important to remember that all but one of the 118 who had mild symptomatology recovered and comprised 55% of those with a favorable outcome. It may be expected then that the psychoses with the highest frequency of mild symptomatology (Table IV) have the best outlook: psychosis with psychopathic personality, mental deficiency, undiagnosed psychosis and alcoholic psychosis. Another surprising finding is the *low* recovery rate of schizophrenia—18%. In recent years, comparable recovery figures—both for "spontaneous" and "shock" cures—run much higher for non-prisoner schizophrenics; about 30% in state hospitals^(20 23) and nearly 40% in private institutions.^(24 25)

The data were analyzed for significant factors in recovery. Negroes had the best response of any racial group: 59% recovered; native second (or more) generation whites came next with 47%. The poorest was noted in Indians—18%, Mexicans 21% (none of the schizophrenic Mexicans recovered), and the European or Canadian foreign-born whites 24%. Table VII gives the recovery rate for each level of mental age. Excluding the feeble-minded (who had a relatively good prognosis) and the very superior (who had a poor outlook) recovery is roughly proportionately to tested intelligence. This has been suggested by the studies of Malamud⁽²⁰⁾ on schizophrenics.

Environmental factors were unimportant statistically in determining the prognosis. The childhood adjustment of the patient had no relation to the outcome of the later psychosis; neither did the adult adjustment factors of occupational instability, transiency, alcoholism, narcotic addiction and previous hospitalizations for mental disease. On the other hand the higher the educational achievement, the more favorable

the outcome; 58% of those who were educated beyond high school recovered compared to 52.1% with just high school diplomas, 47.4% with grade school education and 39.2% with uncompleted grade school work. Marital maladjustment is an indicator of poor prognosis. Those patients who exhibited symptomatology just prior to arrest had a poor outlook; only 31.2% responded to treatment. Previous criminalism or penitentiary experience had no adverse relationship to recovery. Those psychotics imprisoned for immigration violations (14.3% recovered) and for violent crimes (27.3%) showed the least response to treatment, while those incarcerated for crimes of acquisitiveness the best (49.4%).

Acuteness of onset of mental disease is an important factor in prognosis.⁽²⁵⁾ The patients whose onsets occurred before the commission of the current offense were usually those who had been sick for a long time (chronic onset); according the prognosis should have been and was poor: only 16.4% recovered. Onsets noted at incarceration and before six months of prison life were usually acute; the prognosis was expectedly better: 51% recovered. Onsets after six months incarceration were both acute and chronic (subacute): accordingly 39% recovered. When it is realized that 265 (53%) of the psychoses had an acute onset and 174 (34.8%) a subacute onset, it is not surprising that the general recovery rate was good.

Psychotic symptoms that foreshadowed a poor prognosis were delusions of poisoning (28.2% recovered), apathy (29.4%), assaultiveness (26.4%) and overt homosexuality (26.3%). The poor prognosis in schizophrenia (18%) remains unexplained. From the above designations of onset, 45.6% of schizophrenics were acute, 35.9% subacute and 18.5% chronic; yet the recoveries were only 23.2%, 15.1% and 10.0% respectively in each group (compared to the general responses of 51%, 39% and 16%). The relationship between schizophrenia and criminalism mentioned previously was of no statistical aid in explaining this poor prognosis.

Specialized treatment was given paretics and schizophrenics. Thirty-seven of the neuro-luetics received malarial therapy; of these 19 recovered. Thirteen did not receive this treatment, chiefly because of physical incapacity; five of these recovered by chemotherapy alone. Thirty-four schizophrenics had courses of metrazol injections; only six (18%) recovered. The results were influenced by the difficulty of obtaining permission in favorable cases; the disease was long standing in 65% of those treated. Although not as strikingly successful as in state

hospital or private practice, the use of metrazol is considered justifiable since in all but eight of those treated institutional adjustment was improved and in isolated cases, such as reported below, its effect was dramatic and almost life-saving.

Case XVIII—Recovery with metrazol.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The records of 500 male psychotics received at the Medical Center for Federal prisoners from 1937 to 1941 were studied. It was found that the backgrounds, equipment, personality, previous adjustment and criminalism of psychotic prisoners, while slightly less favorable, do not differ qualitatively from those of non-psychotic prisoners. On the other hand the psychoses of inmates differ quantitatively and qualitatively from civilian psychoses. The following observations were made:

1. Dementia Praecox (Schizophrenia), and Psychosis with Psychopathic Personality are seen in far greater proportions than in non-penal psychiatry and constitute the major problem in prisoner psychoses. Affective psychoses and the organic psychoses are relatively uncommon.
2. The greater number of dementia praecox cases is probably due to the fact that criminalism is often part of a schizophrenic behavior pattern. Psychopathic personalities, also by virtue of their characteristics, are more prone to law violations and transient psychoses.
3. Paranoid symptoms are almost universal and depression, often with suicidal attempts, is common.
4. Relatively few prisoners were psychotic before committing the offense, but four-fifths were before the end of one year of penal life.
5. Over two-fifths of all patients recovered, but the prognosis for schizophrenia is exceedingly poor (18%). No adequate explanation for the latter was found. Metrazol treatment in schizophrenics, while justified, did not raise the rate of recoveries.

Further studies will be necessary to delineate the psychotic prisoner group from other prisoners and from civilian psychotics. Two future lines of approach seem indicated, especially with the most frequent psychosis, schizophrenia: (1) non-prisoner psychotics might be compared with prisoner-psychotics (with similar backgrounds, etc). and (2) the post-release adjustments of the psychotic prisoners could be determined by accurate follow-up studies.

Case I-35, committed on a three year sentence for theft of mail, diagnosed as paranoid dementia praecox.

He was a well behaved and shy child. Both parents died before he was 15 and at that age he left his older sisters and never after regained contact with his relatives. He led a vagrant existence, never held a steady job, never went out with girls, never developed any close interpersonal relationships and was known as a "peculiar" personality and occasional drunkard. Criminalism began at fifteen and of the succeeding twenty years seventeen were spent in jails and state prisons for petty larceny, robbery, burglary, vagrancy and drunkenness. On all prior incarcerations he was seclusive, disinterested but contented. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he seemed introverted and "on guard." Three months later he was sent to the hospital for screaming in his cell at night because "people cussed me." He revealed that for eleven years he had been "fighting some gangs who had a death-ray machine." His attitude was suspicious, his manner sententious and his thinking processes illogical and disconnected. He had a poorly organized but fixed paranoid delusional system. He was emotionally flat, without interests, plans or desires. In the two years at the Medical Center he became progressively more seclusive, uncommunicative and withdrawn.

This patient was a schizoid child and without emotional ties after the death of his parents. Criminalism served as a mode for escape from social responsibilities and incarceration afforded security. The development of psychosis was probably gradual and represented further withdrawal from reality.

Case II-34, committed on a year and a day sentence for possession of untaxed liquor, diagnosed as a catatonic dementia praecox.

He was an obedient and retiring child, the second of a large law-abiding family. His father was an alcoholic. The patient quit school at an early age due to lack of interest and stopped work because of "weakness." He seemed introverted, never went out with girls and always suffered somatic symptoms which he used as an excuse for drinking. At sixteen he became a bootlegger and was fined and jailed many times in succeeding years for liquor law violations, drunkenness and larceny. He served a two-year penitentiary sentence at twenty-one. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he seemed passive, uncommunicative and indifferent. Six weeks later he suddenly became fearful, tense, confused and claimed he was "doped." Voices gave him contradictory commands. Oral productions were incoherent and finally stopped. He was negativistic, stared at the wall and several times became dangerously assaultive. A course of twenty metrazol treatments was given. He improved to the extent of making a better institutional adjustment but remained apathetic and at his maximum term was discharged to a state hospital.

This patient was schizoid, inadequate socially and occupationally. Criminalism and alcoholism enabled him to adjust at a precarious level, but also represented partial withdrawal from reality. Psychosis was quickly precipitated by incarceration; metrazol did not result in a cure, probably because of his basically schizophrenic personality.

Case III-25, committed on a twenty year sentence for interstate transportation of stolen autos, diagnosed as paranoid dementia praecox.

He was the only delinquent in a poor family of six. His father was unstable, alcoholic and cruel; the patient reacted to maltreatment by disobedience, stubbornness, moodiness and truancy. He was placed in a boy's school at fourteen and later ran away from home at sixteen. For five years he was a transient but settled down to work as a landscape gardener for a year. People who knew him then stated that he was honest, industrious, idealistic, generous and sexually puritanical. After he was laid off work he

found difficulty in making a living and finally became desperate. As he later explained, "I either had to become a gigolo or take a gun, so I took the gun." He embarked on a wild escapade of crime which lasted eight months; he stole nine autos, committed fifty burglaries and holdups in five states and wounded several during these holdups. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he was cheerful, talkative and cynical. Six months later he suddenly refused to write to his family. He became seclusive, sensitive, paranoid towards others and after a year of incarceration, was hospitalized. He believed there were "eighteen different attempts on my life" because enemies were trying to interfere with his mission to save the institution from bombing, graft, etc., and the world from evil. The patient communicated with God and believed himself a Messiah whose sin of "blowing up and giving in to crime rather than venality" was forgiven. He was emotionally flat and without insight. Metrazol treatment was refused by relatives. The first year of treatment at the Medical Center resulted in no change in his condition.

The patient suffered severe emotional deprivations during childhood to which he reacted with aggressive behavior and flight. He tried to lead an idealistic ascetic life, a denial of his hostile feelings. When this effort failed and when he was reduced to poverty the hostility evidently gained ascendancy and he embarked on a mad career of robbery and assault. That his flagrant crimes were psychologically determined was suggested by his own remarks. After incarceration there occurred unconscious expiation for his aggressions with projection of the hostilities into persecutory delusions with the development of ego-saving omniscience.

Case IV-21, committed for a found year sentence for transportation of a stolen auto across state lines, diagnosed as a hebephrenic dementia praecox.

The patient's childhood was marred by a drunken, abusive and cruel father, who eventually was committed to a mental institution. He was considered a normal child, devoted to his mother and siblings. He worked hard from the age of fifteen on and at eighteen became manager of a small city chain store. At 19 he began to feel that his employer was picking on him, talking about him, and finally poisoning his food and tormenting by voice. Later he claimed he had homosexual relations with this man. The patient tried to avoid his persecutor and finally, in desperation, left his job and home. He protected himself against attack with a gun and once was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. Several months later, he conceived the idea of stealing a car, so that he could get in prison, have a testicle removed and then be pardoned by the President and his employer. On admission to the Federal penitentiary the patient was obviously psychotic. He was silly, grinned inappropriately and expressed changeable bizarre delusions and hallucinations. His condition gradually became worse. He attempted suicide several times, tried to escape, had periods of negativism and asautiveness and was more seclusive before discharge to a state hospital at his maximum time.

This patient was obviously not a criminal and his criminal act was causally related to the pre-existing schizophrenia.

Case V-35, committed on a two year sentence for using the mails to defraud, diagnosed as a hebephrenic dementia praecox.

The patient had a better than average background, was considered a normal child and was graduated from college. He went into the stock and finance business and was eminently successful. He married young, but after eleven years divorced "because my wife was too frigid" and married his secretary. Three years later one of the large companies in which he held office failed and the patient lost all his money. He was convicted of using the mails to defraud. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he seemed to be free of psychosis and to have a good attitude toward his conviction. He made an

initial good adjustment, but after several months became seclusive, withdrawn and depressed. He was confused, expressed ideas of reference, believed someone outside "has it in for me" and "influences my mind." Later he became silly, giggled inappropriately, thought himself bisexual and in possession of unusual powers. His thinking remained illogical and disconnected and his affect inappropriate but some of the more obvious delusional material disappeared. He was discharged at maximum term to a state hospital.

This patient, who before was a respected member of his community, lost all prestige and material possessions by the company failure and subsequent conviction and incarceration. This apparently was too much of a blow and gradually broke down his defenses. He "escaped" into psychosis.

Case VI-24, committed on a year and a day sentence for an interstate shipment theft, diagnosed as catatonic dementia praecox.

The patient was the youngest of five; two older siblings were mental defectives and two criminals. He was a normal child, interested in study and music. He worked hard as a mechanic and showed the average interests of a young man. After he lost his job he was induced into crime by his older brothers and was fined several times for minor offenses before the current one. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he was friendly, cheerful, polite and cooperative. Three months later he unsuccessfully defended himself against a sexual assault by other inmates. Three weeks afterwards he was admitted to the hospital, convinced that he but a few moments to live. Then he became confused, depressed, retarded, untidy and negativistic. He varied between catatonia and violent assaultiveness. On rare occasions he talked and revealed auditory ("bad names") and olfactory ("bad smells") hallucinations and delusions of being poisoned. At the end of maximum term he was discharged unimproved to a state hospital.

This is a history of a presumably normal man who was apparently led into crime by economic duress and the influence of older siblings. He reacted with extreme conflict to assault and was precipitated into catatonia.

Case VII-29, negro, committed on a year and a day sentence for liquor law violations, diagnosed as catatonic dementia praecox.

The patient had an uneventful childhood. He started to work at an early age and at twenty opened a barber shop and as a sideline, an illicit liquor business, which he ran until arrested on the current charge. He married at twenty-four and raised a family. He worried often about his illegal activities, was almost a "nervous wreck," became over-religious and occasionally heard "warning voices." On admission to the Federal penitentiary he was quiet and cooperated well in the treatment of an old gonorrhea. One month later he was found in the hall rigid, negativistic, and repeating "how come yo' all do me this way?" He believed he was being poisoned, became confused, mute, and at times had periods of excitement in which he prayed loudly to the Lord "to be given a chance." Gradually the patient's condition improved and he gained insight into his psychosis. He realized that law violations caused him too much anxiety. He was discharged as "recovered" on conditional release.

In this case the important factor contributing to the psychosis was a punishing conscience which would not let the patient "get away" with law violations. Arrest, separation from loved ones and the uncertainty of his new environment broke down his defenses. "Serving time" apparently assuaged his super-ego and recovery followed.

Case VIII-27, committed on a six year sentence for narcotic sale, diagnosed as paranoid demntia praecox.

The patient was brought up in a delinquency area and his father was a drunkard and deserted. He was a problem child in school and a petty gambler as a youth. He

served one penitentiary sentence for narcotic sales from twenty to twenty-two. Following that he made a good adjustment, planned to marry, but was induced to make "extra money" by acting as a go-between for a narcotic sale. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he seemed bitter over his sentence. However, he made an excellent adjustment and obtained a job in the prison industries. After one year he was transferred to a lighter custody institution. Two months after transfer he "blew up" over the fact that through an error, his fiancée had been removed from his mailing list and he had not yet been placed in the industries. He rapidly developed ideas of persecution, believed his mind was being controlled by dictaphones, thought his food was poisoned and smelled burning bodies outside of his cell. He was flat, seclusive and without insight. During two years residence at Medical Center he gradually improved and became lively, friendly and a reliable worker. He was no longer bothered by persecutions although he still believed they "had it in for him" at the referring institution.

Criminalism in this patient seemed to be related more to community mores and poor judgment. For some reason he was able to withstand the frustration of incarceration but not the later frustrations arising out of his transfer.

Case IX-22, committed on a three year sentence for transportation of a stolen auto across state lines, diagnosed as psychosis with psychopathic personality.

The patient was from early childhood spoiled, disobedient, hard to handle, unreliable, untruthful and, later on, a thief and truant. He left home at fifteen to become a transient, was arrested several times for petty larceny and spent a year in a reform school. He was recognized as an unstable psychopath on admission to the Federal reformatory. Within several months he got into disciplinary difficulties and when punished set fire to his cell. He began telling fantastic tales of his "life" to the doctors, each a different one on succeeding days, all palpable lies and all preceded with a confession that yesterday's story was false and today's the "real truth." Some concerned his sexual experiences (had had relations with "more than five hundred women"), others his radio contracts as a musician, his "persecution" by homosexuals or his role in a gigantic car ring, etc. These tales were close to delusions (he once thought a magazine would "buy" his life story), were told with circumstantiality and with loose sound and word associations. His affect was shallow and inappropriate. Otherwise, the patient maintained good contact with his surroundings and was not bizarre in action. In two years residence at the Medical Center he gradually improved. The "stories" were told less frequently and finally stopped. He remained an unreliable psychopath in other respects.

This patient had a disturbance of thinking processes and of affect, both very suggestive of schizophrenia. Nevertheless he maintained good contact with his situation and could not be classed as a praecox.

Case X-25, committed on a three year sentence for forgery, diagnosed as psychosis with psychopathic personality.

The patient's father was cruel and separated from his wife when the patient was thirteen. He was a moody child, suffered headaches, was difficult to handle, a behavior problem in school and a runaway from home. He became a petty thief, a nomad at sixteen and served a penitentiary sentence from eighteen to twenty-one. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he seemed unstable and antagonistic. He made an exceedingly poor adjustment, was impulsively insolent, disobedient and worked sporadically. After a year he was placed in segregation for inciting others to riot and was brought under psychiatric surveillance for episodes of destructiveness. On the N-P ward he was negativistic, sang and cursed loudly at night and during the day appeared confused, mute and disinterested. After two months of that behavior he was transferred to the Medical

Center. On arrival he was in perfect contact with his surroundings and claimed he "faked" his psychosis to get away from the referring institution where he "messed up." No further psychotic symptoms were observed in the following year. He was often uncooperative and impulsively belligerent but did not become involved in any major disciplinary infractions.

The patient's psychotic episode had many schizophrenic features (catatonia) but was largely malingered and disappeared when removed from the exciting circumstances.

Case XI-20, committed on a two year sentence for transportation of a stolen auto across state lines, diagnosed as psychosis with psychopathic personality.

The father deserted the family when the patient was five. The patient was a stubborn, irritable, demanding child, truant from school and unable to get along with his siblings and playmates. He was completely unreliable, stole from everyone and forged checks on his family; an overindulgent grandmother saved him from court proceedings. He married at eighteen and deserted his wife two months later to become a transient. On admission to the Federal reformatory he seemed immature, indifferent and impudent. Within a month he violated prison rules, was antagonistic to the personnel and fought with inmates whom he claimed were kidding him and calling him "bad names." He thought everyone "had it in for me," became agitated, confused and demanded to be "locked away from everyone." Affect was flat and he was untidy in person. On arrival at Medical Center his psychotic symptoms disappeared and he admitted that he "blew his top." He made a marginal adjustment at first but improved later and gained some insight into his personality defects. He was discharged on conditional release as "recovered."

The patient's psychosis was close to dementia praecox but was largely situational (it was his first institutional contact with other aggressive psychopaths) and he did not lose contact with his environment. Removal to more sympathetic surroundings brought about immediate remission of symptoms.

Case XII-23, committed on a four year sentence for mailing an extortion letter, diagnosed as psychosis with psychopathic personality.

The patient was an illegitimate child, raised by his mother and by foster-parents. He was an over-active, quarrelsome, demanding child, unable to adjust in any home or school. When his mother married "to give him a father" he left home "in a rage." He became a transient for the next six years, living by parasitic deception of the gullible. He was an incessant publicity-seeker and "faked" psychosis to be admitted to no less than nine mental institutions, often for food and often "to outwit the doctors." He committed the current crime with full newspaper publicity beforehand "to see what the Federal reformatory could do for me." On admission to the Federal reformatory, the psychiatrist felt this egotistic boy would have a malevolent influence on the institution. He was transferred to a penitentiary. There he threatened "dire results" if he were not returned to the reformatory and soon caused fights by taunting others. When isolated, he flew into a temper-tantrum and destroyed his room furniture. In a stripped cell he became noisy, excited, challenged everyone to a battle, asked repeatedly for "conferences" with psychiatrists, demanded special privileges, etc. Denials brought forth further expression of anger, temper, threats to castrate himself, to commit suicide, to beat up everyone, to expose to the world the "brutality" of prison officials who were "persecuting" him. He was unamenable to reason. Restoration of any privilege led him to demand impossible concessions and inevitably to frustration, paranoid projections and temper-tantrums. On admission to the Medical Center no psychotic behavior was ob-

servable. Gradually his privileges were restored. In the following two years there were no psychotic episodes. His personality remained the same and his adjustment marginal.

This narcissistic patient was unable to accept a frustrating situation and reacted with infantile destructiveness and paranoid projection sufficiently removed from reality to constitute a major if transient psychosis.

Case XIII-41, committed on a two year sentence for forgery, diagnosed as psychosis with psychopathic personality.

The patient was an unruly, demanding child, a problem in school and a runaway from home at twelve. Criminal career began early and he was imprisoned in county, state and Federal institutions for crimes ranging from sodomy to impersonation. He was migratory, unstable occupationally, a deserter of three wives. On admission into the Federal penitentiary, there were no unusual psychiatric signs. After several months he reported that he had "epilepsy" and malingered attacks. At the Medical Center these disappeared. However, he was quarrelsome, domineering towards others, insolent to officers, feigned many types of illness from tuberculosis to "worms" to avoid work, lied purposefully without compunction and violated nearly all institutional rules. He agitated other patients, stole clothes and food, not so much for his personal gain but to harass the staff. Then he began to "amuse" himself with deteriorated psychotics, maliciously torturing and striking them and attempting to assault them sexually. Often psychomotor activity was increased and his mood elevated. He always denied his misdeeds, blamed others and had absolutely no insight. He was placed on psychotic status and remained until his maximum expiration date. No change in his behavior occurred and most of his time was necessarily spent in isolation. Two months after release word was received that he was in a state penitentiary for forgery and had feigned tuberculosis.

Although classical symptoms of psychosis were lacking, his overactivity and aggressive anti-social behavior were so extreme, so primitive in motivation, so uncontrollable, without being recognized as such, that it could only be concluded that the patient was acting on a psychotic plane. Recovery did not occur.

Case XIV-38, committed on a five year sentence for sale of narcotics, diagnosed as psychosis with psychopathic personality (reactive depression).

The patient's father, uncle and two brothers were drug addicts. Patient early showed abnormalities, was a behavior problem in school and was sent to a reform school in adolescence. At eighteen he became addicted to drugs; he used at various times morphine, heroin, opium, marijuana, nembutal and alcohol. At nineteen, he married an older woman after knowing her ten days; they separated three months later. He made a poor adjustment occupationally, resorted to thievery and sale of narcotics to support his habit and spent one half of his life in penitentiaries after the age of twenty-four. On a previous Federal sentence he had a mild depression, impressed the psychiatrist as being an inadequate type of psychopathic personality. On this admission to the Federal penitentiary he was "blue," despondent, retarded, had suicidal thoughts and feared he was "going insane." After transfer to the Medical Center his mood immediately improved. He said he had exaggerated his symptoms to be sent to Springfield but admitted his long sentence and incurable addiction had "gotten me down." He was alert, cooperative, pleasant and reliable in the tasks assigned him. No further abnormalities were observed. After three years residence at the Medical Center he was discharged as "recovered" on conditional release.

The depression, although resembling the depressed phase of a manic-depressive psychosis, was a reaction to the situation and consistent with his inadequate personality.

Case XV-26, negro, committed on a twenty-five year sentence for armed mail robbery, diagnosed as a paranoid state.

The patient was brought up in an area of delinquency and several older siblings were criminals. Both parents died before he was ten. He was sent to a reform school at fourteen for thievery. An older brother was co-defendant in the current offense. No unusual psychiatric findings were noted on admission to the Federal penitentiary; for four years the patient maintained an excellent adjustment; it was after custodial officers searched him for a non-existent knife that someone claimed he was carrying that he began to feel paranoid against officials. He thought that people were "picking on me" to make his life miserable because he was a "poor colored man." Custodial officers "stood around and gritted their teeth at me" and the old officers "told the new ones to watch me." He was sure certain officials "had it in" for him and "put the finger" on him. When received at the Medical Center he substantiated the story of his "persecution" but was reluctant to discuss it. He made an excellent adjustment and never demonstrated any paranoid reaction toward those at the Medical Center. After two years observation he was transferred to a different regular penal institution as "recovered."

The paranoid symptoms were aroused by situations in which the patient originally was "put on the spot." He misinterpreted future events grossly enough to be considered psychotic. Removal to a new environment resulted in a complete remission of symptoms.

Case XVI-35, committed on a five year sentence for impersonation, diagnosed as paranoid state.

The patient was raised in a city slum district. His parents died before he reached puberty. He was an "incorrigible" child, a truant and petty thief, first arrested at the age of nine. He was unstable occupationally, migratory and after twenty-four in and out of prisons for such offenses as larceny, sodomy, rape and assault. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he made a good superficial impression. Before many months it became apparent that he was an egotistic, demanding, hard-headed man who antagonized other inmates. He was transferred to another penitentiary and when he could not get along there, to a third. At the latter, he developed definite paranoid ideas, believed he was being persecuted by inmates because they thought him a "rat" and accounted for all adverse behavior reports as "machinations of my enemies." On admission to the Medical Center he had an ingratiating convincing manner. Soon, however, he became involved in conniving activities, caused friction on the ward and was strongly suspected of aggressive homosexuality. He was tried on many jobs but on each he did not follow instructions and stubbornly wanted things done his own way. He felt he was being given a "raw deal," that all of his work supervisors tried to "mess him up," and that doctors disliked him and listened to "lies" about him. There was no change in his condition in three years residence at the Medical Center.

This patient was a narcissistic, aggressive psychopath whose inability to adjust was rationalized constantly in a paranoid manner. The latter became the chief pathological symptom.

Case XVII-40, committed on a fifteen year sentence for manslaughter, diagnosed as psychosis, undiagnosed type.

The patient's father was a drunkard and his mother overindulgent. He was sent to reform school at fourteen for petty larceny and twenty-two of the succeeding twenty-six years were spent in jails and prisons for offenses running the full gamut of crime. He never was out of custody for as long as a year; his only marriage was annulled. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he was moderately depressed, unstable and told a

circumstantial, confused story about his crime. He was kept under observation for three years before declared psychotic. He expressed persecutory ideas referable to prison officials, feelings of unreality and desires to kill someone. After failing to obtain a reduction in sentence he attempted suicide. He was depressed, confused and retarded. He had fleeting auditory hallucinations. Later, his mood changed to one of joviality. On admission to the Medical Center he was superficially euphoric but on further examination exhibited indifference and flatness. Thinking was confused, illogical and the content concerned with circumstantial justification for his offense. Prison officials and inmates "misunderstood" him and some "had it in" for him. Insight was lacking and judgment impaired. Often because of unprovoked assaultiveness he had to be isolated. No changes occurred in a year's residence in the Medical Center.

In this case, there were elements of psychopathic personality (early behavior abnormalities, criminalism), of affective psychoses (manic-depressive mood swings) and of schizophrenia (shallow affect, poor insight and judgment, impaired intellection with delusions). Paresis was ruled out by blood and spinal-serology. As the psychiatric syndrome was not characteristic of any type of psychosis he was classified in the undiagnosed group.

Case XVIII-34, committed on a five year sentence for counterfeiting, diagnosed as catatonic dementia praecox.

The patient had a normal childhood, married at twenty-four and was moderately well-adjusted. During the depression he lost his job and, easily influenced, stole some hogs and was sent to a state penitentiary for a year and a half. After a year of work he was again pushed into the ranks of the unemployed and resorted to counterfeiting coins, which he learned in the state prison. On admission to the Federal penitentiary he was amiable and frank. For two years his adjustment was excellent. Suddenly he became agitated, depressed, fearful and thought he was to die. When questioned closely, he revealed that voices were calling him "rat" and were warning him that he was to be stabbed for "informing." He was apprehensive, spoke in whispers, refused food and was afraid to fall asleep. He passed into an agitated, self-destructive catatonic state, completely out of touch with his surroundings. He threshed about in his bed incessantly, tore at his skin, rapidly lost weight and within three months was unrecognizable. A course of fifteen metrazol injections was given with remarkable results. He regained normal contact, put on forty pounds, lost all hallucinations and delusions; however, he believed the doctors and metrazol had saved him from "heart trouble." Insight remained poor. Although reserved and passive, no psychotic symptoms were observed, and he was discharged as "recovered" on conditional release.

This catatonic agitation rapidly exhausted the patient and all other methods—sedation, hydrotherapy, amytal, etc., failed. There was little question that metrazol was responsible for the dramatic improvement and probably had saved his life.

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


Figure 1 — Age Distribution Curves

TABLE I
Classification of Mental Disorders

	NO.	PERCENTAGE OF STATE HOSPITAL FIRST ADMISSIONS 1935	
		PERCENT	
Dementia Praecox	217	43.4	20.5
Catatonic	54	10.8	
Hebephrenic	37	7.4	
Paranoid	93	18.6	
Simple	16	3.2	
Mixed	17	3.4	
Psychoses with Psychopathic Personality	75	15.0	1.7
Schizoid	31		
Affective	11		
Schizo-affective	2		
Affective Psychoses	16	3.2	12.1
Manic Depressive, Depressed	5		
Manic Depressive, Manic	2		
Manic Depressive, Mixed	2		
Involutional Melancholia	5		
Reactive Depressions	2		
Paranoia and Paranoid Conditions	22	4.4	1.4
Paranoia	1		
Paranoid State	8		
Paranoid State, Situational	6		
Paranoid State, Psychopathic Personality	7		
Psychoses with Mental Deficiency	30	6.0	3.6
Schizoid	4		
Affective	2		
Situational	2		
Undiagnosed Psychoses*	34	6.8	7.0
Psychoses with Syphilis of the Central Nervous System	50	10.0	14.5
General Paresis	42		
Other C. N. S. Syphilis	8		
Senile Psychoses and Psychoses with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis	15	3.0	22.4
Senile Psychoses	7		
Psychoses with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis	8		

Psychoses due to Convulsive Disorder (epilepsy)	13	2.6	2.9
Psychoses due to Alcohol (with pellagra 3)	18	3.6	8.2
Psychoses due to Miscellaneous			
Toxic and Organic Conditions	10	2.0	5.8
Intracranial Neoplasm	2		
Post-traumatic	2		
Tuberculosis Delirium	2		
Bromide Intoxication	1		
Barbiturate Intoxication	1		
Arsenical Poisoning	1		
Caisson's disease and Drug Intoxication	1		

* Includes the diagnosis: "without psychosis."

TABLE II

Schizophrenia and Criminalism

	NO.
1. Criminalism as Schizophrenic Behavior	151
a. Gradual Decompensation into Psychosis	59
Psychotic before offense	16
Psychotic after incarceration	43
b. Sudden Precipitation into Psychosis	68
The inadequate type	40
The hostile type	28
c. Isolated criminal acts due to Psychosis or Schizophrenic thinking	24
2. Criminalism Unrelated to Schizophrenia or other personality and to subsequent Schizophrenia	66
a. Schizoids	24
b. Non-Schizoids	42
c. Precipitating Events	
1. Homosexual Conflict	15
2. Prison Hostility, Loss Prestige, Separation, etc.	24
3. Excess Guilt Feelings	5
4. None Apparent	22

TABLE III

Symptomatology

	NO.	PERCENT
1. Perception		
Hallucinations, Illusions, etc.	269	53.8
Confusion, Disorientation, etc.	193	38.6
2. Intellection:		
Paranoid Symptoms	402	80.4
Persecution by Poisoning	103	
Persecution by "Homosexual Accusations"	42	
Persecutions by "Informers"	20	
Grandiosity	78	
Grandiosity without persecution	15	
Somatic Delusions or Severe Hypochondriasis	169	33.8
3. Emotion:		
Depression	235	47.0
Euphoria	72	14.4
Euphoria without any depression	42	8.4
Apathy	221	44.2
Apprehension	103	20.6
4. Volition:		
Assaultiveness	110	22.0
Destructiveness	72	14.4
Overt Homosexuality	38	7.6
Suicidal Attempts	121	24.2

TABLE IV
Minimal and Transient Symptoms

	NO.	PERCENT OF TYPE PSYCHOSIS
Dementia Praecox	8	4
Psychoses with Psychopathic Personality	46	61
Affective Psychoses	1	6
Paranoia and Paranoid Conditions	2	9
Psychoses with Mental Deficiency	11	37
Undiagnosed Psychoses	18	53
Psychoses due to C. N. S. Syphilis	10	20
Senile & Arteriosclerotic Psychoses	2	13
Psychoses with Epilepsy	5	38
Psychoses due to Alcohol	10	56
Miscellaneous Organic and Toxic Psychoses	5	50
Total	118	23.6
Transient	50	16.0
Minimal	38	7.6

TABLE V
Onset of Psychosis

	NO.	PERCENT
Before Offense, definite	37	7.4
Before Offense, probable	24	4.8
Noticed at Primary Examination	78	15.6
Before 6 Months Incarceration	187	37.4
After 6 Months, before 1 year	72	14.4
After 1 year of imprisonment	102	20.4

TABLE VI
Status at End of Observation

	SLIGHTLY IMPROVED OR UNIMPROVED	DEAD	GREATLY IMPROVED	REMITTED	NUMBER	TOTAL "SOCIOALLY RECOVERED," ^a	
						PERCENT	PERCENT OF 500
Dementia Praecox	175	3	3	36	39	18.0	7.8
Psychoses, Psychopathic Per- sonality	9	0	1	65	66	88.0	13.2
Affective Psychoses	7	0	0	9	9	56.2	1.8
Paranoia & Paranoid Conditions	15	1	2	4	6	27.3	1.2
Psychoses, Mental Deficiency	12	0	3	15	18	60.0	3.6
Undiagnosed Psychoses	11	1	2	20	22	64.7	4.4
Psychoses, C. N. S. Syphilis	21	5	9	15	24	48.0	4.8
Senile & Arteriosclerotic							
Psychoses	8	3	2	2	4	26.6	0.8
Psychoses due to Alcohol	5	0	0	13	13	72.2	2.6
Psychoses due to Epilepsy	6	0	0	7	7	53.8	1.4
Misc. Organic & Toxic Psychoses	3	2	0	5	5	50.0	1.0
TOTAL	272	15	22	191	213		42.6
Suicide			4				
Parietic Deterioration			4				
Coronary Occlusion			1				
Carcinoma of Stomach			1				
Perforated Peptic Ulcer			1				
Cerebral Neoplasm			2				
Tuberculosis, Pulmonary			1				
Senile Deterioration			1				

TABLE VII

Recovery and Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE	INTELLIGENCE		QUOTIENT	NO. "RECOVERED"	PERCENT
Feebleminded	0	—	50	9	90.0
	51	—	70	23	37.7
Borderline	71	—	75	11	21.6
Dull Normal	76	—	87	42	38.5
Normal	88	—	113	86	46.6
High Average	114	—	120	14	51.8
Superior	121	—	140	18	52.9
Very Superior	Over 140			2	28.6
Unknown				8	47.0

Special Article

WAR, CRIME AND THE COVENANT

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PART I. THE COVENANT

I. Dual Unity

The infant starts life in the *dual-unity* situation. This means a state of things in which infant and mother form a whole and yet at the same time the two elements of a unity. Frustration for the infant means the absence of the mother, gratification of its desires is connected with the mother's presence. In the phantasy world of the infant it originally forms a unity with the mother and it requires repeated frustrations for the infant to discover the boundaries of the ego and the existence of reality. Burlingham's cases show that this dual-unity of mother and child is not merely a phantasy, that there is actually a strong *rapport* between the unconscious of the mother and the unconscious of the infant or little child.⁽¹⁾

This development from phantasy to reality runs on parallel lines with facts because growth means just this—the gradual breaking up of this symbiotic unity. The expression “dual-unity” was invented by a patient of Hoffman's. “He and his mother,” he declares, “formed one being originally. If they had been cut into halves they would both have ceased to exist. Love flowed from mother to him in the shape of milk and from him to mother—as urine. If he could have the same sensations today he would be immortal because this dual-unity is more than two put together; it amounts to omnipotence. Hoffman describes this stage of dual-unity as follows: “There is no dividing line between the object and the primitive ego. There is both a primary identification with the object and a reversal of this process, an identification of the object with the Ego.” “The same narcissitic libido is reflected from the object which

⁽¹⁾ D. T. Burlingham, “Die Einfühlung des Kleinkindes in die Mutter,” *Imago*, XXI, 429.

plays the role of the primary ego or of a mirror."⁽¹⁾ Two myths quoted by Freud in connection with his theory on the origins of life and of the sexual impulse evidently also contain psychological evidence of the original dual-unity and the breaking up of this unity. One is the Platonic myth about the original human being, with two faces, four hands, four feet and double genitals, who were cut into two halves by Zeus and now are yearning to reunite with each other. The other is the version of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. The Atman or Self was alone but yearned for a double because it had no pleasure. The Atman was the size of a man and a woman who are having intercourse and when it was divided into two halves these two halves became husband and wife. Therefore this body originating from the self is not a whole but half.⁽²⁾

The infant first experiences reality as a *frustration* and the nipple as the means by which this frustration is ended. In cosmogonic myths we find this original dual-unity which is then separated by a divine being. According to the Aranda human beings originally existed in an incomplete state. Their eyes and ears were closed; they had a small round opening instead of the mouth. Fingers and toes were grown together, fists were closed and grown to the chest and they were grown together in couples like the Siamese twins; therefore they were called "rellá inter-inja," "grown-together" people. The lizard comes and with his stone knife he cuts the twins asunder and liberates their organs.⁽³⁾ The significant feature in this myth is that the separation of the original dual-unity and the free use of the limbs go together. According to the Lengua of the Gran Chaco, man and woman were originally created like Siamese twins and were then separated by a beetle and given power to propagate their species.⁽⁴⁾ The raising up of the goddess Nut from the embrace of Keb is the first act of creation.⁽⁵⁾ Uranos, Gaia, and Kronos are in the same roles in Greek cosmogony.⁽⁶⁾ The Maori Tane-mahuta decides not to kill the parents but to rend them apart.⁽⁷⁾

The force that separates the dual-unity into two entities is a hostile force, or, in other words, the infant is compelled to experience reality

(1) E. P. Hoffman, "Projektion und Ich-Entwicklung," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XXI (1935), 36ff.

(2) S. Freud, "jenseits des Lustprinzips," *Gesammelte Schriften*, VI, 251. Platon I, 366. Deussen *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, 1905, 393.

(3) Roheim, *Australian Totemism* (1925), 128, 129 (with references).

(4) W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land* (1911), 114-5.

(5) E. A. Wallis-Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians* (1904), II, 105.

(6) O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (1906), I, 425.

(7) G. Grey, *Polynesian Mythology* (1855), 2.

in the form of frustration. "Experience means to experience what we don't want to experience," and hence obviously the first form in which we assert our independence against an intrinsically hostile reality is by motor action, that is, by uncoordinated and then gradually by more purposeful aggression. A patient of Bychowski says: 'I regard reality as a man who forces his attention on me.' The *misoneism* of the infant is therefore well founded.⁽¹⁾ An unfulfilled desire arouses aggression⁽²⁾ and therefore as the absence of the mother causes tension and her presence satisfaction it is obvious that the mother must be hated and loved at the same time.⁽³⁾ I do not think that the attempt made by A. Balint to distinguish between the child's destructive trends and hate is justified;⁽⁴⁾ on the contrary we must say that in the first intake of food at the nipple we have both the basis of love (milk is good, the child is satiated), and that of aggression (to get the milk out of the nipple, to eat the mother).

It is, however, to R. Mack Brunswick or rather to work carried out by Brunswick in collaboration with Freud that we owe some highly suggestive hints on the developmental phases of the infant and the child. "What we learn is that each bit of activity is based on and identification with the active mother, an identification which provides a form of activity inherent in the child who does for and to itself what the mother has done for it, playing the roles both of mother and child in the manner typical of childhood. Indeed the child plays the role of the mother not only toward itself but also toward other children, animals, and toys, and ultimately and above all towards the mother herself."⁽⁵⁾ The child's earliest activities are copied on the activity of the mother but with organic growth and increasing independence. "True aggression inevitably arises when the mother is obliged to hamper this budding activity either by forbidding or compelling certain acts." "Early narcissistic injuries on the part of the mother enormously increase the child's hostility."⁽⁶⁾ In a series of important papers Dr. Hermann has demonstrated the significance of the "hand-mouth" system as an early erogeneous zone and of grasping as a manifestation of the early object-directedness of the libido.

(1) C. Bychowski, "Aktivität und Realität," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XIX, 159.

(2) I Riviere, *Hate, Greed, and Aggression*, (Psychoanalytical Epitomes,) 2, 6.

(3) M. Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation*, (Psychoanalytical Epitomes,) 2, 58.

(4) A. Balint, "Liebe zur Mutter und Mutterliebe," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XXIV (1939), 38.

(5) Ruth Mack Brunswick, "The Praeodipal Phase of the Libido Development," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, IX (1940), 298.

(6) *Ibid.*, 301.

Like the young ape the human infant clings to or holds on to its mother with its *hand* and *mouth* and it is in this sucking and grasping that the object-directedness of early libidinal trends manifests itself. This holding on to or grasping as a partial impulse of the libido contains both Eros and Thanatos, both love and aggression elements. As the mother can never satisfy the infant's dependency⁽¹⁾ cravings, the infant will develop the reaction of pushing away, of in-dependence, which means a breaking up of the dual unity, an aggression directed against the mother. This independence phase in turn is followed by new *seekings*, by an eternal trend to find substitute objects or mother equivalents.⁽²⁾ The separation of the biological unity "mother-child" gives us the tendency "back again." But the tendency "towards" is also imminent in the new independence or individuality called forth by the separation.⁽³⁾

2. The Father

Anthropologists and psychoanalysts of the "culturalist" school have as yet not been able to find a human group in which incest regulations were lacking. This alone ought to be sufficient refutation of the idea that the Oedipus complex is created by society because regulations that are "created" by every society must be inherent in human nature and indeed the basic elements of the process which leads to the formation of a society. If we admit the universality of infantile sexuality—and to deny this is really an astonishing feat—we have also admitted the universal validity of the Oedipus complex, since cravings of a libidinal type arise in the infant at a period of life in which all its cravings or emotions must tend towards the mother.

The "mother imago" exists in two copies, the "good" and the "bad" mother (cf. Rado, M. Klein). The "good mother" forms a "dual-unity" with the pleasure-ego, while the "bad mother" and frustrating reality are also offshoots of the same root or an original unity. It follows from the nature of things that the father steps into the shoes of the bad mother and becomes the primal enemy, the obstacle of gratification. Originally this is valid for both sexes. A Lomitawa woman once told me the history of her divorce. She left her husband because he got a fit of jealousy when she was suckling her baby and burnt the little girl's vagina with a

(1) De-pendere means to hang from something.

(2) Imre Hermann, "Sich-Anklammern-Auf-Suche-Gehen," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XXII (1936), 338.

(3) Fr. J. J. Buytendijk, *Wesen und Sinn des Spiels* (1935), 34.

torch. In analysis one always finds intense hostility in fathers of as yet unborn children. This hostility is originally directed against the sibling rival of their infancy or their own father and then becomes overlaid by identification mechanisms after the birth of the child. This identification on the part of the father is twofold; with the son and with the mother (i. e., with his wife). The former is based on our delayed infancy, on the "timeless" aspect of the Unconscious; we are always ready to go back to our own childhood. The latter, the identification with the mother-wife, is due partly to our inherent ambisexuality, but even more to the fact we have mentioned above, viz., that the primary form of identification is with the mother. In the Normanby Island language *sina* is mother, *sina-bwana* is bgi, and *isinabwa* is "he has become grown up." In analysis we can often observe how "good" fathers frequently identify themselves with their wives in the mother role in phantasy and act like rivals for the baby's love in reality. The bad mother image is originally split off from the primal dual-unity of mother and child but after the father takes the place of the "bad mother," he also becomes a second "good mother"⁽¹⁾ and the trinity of mother-father and son succeeds in phantasy to the dual-unity.

The original biological unity is first severed at birth and first restored when the child receives the nipple. The nipple in the mouth is the original *introject*, the basis of super-ego formation. In the relationship of the Super-Ego to the Ego the Mother-Child situation is reproduced in its varying aspects—but partly in reverse. For the source of the aggression is in the child and this aggression returns in a boomerang fashion against the Child-Ego. The tendency to hold on to or grasp (Hermann) is also in the child but in the Super-Ego - Ego relationship it is in the Super-Ego. On the other hand this is only one side of the truth. Both the aggression and the holding on to are also environmental, that is in the mother.⁽²⁾ This original introject formation is both an attempt to separate from the mother (the child can do without the object because it has the incorporated object-representative) and an attempt to hold on to the object (the mother is always at hand). To say that the super-ego is derived from society is correct if we mean by "society" the nuclear form of human sociability, the mother-child relationship. When the father appears on the scene first as an interloper, then as a "good

(1) In a minor degree.

(2) Because they were in her as a child, i. e., because all object-relationships are fundamentally ambivalent.

object" of the mother type, the whole process is repeated. In the meanwhile with the early onset of genitality the mother has become more and more a love object. The archaic dual-unity is crumbling, the border-lines of the Individual, of Reality, and of the Love Object are being set up. At this juncture the situation with the father acquires additional reality. Father and Son are rivals for the mother. The son now makes an attempt to avoid the dangers of this situation on predetermined lines. It cannot get nourishment from the paternal nipple (or penis) but in phantasy it can repeat the object-incorporation of the pre-oedipal phase and thus form the basis of a true paternal super-ego and transform the stark reality of the father-son conflict into the endopsychic reality of the Super-Ego conflict.

3. The Child and the Group

Since Karl Groos first attempted to explain the function of play we are aware of the fact that playing has something to do with the process of growing up. We also know that a considerable number of children's games are dramatizations of the trauma of separation. In the famous case observed by Freud a child of one and a half years used to play at throwing things away. It would catch hold of anything that came handy, throw it away into a corner of the room, and exclaim "Ooh!" which meant "gone." One day when the mother had been absent for several hours she was received by the child with the information "baby ooo!" The child had been looking into the mirror where it caught sight of another "baby." Then the child invented a game which consisted of making "baby" (the reflection in the mirror) disappear by ducking down and then finding "baby" again by standing up. The child attached a reel to a string and would play at throwing the reel out of its bed and then pulling it back again. Freud said: "After this it was easy to find the meaning of these games. It was connected with the great "cultural" achievement of the child, with the amount of capacity for tolerating deprivation which it had evolved, viz., the capacity to tolerate the absence of the mother. The infant found consolation in dramatizing disappearance and re-appearance with the aid of the objects within its reach."⁽¹⁾ Games of the "blind man's buff" (German "*blind*

(1) S. Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VI, 201.

cow") type represent the mother as searching for the child and by this device the child overcomes its anxiety, the tension connected with the absence of the mother. In the Scotch version the game is played with the following text: "Your mother is looking for you." "Why?" "Come home and eat your soup." "Where is the spoon?" "Turn round three times and look for it!"⁽¹⁾ In a widespread group of games the plot is that each child in succession is separated from a group but the children are then compensated for the loss by the formation of a new group. The children of Normanby Island play the game as follows: They sit down in a group and one of the children represents the owner of the garden. He sings: "Play, play happy! Thieves their taro, I plant." Then he goes away and the thief comes. One by one he takes the children, i. e., the taro, from the group. Each time a child disappears the "owner" asks "Who stole from my garden?" The children reply "Nothing" till there is only one child left and this last child from whom the other children or "taros" have been taken away is called the "mother" of the taro. Another game of the "group separation" kind is called *Maremare yapos*, turtle's eggs. They draw a line in the sand on the beach and one of the boys rubs the back of another boy, singing as he does so: "Turtle its eggs, egg very many, calling, calling, sizzling!" Then the boy whose back has been rubbed runs to the line, turns back again and tries to catch the others who are standing in a group, one by one. Whenever he has caught one he takes him to the other side of the line till he has gathered the whole group on the other side. The "turtle's eggs" are the children themselves. As the eggs come out of the turtle children are born from the mother; the group in these games represents the mother and as the "eggs" come out one by one they abreact the trauma of separation and are re-united in another group on the other side of the line. Games in this area always end with the same formula. The children stand up in a group and say: "Lice, fly away! Big lice, fly away!" This is symbolic, for the lice mean the children. Every game therefore represents the separation of the child from the mother (fly away) and the child is represented by an animal that clings to the surface, the child holding on to the mother (Hermann). Another widespread group of games combines this motive of separation from the group and the formation of a new group with an archway through which the children have to

(1) R. C. Maclagan, *The Games and Diversions of Argyleshire* (1901).
Plon-Renz, *Das Kind* (1912), II, 293.
K. Wehrhau, *Kinderlied und Kinderspiel* (1909), 44.

pass. In English the game is called "London Bridge is falling down." Mannhardt⁽¹⁾ was interested in this game from a mythological point of view. Two children decide that one of them is the Sun, the other the Moon. They lift their arms and form a gate through which all the others must pass. They stop the last child and ask him whether he wishes to join the Sun or the Moon. Two groups are formed and now they try to pull each other over a line. The main thing is to separate the children from one group and pull them over to the other.

In the Ba-Ila variant of the game, two boys (representing the mother's two legs) form an archway with their arms while the others march round. The boys who stand in the middle sing: "My children, make a circling movement in the forest." The last boy who is trapped sings: "The little, little quail scratches about among the herd boys." The two leaders are the mother and the last child who is caught in the archway is the infant going back into the womb.⁽²⁾ In Gazaland they play a game called "The Caterpillar." A boy kneels down on his hands and knees and two children sit down on the ground, one on either side of him, facing one another. They then put their legs over the back of the boy who is kneeling and grasp one another firmly by the hands. The kneeling boy has then to rise with these two children clinging to his back and as he walks away with them the other children get very excited and sing out: "the caterpillar and its child; the caterpillar and its child."⁽³⁾ The boy who carries the others is evidently the caterpillar and they are "grasping" each other and their mother.

The analysis of *infantile obsessions* shows the inter-relatedness of the "group" and the "mother" concept. A patient had the following obsession. He always used six sheets of toilet paper as long as he lived at home. Later when he left home he noticed he was using only five. Then it dawned upon him that there had been six of them (two parents, four siblings) while he lived at home and then only five when he left. At the same time he would press on his toe or heel (while having a bowel movement) and then on the opposite toe or heel to counteract the effect of the first pressure. Analysis reveals that while defecating he is identifying himself with his mother in the act of delivery. But to defecate or to be delivered means also to lose a part of one's self, the Self be-

(1) W. Mannhardt, "Das Brückenspiel," *Zeitschrift für deutsche Mythologie* IV (1859), 301, 302.

(2) Smith and Dale, *The Ila-speaking People of Northern Rhodesia* (1920), II, 258. Cf. D. R. Mackenzie, *The Spirit Ridden Konde* (1925), 158.

(3) D. Kidd, *Savage Childhood*. (1906), 177. See also Roheim, *Childrens "Games and Rhymes in Duan"* *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 45, 1943, 99-120.

ing at the same time identified with the family group as an extension of the original dual-unity. He loses the feces, he has to make sure that all the six members of the family are still there. At the same time he wants to be delivered of (and rid of) one of his brothers; to counteract this and punish himself for it he exercises a corresponding pressure on the other side which represents himself. In these games of separations and seekings the play group represents the mother and joining the group is the restoration of the archaic mother-child unity.

4. Blood Brothers

Society is based on identification. In studying ceremonial covenants between individuals in various societies we see the process *in nuce* which we assume is also the basic elements of man's sociability. In Sipupu and other villages of Normanby Island (D'Entrecasteaux group) I found an institution called *etabu* (taboo) or *gumagi* (my betel nut). Two young men visit a girl together and spend the night with her without having intercourse. They are friends after that and it is taboo for them to have intercourse with the girl who is the uniting element in the bond. Hence the institution is called *etabu*. Probably the taboo is broken in some cases; instead of both abstaining from the girl they both have intercourse with her. The other expression, *igu magi*, i. e., my betel nut, means that friends chew a betel nut together. A similar institution exists at Tikopia. It is called *soa*. The bond is usually made in the days of bachelorhood. The young men are used to going about in bands, fishing, cultivating and dancing in groups and then they will develop a friendship between two of them. One proposes that they be *soa* and if the other agrees the affair is ratified by the exchange of food and other gifts. The ceremonial binding of the friendship is symbolized by chewing betel together. A single areca nut and a single betel leaf are divided by one of the pair, a share handed to the other and both chew at the same time.⁽¹⁾ Similar ceremonial friendships have been reported from West Africa⁽²⁾ and elsewhere.

In a very instructive book on artificial relationships among the Southern Slavs Ciszewski has collected data on these covenants. Near one of the Bulgarian convents in the hills there is a stone with a narrow gap. The pilgrim has to squeeze through this opening and another pil-

(1) Raymond Firth, "Bond-Friendship in Tikopia," in *Essays Presented to R. R. Marett* (1936), 250-63.

(2) I. A. Driberg, "The 'Best Friend' Among the Didinga," *Man* (1935), 110.

grim who preceded him must help him to do so by pulling his hand. The two then go to the priest and after saying the customary prayers become adoptive brothers. Having been born from the same symbolic mother (the hole in the stone) they are now symbolic brothers.⁽¹⁾ Another form of ceremonial brotherhood is established on the day of St. John the Baptist. They wound each other and suck the blood from each other's wounds, thereby becoming *blood brothers*.⁽²⁾ In some districts of Bulgaria children who have been nursed by the same woman are in the same relationship to each other as those who have entered some ceremonial form of covenant making.⁽³⁾ The mere fact that an oath or covenant is something that one drinks or eats already indicates its origin in the oral phase, that is, in the mother-child situation. In Turkish an oath is *icmek*, i. e. to drink a blessing or sacrifice.⁽⁴⁾ In Pendschab legends the hero takes the oath by drinking the milk of his own mother.⁽⁵⁾ The Kpelle who form a secret society or covenant by sacrificing blood to a magical object call this object the mother of the secret society and the members of the society are her children.⁽⁶⁾ When the Governor of Busra decides to have the whole town slaughtered, his mother bares her breast and makes him take the oath by her breasts that he will desist. Bedouin mothers call upon their sons to do or not to do a thing "by my breast which thou hast sucked."⁽⁷⁾ If somebody desists from taking blood revenge and accepts camels as a compensation and then drinks the milk of these camels, it is as if he were to drink the blood of his dead kinsman. Hence the proverb to drink "milk instead of blood."⁽⁸⁾

The "theory of union" as the basic element in human society was first evolved by Ernest Crawley. "The method now to be described is simply the mutual inoculation of two individuals with each other. A and B being mutually taboo desire to remove the dangers of their relation; being destined to live or to perform some dangerous act together or to be in more or less close and therefore potentially dangerous connection their best method is, as we have seen, inoculation. A therefore inoculates himself against B by taking a part of B into his own system and B

(1) St. Ciszewski, *Künstliche Verwandtschaft bei den Sudslaven* (1897), 5.

(2) *Ibid.*, 45.

(3) *Ibid.*, 20.

(4) H. Vámbéry, *Die primitive Cultur des Turko-Tatarischen Volkes* (1879), 252.

(5) Temple, *Folk Lore*, X, 408 (quoted by R. Lasch, *Der Eid* (1908), 73).

(6) D. Westermann, *Die Kpelle* (1921), 278, 279.

(7) Pedersen, *Der Eid bei den Semiten* (1914), 171.

(8) Pedersen, *op. cit.*, 115.

does the contrary, but this is equivalent to reverse inoculation for A has practically given B part of himself and B has reciprocated the gift and indeed the two methods here coincide. The results are those which belong to reciprocity; each has a part of the other in his keeping and this part not only assimilates each to the other by transmission of properties but is a pledge, deposit and hostage. Thus identity of interests is secured and the possibility of mutual treachery or wrong is prevented not only by the fact that injury done to B by A is equivalent to injury done by A to himself, but also by the fact that if B is wronged he may work vengeance by injuring through his malicious properties or by the method of ngadhungi⁽¹⁾ the part of A which he possesses and not only this but theoretically at least in such an event the part of B possessed by A may punish A by the sympathy it still retains with B, its original owner. Each has 'given himself away' in a very real sense."⁽²⁾

In other words a covenant as a basic form of society is *the duality restored*.

A covenant of friendship is called *mulongo* by the Ba-ila. A binding covenant is that of blood-brotherhood. Each of the two men cuts his arm and sucks the other's blood as the sign and seal of their vow binding them not to refuse each other anything. One says: "As we thus drink each other's blood, if I come to ask anything of you whatsoever, will you refuse me?" The other replies: "No, I will give you anything and everything you ask of me." Having exchanged this promise they must keep it till death. If one breaks the vow he will die "on account of the blood."⁽³⁾ Among the Ukena when two men swear blood-brotherhood, they take the blood and share the liver of a chicken and some ginger. Then each of them strikes a piece of iron and some iron implement held by a third person, and swears the oath of brotherhood.⁽⁴⁾

These covenants or unions occur not only when a ceremonial friendship or alliance is formed but in all sorts of life situations. All these unions have a physical basis; it is either an oral introjection (eating, drinking) or a union based on the holding or grasping of the infant.⁽⁵⁾ (Hand-mouth system: Hermann). The interpretation of the contracting parties who form an alliance as symbolic brothers, "blood brothers" is perfectly evident. The famous case of the Narrinyei, quoted as a basis

(1) Destroying the nails, hair, excrements, or food left over.

(2) Ernest Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, I, 285, 286.

(3) Smith and Dale, *The Ila-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia*, (1920), I, 308.

(4) A. T. and G. M. Culwick, *Ukena of the Rivers* (1935), 381.

(5) Cf. Hermann, "Sich Anklammern Auf Suche Gehen" *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*. XXII, 1936, 338.

for his theories by Crawley, is to the point: "When a man has a child born to him he preserves its umbilical cord by tying it up in the middle of a bunch of feathers. This is called a *kalduke*. He then gives this to the father of a child or children and these children are henceforth *ngia-ngiampe* to the child from whom the *kalduke* was procured and that child is *ngia-ngiampe* to them."⁽¹⁾ That is a ceremonial relationship as basis for inter-tribal trade is founded on the umbilical cord as the bond between the members of the two tribes. But if the contracting parties are siblings it is evident that the medium which unites them must represent the mother. In the Hungarian village of Pórzembat, if there is no love between a married couple and if the wife and her mother happen to have milk at the same time they bake cakes mixed with the milk of both mothers in two ovens. The "mouth" or opening of the two ovens is turned towards each other. The mouth of the oven symbolizes the vagina of the women and the two ovens turned towards each other are the two women, the two mothers. Similar ovens are used at Bánokazent-györgy and the cakes are prepared with the milk of two sisters. The cakes are given to a lad and a lass; the result is that they fall in love with each other. In the county of Szatmar girls sieve mother's milk through the lower part of their shirt (i. e., the part that touches the vagina) and give the cake prepared with the milk to their lovers.⁽²⁾ These covenants or bonds unite man and woman, the shaman and his patient, various clans and tribes, guests and hosts. The Tunguz shaman "takes the patient's head between his hands, sucks his brow, spits in his face, and fixedly looks at the affected part."⁽³⁾ When an Irish peasant wishes to welcome his friends with more than usual heartiness he spits in his own hand ere he grasps his friends' with it.⁽⁴⁾ At Orango in the Bissagos Archipelago (off the Senegambian Archipelago) friendship is sealed by spitting into each other's hand. Among the Southern Somali and Oromo the ceremony of reception consists in the host spitting in his hand and rubbing it on the stranger's forehead as a sign of naturalization.⁽⁵⁾ Among the Barotse, when relatives take leave of each other they spit upon each other's faces and heads.⁽⁶⁾ In all sorts of situations a fundamental ten-

(1) G. Taplin, *The Narrinyeri* (1878), 32, 33.

(2) Roheim, *Magyar Nephit es Nepszokasok* (1925); *Hungarian Folk Belief and Custom*, 59.

(3) Mikhailowski, in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, XXIV, 97, quoted by E. S. Hartland, *Legend of Perseus* (1895), II, 274.

(4) E. S. Hartland, *op. cit.*, 265.

(5) E. S. Hartland, *op. cit.*, II, 264.

(6) L. Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa* (1900), 77.

dency of human beings is to restore the state of dual union. This is the significance of *salutations*.

"The lowest class of salutations which merely aim at giving pleasant bodily sensations merge into the civilities which we see exchanged among the lower animals. Such are patting, stroking, kissing, pressing noses, sniffing, and so forth. The often described sign of pleasure or greeting of the Indians of North America by rubbing each other's arms, breasts, and stomachs and their own, is similar to the Central African custom of two men clasping each other's arms with both hands and rubbing them up and down, and that of stroking one's own face with another hand or foot in Polynesian and the pattings and slappings of the Fuegians belong to the same class." "The Andaman Islanders salute by blowing another's hand with a cooing murmur. Charlevoix speaks of an Indian tribe on the Gulf of Mexico who blew into one another's ears."⁽¹⁾

Tylor therefore regards salutation as a ritualized form of pleasurable, that is libidinal, activities. Herbert Spencer also connects the primary form of salutation with the mother-child situation. "The ewe bleating after her lamb that has strayed and smelling now one and then another of the lambs near her, but at length by its odour identifying as her own one that comes running up, doubtless thereupon experiences a wave of gratified maternal feeling and by repetition there is established between this odour and this pleasure such an association that the first habitually produces the last. The smell becomes on all occasions agreeable by serving to bring into consciousness more or less the philoprogenitive emotion."⁽²⁾

Smelling, inhaling, and kissing are therefore forms of salutation. With the Chittagong Hill people the "manner" of kissing is peculiar. Instead of pressing lip to lip they place the mouth and nose upon the cheek and inhale the breath strongly. The Samoans salute by juxtaposition of noses accompanied not by a rub but by a hearty smell. They salute and smell also the hands of a superior.⁽³⁾

In fact we may say that there are two main types of greeting, the one based on oral introjection (kissing, inhaling, etc.), the other on contact of the epidermis and on the grasping reflex (Hermann) so that both forms are based on the hand-mouth system (Herman) and are attempts to regain the primary dual-unity. Charlevoix notices in the Indian pic-

(1) E. B. Tylor, *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* (1870), 51, 52.

(2) H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology* (1902), II, 15.

(3) Spencer, *op. cit.*, II, 16, 17.

ture writing the expression of alliance by the figure of two men holding each other by one hand while each grasps a calumet in the other hand. Joining hands means union and in the Polynesian marriage ceremony bride and bridegroom are placed on a large white cloth and join hands.⁽¹⁾ "The idea which shaking hands was originally intended to convey was clearly that of fastening together in place and friendship, and the same thought appears in probable etymology of peace: pax, Sanskrit pac—to bind, and in league from ligare."⁽²⁾

Two people shaking hands may be said to be mutually "grasping" or holding each other, that is, each party has appointed the other as a mother substitute. The derivation, both of salutations and of peace makings or covenants from the mother-child situation is perfectly obvious in the case of the kiss. While the lover's kiss is limited to the European area the maternal kiss may be regarded as universal and is evidently the inversion of the sucking or other playful oral activity of the child. Tylor describes it as "salute by tasting,"⁽³⁾ d'Enjoy as a "bite and a suction,"⁽⁴⁾ and Crawley says, "The element of truth is the fact that the kiss, like language, is a refinement of the nutritive process of the mouth."⁽⁵⁾

The Aranda have two words which can be translated by "kissing" and are actually applied to the perfunctory type of kiss given by the mother to her child, *aruntjima* and *injainama*. Both words apply to cunilingus and fellatio and to the smelling and sniffing of the vagina. But *injainama* is also to suck (milk) and in general to drink. "Aruntjima" and "injainama" usually denotes sexual practices with the mouth. "Aruntjima" as kissing occurs only between mother and child (Field notes).⁽⁶⁾ "In Latin osculum was the kiss on the face or cheeks as used between friends; basium was the kiss of affection made with and on the lips, suavi-um was the kiss between the lips confined to lovers alone."⁽⁷⁾ "It was especially in connection with marriage that the kiss *osculum*, *oscle* was

(1) W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches* (1830), II, 560.

(2) Tylor, *op cit.*, 47.

(3) Cf. Lombroso quoted by H. H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* (1905), IV, 218.

(4) Nyrop, *The Kiss and its History* (1901), 180. E. B. Tylor, "Salutations," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1911), XXIV, 94. P. d'Enjoy, "Le baiser en Europe et en Chine," *Bulletins de la Societé d'Anthropologie de Paris*, VIII, 181-83.

(5) Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, I, 341.

(6) In one case, however, the anthropologist reports the custom as obtaining also between husband and wife. W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among the North West Central Queensland Aborigines* (1897), 184.

(7) Crawley, *op. cit.*, I, 343.

prominent. Osculum was a synonym in general for pactum, osculata pax a peace confirmed by a kiss, osclare meant dotare, and osculum inter-veniens was a term applied to gifts between engaged persons."⁽¹⁾

The theory of *society as based on a covenant* and of the feeling of unity that links the members to each other was first put forward by Robertson Smith.

"The sacrificial meal was an appropriate expression of the antique ideal of religious life not merely because it was a social act and an act in which the god and his worshippers were conceived as partaking together but because . . . the very act of eating and drinking with a man was a symbol and confirmation of fellowship and mutual social obligations."⁽²⁾ The bond of union lasts as long as the food is supposed to remain in the system so that some tribes were wont to renew the bond every twenty-four hours by eating together. Zaid al Khail, a famous warrior in the days of Mohammed, refused to slay a vagabond who carried off his camels because the thief had surreptitiously drunk of his father's milk-bowl before committing the theft.⁽³⁾ "A kin was a group of persons whose lives were so bound together in what must be called a physical unity that they could be treated as parts of one common life. The members of one kindred looked on themselves as one living whole, a single animated man of blood, flesh, and bones in which no member could be touched without all the members suffering."⁽⁴⁾

These findings of the famous Semitic scholar show one thing quite clearly: that the family and the clan, the units of human society, are based on the original dual-unity of mother and child.⁽⁵⁾ "In Hebrew the phrase by which one claims kinship is: 'I am your bone and your flesh.' Both in Hebrew and in Arabic flesh is synonymous with clan or kindred group."⁽⁶⁾

Robertson-Smith goes on to explain that all this is not merely metaphorical but literal and that as kinship means a participation in a common mass of flesh and bones, it depends not only on the fact that a man is born of his mother's body and thus is a part of her flesh but also on the not less significant fact that he was nourished by her milk. Thus

(1) Crawley, *op. cit.*, I, 349.

(2) W. Robertson-Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (1907), 269.

(3) Robertson-Smith, *op. cit.*, 270.

(4) Robertson-Smith, *op. cit.*, 273, 274.

(5) It does not follow, however, from this that matilinear reckoning of descent antedates patrilinear reckoning.

(6) Robertson-Smith, *op. cit.*, 274.

the milk tie is equivalent to the blood tie and any food tie is again equivalent to the milk tie.⁽¹⁾

The bond may be formed by the contracting parties participating in the flesh and blood of one animal or by mutually drinking each other's blood. In the former case the animal or any other medium that unites them represents the mother and the parties have thus become brothers. Trumbull has collected instances of spilling blood or sacrificing an animal on the threshold and it seems probable that in these rites the threshold signifies the vulva, the house of the mother.⁽²⁾ In the form of the ritual in which there is no such medium (blood covenant) the contracting parties are mutually playing the mother and the child roles.

We know, however, that oral introjection means both love and aggression. The same is valid for Hermann's "grasping" theory. In other words both the dual-unity of mother and child and the bond that unites society is based on a fusion of Eros and Thanatos.

The study of totemism in Central Australia, especially in connection with eating or not eating the totem animal makes this quite clear.

The headman of the witchetty grub totem takes one of the stones that represents a witchetty grub ancestor and strikes the stomach of each man with it, saying "You have eaten much food."⁽³⁾ According to my informants, when they perform the magic for multiplying wild ducks, they make an *ilpintira* (a drawing that symbolizes the womb) on the ground and then they rub the bellies of the young men with the duck tjurunga. Yirramba Banga said that when he was first shown the witchetty grub tjurunga by one of his tribal elder brothers, he was first made to lie down and then they hit him on the tnata (belly) with the tjurunga). This is always done when they show the tjurunga for the first time to one of the young men.

Evidently the meaning of being butted or hit in the stomach is that of a punishment either for past or future misdeeds. The accusation is that the person has eaten too much food, and as this is a totemic ceremony too much food can only mean too much of the totem animal. According to Spencer and Gillen the Aranda will eat only sparingly of his totem and even if he does eat a little of it he is careful not to eat the best part. If he is an emu man he will not eat emu fat and emu eggs only if

(1) Robertson Smith, *op. cit.*, 271.

(2) H. Clay Trumbull, *The Threshold Covenant* (1896). Cf. especially Hommel's remarks, pp. 333-35.

(3) Spencer and Gillen, *The Aranda* (1927), I, 149.

he is very hungry and even then not too abundantly. If an emu man found a nest of emu eggs and he was very hungry he might cook one but he would take the remainder into the camp and distribute them. The same principle holds good for all the totems. The totem of any man is regarded as the same thing as himself. A native explained this to Spencer when discussing the question: "That one" (pointing to his photograph) "is just the same as me, so is the kangaroo." At the ceremonial multiplication of the totem the chief must eat a little of the totemic animal. If he eats too much or if he eats none at all he annuls the effect of the ceremony. The natives say that he must have some of his *knaninja* in his inside.⁽¹⁾ According to my Pitjentara informants they do not eat their own *tukutita* (ancestor, totem). It is *kuka walta* (flesh, his own, proper one). If they eat it they eat only certain parts, like the tail of the kangaroo. At the ceremony they eat a little of the emu flesh, because if they do this, "palla paluni," multiply it well. If he eats either too much or none at all, he cannot multiply the animal. If he eats too much he might even "spoil" the animal and the others might kill him. The technical term for this "spoiling" is "papuanitjipi," in Aranda, "etakindja." This word has been used by the Lutheran mission as an equivalent of "conscience," in their translation of the Bible. I think this rendering is quite correct; if they eat too much of an animal this gives rise to guilt feelings, to anxiety—they are destroying that which is part of themselves or of which they are a part. The central idea of totemism was explained by my Ngatatara informants as follows:

Tukurpa	waltara	palumpa
Ancestor	totem	his

The "waltara" (totem, ancestral spirit) is *altjaikura*—"his own" in Aranda.

If a kangaroo man has been eating too much of the kangaroo that is "spoiling" it, throwing the meat away, his "waltara" comes and tells him, "Don't spoil it;" he must smash the bones and the tail, he must not throw them away. "Don't bite the tail, cut it with a stone knife." "It is waltanku" (your own). Sometimes when a man cooks a kangaroo tail it may go "bang" bursting like a gun. Then he won't eat; but the others pull it to pieces and eat it ravenously like dogs. If somebody makes a mistake at these ceremonies, his father, mother, or brother might die in consequence. Then he thinks it was "*etakama*," "I have spoilt

(1) Spencer and Gillen, *The Aranda*, (1927), I, 82.

it." Or he might die himself for the same reason; then he has *etakama* himself. The blood avenger spears his man; he should catch him quickly and hold him in his arms before he dies. If he lets him die without holding him in his hands, that is pure "*etakama*" and he might die himself. If he kills a man he should at least hold him afterwards, for he himself is identical with his victim and he might die of his own aggression.

The rites in which a young man is received into society, becomes a part of society, contain this element of *restoring a dual-unity*, that is, they *dramatize introjection*.

Among the Murngin in North Australia, "the boys who are about to be circumcised are painted on the dancing ground by the elder men. The totemic design of the clan is placed on each candidate's chest and abdomen with the juice of an orchid bulb as adhesive."

After this sweat from the armpit of an old man is rubbed on the eyelids of the boys to strengthen their eyes for the coming ceremony.⁽¹⁾ After the circumcision the boys are steamed; they stand on the upper logs and squat over the fire. The dampened leaves are thrown into the fire and produce a thick steam. This envelops the boy and is supposed to enter his anus, go all through his body and come out his mouth. The scared steam represents all good things. It makes the boy magically "strong," it prevents him from being "greedy," or feeling the pangs of hunger. It helps him so that he will always have plenty of kangaroo, fish, and other animal or vegetable food.

In the next phase of the ceremony we see the same thing represented in the language of totemism.

"The boys are taken off the fire and placed on the ground. A man brings a piece of paper bark on which several small pieces of food have been placed. Every variety of food obtainable in the camp has been represented on the bark tray. The boy is given a piece of kangaroo meat or some other food and an old man says: 'That is not kangaroo meat. You tell me the name of that which you are eating. What is it?' The old man sits beside the youth and whispers the totemic name of the animal into the ear of the boy. The boy then calls out this esoteric name as he swallows the food." Even though a kind of food is not represented on the tray the name is told to him and another pellet takes the place of the missing edible.

By giving it a new name the food becomes sacred, i. e., symbolic

(1) W. Lloyd Werner, *A Black Civilization* (1937), 282.

food and as the pellet of food goes into the boy's mouth, the word, the name, goes from the old man's mouth into the boy's ear.

Another form of totem communion is that of the palm nut loaf. The women bake a large palm nut loaf and the ceremonial bread is divided and eaten by all the men who participated in the ceremony. The neophytes are again held above the fire so that both mouth and anus are filled with purifying steam. This is to allow the young men to eat the large game which was hitherto taboo, that is, the steam represents the game and the large game stands for the old men. When the bread is eaten the leader calls out the various totem names and this is supposed to infuse the bread with the magical power of the totems.⁽¹⁾

A direct introjection, i. e., eating or drinking of the initiators, the fathers, is an essential part of Australian puberty rites. Among the Murngin they open the veins on their arms and let the blood flow on the boy.⁽²⁾ Or as in the Pitjantara initiation ceremony I witnessed and described, they open the veins on their arms, pour the blood into a bark receptacle and the boys drink or eat it. The explanation is that this will make the boys "have a big body." At the Karadjeri initiation the novice is made to drink the man's blood from a bark dish, and is told not to vomit it because the spirit would be offended and would kill his father, mother, or sisters. Then the old men drink the blood and until the boy sees them doing this he believes the blood will kill him.⁽³⁾ If kept inside the blood would kill him because by eating the blood he is really eating the old men. If, on the other hand, he vomits it he has refused to introject them, to identify himself with them, and the aggressions in him are not balanced by identification; the spirit "kills" the fathers. In the Melville Island puberty rite the yams eaten at the ceremony are addressed as "our fathers" by the men.⁽⁴⁾

5. Conditional Curse

Society is based on a repetition of the original dual-unity; but with a displacement, instead of the mother and child covenant we have the father and child covenant. Aggression or Thanatos is active (in com-

(1) W. Lloyd Warner, *A Black Civilization* (1937), 288, 289, 328, 329, 355.

(2) Warner, *op. cit.*, 274.

(3) R. Riddington, "Karadjeri Initiation," *Oceania*, III, 66.

(4) B. Spencer, *Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia* (1914), 102,

ination with Eros) in forming the original covenant; it is also traceable in these symbolic dual-unity rites.

When the covenant or bond is formed it is already laden with this danger which, however, becomes active only if the covenant is broken. If we regard the covenant as reproducing the child-mother situation, in which the infant's aggressions (on account of his identification or rather lack of dis-identification) re-appear in the form of guilt or anxiety, we can understand why if one of the contracting parties breaks the oath or covenant, the punishment is made to fit the crime.

In Morocco a wish or curse can only take effect if there is a conductor between the one who curses his enemy and the victim. "As particularly efficient conductors are regarded blood, bodily contact, food and drink. In Morocco the duties of a host are closely connected with the institution of *l'ar*." "If a person desires to compel another to help him or forgive him or to grant some request, he makes *l'ar* for him. He kills a sheep or a goat or only a chicken at the threshold of his house, or he grasps with his hands either the person whom he invokes or that person's child or the horse he is riding or he touches him with his turban or a fold of his dress. In short he establishes some kind of contact with the other person, to serve as a conductor of his wishes and of his conditional curses. It is universally believed that if the person so appealed to does not grant the request his own welfare is at stake, and that the danger is particularly great if the animal has been killed at his door and he steps over the blood or only catches a glimpse of it. As appears from the expression, "This is *l'ar* for you do not do this or that," the blood or the direct bodily contact is supposed to transfer to the other person a conditional curse: If you do not help me then you will die, or your children will die or some other evil will happen to you. So also the owner of a house or tent to which a person has fled for refuge must in his own interest assist the fugitive who is in his *ar*; for by being in his dwellings the refugee is in close contact with him and his belongings."⁽¹⁾ All Bedouins regard the eating of "salt" together as a bond of mutual friendship and there are tribes who require to renew this bond every twenty-four hours or after two nights and a day between them since otherwise, as they say, the salt is not in their stomachs, and can therefore no longer punish the person who breaks the contract.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ Westermarck, E., *The Origin and the Development of the Moral Ideas*, 1906, I, Pgs. 586, 587.

⁽²⁾ Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I, 589.

In certain forms of the custom the l'ar reverts very characteristically to the original child-mother situation. "When a person is accused of having stolen something from his mother he puts his hand underneath her clothes, takes hold of one of her breasts and swears, "By this breast." Among the Ait Sadden a person may make an oath to a woman whom he has sucked as a child by saying, "By that which I sucked from you."

A woman, a stranger, enters a tent, gives her breast to any little child who happens to be there whether there is milk in it or not.⁽¹⁾ A refugee places himself in the l'ar of a woman by touching her or by sucking her breast by which he becomes as it were her son.⁽²⁾ These data show the mother-child relationships in the l'ar and the following proves that the inherent sanction is the aggression involved in the same relation. The way to compel a reluctant person to enter into such a covenant is to threaten to cut the neck of one's own child at her (or his) door.⁽³⁾ The l'ar is a great boon to strangers in those parts of the country where the Government has no power.⁽⁴⁾

This is the way the Nandi make peace after a war. Perhaps the most binding ceremony of all is when the chiefs and elders go to a soldier ant heap and having spat in it, say: "May the children of the man who breaks this peace be born in this hole."

The oath in this case contains a direct allusion to the child-mother situation. Some Nandi cut a dog in half, one man of each of the parties who have met to make peace holding it, while a third man says, "May the man who breaks this peace be killed like this dog." Others kill with blows of a club a tortoise or smash a calabash full of water, and flies, and say "May the man who breaks this peace be killed like these things." Or they will castrate a goat and each man taking one of the testicles in each hand, say, "May God castrate the man who breaks this peace." Or they will cut a bowstring and say, "If I break this peace may this bowstring eat me."⁽⁵⁾

The covenant made between Assurnirari, as liege lord, and Mar'ilu as his vassal, was based on the sacrifice of a goat that had been brought up from the herd. "If Mar'ilu breaks this covenant, then just as this goat is separated from the herd and does not return to the herd, so may he and his sons and his daughters be taken out of the country and never

(1) Westermarck, E., *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, 1926, I, Pg. 499.

(2) Westermarck, *ibid*, Pg. 522.

(3) Westermarck, *ibid*, Pg. 529.

(4) Westermarck, *ibid*, Pg. 535.

(5) A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi* (1909), 84.

return to it. This head is not the head of the goat, it is the head of Mat'ilu, the head of his sons and of the great men of his land. If Mat'ilu does not keep this obligation may his head be cut off like this goat's head is cut off."⁽¹⁾

In these ideas regarding the breaking of the bond or oath the striking thing is the boomerang-like nature of aggression or the *talio principle* underlying the whole concept. The parties to the treaty wilfully commit an aggression which then threatens to come home to roost if they don't behave well. If our theory is correct, the unconscious roots of this magical identification with the object go back to the child-mother situation. The symbolic aggression is derived from the child's body destruction phantasy, and ethics in general, the validity of the bond, is due to the retribution anxiety, that is inextricably bound up with these phantasies. We use the word inextricably because at this phase of development the infant has not yet succeeded in completely disidentifying himself from the mother and hence aggression must also mean a danger for the Ego.

The fact that a binding oath is frequently eaten or drunk and that a survival of this feature of the ritual is found even in cases where the emphasis has been displaced, goes far towards substantiating this view that the origin of these concepts lies in the oral or dual-unity phase.

Among the Malays a piece of old scrap-iron belonging to the regalia is immersed in water and this water is drunk by the person who takes the oath.⁽²⁾ When swearing an alliance, water in which daggers, spears, etc., have been dipped is drunk, and they swear, "May I be eaten up by this dagger if I turn traitor."⁽³⁾

Among the Dinka to swear a binding oath a man goes to a blacksmith and *licks his hammer*, then, setting it on the ground, he says, "If I have done this thing may I die."⁽⁴⁾ The Lotuko take the oath by *drinking* water that has been poured on the sacred spears or by "eating Earth." This is done by licking the tip of the right forefinger and placing it on the ground and then on the tip of the tongue.⁽⁵⁾

The oral symbolism of the social bond clearly indicates its source and origin from the biological bond that unites mother and child. This

(1) Pedersen, *Der Eid bei den Semiten* (1914), 110.

(2) Skeat, *Malay Magic*, p. 273.

(3) Skeat, *op. cit.*, p. 525.


(4) C. G. Seligman and Brenda Z. Seligman, *Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan*, 1932, Pg. 194.

(5) Seligman, *op. cit.*, Pg. 334.

does not mean that human society was originally matrilinear.⁽¹⁾ All the anthropological evidence we have points to the contrary conclusion. In the development of every male human being the maternal introjection is repeated in the triangular or Oedipus situation and this paternal introject or super-ego proper is the basis of human society.

(To be continued)

⁽¹⁾ Cf. this point of view in R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, 1926, I-III.



Announcements

The index for Volume IV of the *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology* will be issued separately and will be distributed to subscribers in about three weeks' time.

Apology

The *Journal* announces with deep regret the appearance of a number of historical inaccuracies which occurred in an article in the January issue under the title of "The Prisoner in War Time" by Dr. Marvin Sukov. Specific statements were made in the article to the effect that the Princess Patricia's Regiment of the First World War had been in action at Belleau Wood and was composed entirely of ex-convicts and that the Regiment as a whole, as well as its members individually, had been the most decorated during the World War. It was not until after publication data were produced to the effect that none of the above statements was in fact true although there seemed to be some legendary material which supported that viewpoint.

The Author, as well as the Editor, in presenting the article did not have the slightest intention of maligning in any way a body of men whose valorous deeds made it one of the truly great organizations of the last war. Apology is hereby made for any implication which might be construed in any manner as deprecating the honor of the Princess Patricia's Regiment.

The Editor.

A Research Project

Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck are in the midst of a study of the etiology of crime by the method of comparing 500 delinquents with 500 non-delinquents, matched by age, nationality, socio-economic status, and intelligence. As part of this research, they are also making a contemporaneous study of the responses of the delinquents to the various forms of peno-correctional treatment to which they are being subjected. The study has been under way since 1939 and is being financed by two of the major Foundations. Already psychiatric, medical, psychological, anthropometric and social studies have been entirely or partially completed on some 300 delinquents and 300 non-delinquents; and preliminary analysis has already revealed some suggestive syndromes of causation.

The close-up study of responses of delinquents to specific forms of peno-correctional treatment makes possible a check-up on the prediction tables developed in "Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up" (Commonwealth Fund, 1940). The Gluecks anticipate the emergence of a finer predictive instrumentality than has been possible in their previous studies because a far wider range of biological, social, and personality factors is included in this research than in their previous works.

The foundation of this new study differs from their other work in that they are now, for the first time, gathering all the data on their cases at first hand with their own staff rather than relying on materials already gathered by others and which they then had to amplify and verify.

Among the questions which they hope their research will answer is: Why is it that such a large proportion of young persons reared in so-called delinquency areas do not become delinquent? What are the major areas of difference between delinquents and non-delinquents? To what extent is early recognition possible of trends likely to lead to delinquency so that effective preventive work may be accomplished? To what extent is it possible successfully to predict the course of a criminal career and the specific technique of treatment to which particular offenders are likely to respond?

Abstracts From Current Literature

A - Psychoanalysis

A CASE OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY.* M. WULFF. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 23:112-120, 1942.

A case of male homosexuality is cited and discussed at length as being unusual since it did not conform to the standardized patterns of this sexual deviation.

The case was a young man of 27 years who presented himself for psychoanalysis because of psychical sexual impotence. He was of short stocky build and seemed quite masculine but stated that he was attached sexually to simple robust male peasants who often were dirty and ragged. The patient's family was of the upper middle class in Russia. His mother died when he was too young to remember much about her. During the earlier period of his life he and his father were very much attached to each other and the father would bring the boy presents and spoil him in many ways. In addition, the boy often slept with his father and indulged in sexual bi-play. A second marriage of the father brought a change in his attitude toward the boy. He became brutal, exacting, and would whip the child for the slightest offense. The step-mother was quite acceptable to the boy. A few months later her own daughter who was several years older than the boy made her appearance in the family and sexual bi-play was soon indulged in by both of them. From an early age patient manifested heightened sexual interests. Mutual masturbation occurred at the age of 7 years. At that time he would also watch the love-making of peasants coming into the market and he would spend many hours spying on couples. At the age of 10, he became so sexually excited that he seized a girl from behind on the street and ran away in terror when she screamed. This episode was repeated on one or two other occasions. When the family moved to Palestine (patient, age 17), he encountered in his work many of the low-class Arabs who were filthy and illiterate. The sexual

phantases concerning them replaced the former phantasies he had concerning the Russian peasants. His first homosexual attachment occurred at this time with a roommate who was not so inclined and discouraged his advances. The only other full sibling was a sister who was eight years older than himself. She was quite jealous of him and she appeared frequently in his phantasies. His dreams at night had the peculiar quality of being almost like day-dreams. At an early time in his career he made distinct attempts, after he lost the affection of his father, to secure a heterosexual adjustment through attachment to a girl about his own age. She, however, enjoyed seducing him, then getting him in trouble by informing his father who would beat him unmercifully. The father likewise prohibited the boy from having sexual attachments with other girls in the neighborhood. The dream content of the patient clearly indicates the attempt of the patient to secure a heterosexual love object, the identification of himself with that love object, and the forceful interference by the father.

The author calls attention to the well-known standardized patterns of homosexual development and indicates that his case, although distinctly homosexual, did not meet the requirements of any of these patterns. The first type pattern suggested by Freud's female homosexual case of 1920 indicates the specifications of disappointment in regard to a love object of opposite sex and identification with it, its abandonment so that a person of the subject's own sex then becomes the sought for object. The author's own case does not meet any of these specifications. For example, disappointment did not lead to a homosexual development but distinct efforts were made toward attaining the heterosexual level; this, however, broke down later upon the continued abuse of the father.

Type 2, a pattern proposed by Sadger in 1909, indicates that there is an identification with the mother at puberty and a narcissistic object choice of the subject's

own sex is selected. The author's case does not conform to this pattern.

Type 3, another structural pattern described by Freud in 1922 in which there is a situation of rivalry between two children of the same sex (brothers), the development of hatred in one of them towards his rival and finally the overcoming of this hatred by a hypercathexis of the homosexual love relation to the rival.

Nunberg in 1936 suggested a fourth type which indicates that the homosexual is endeavoring to arrive at a compromise between the aggressive and libidinal impulses. He suggests two types of homosexuals—the aggressive type (sado-homosexuality) and the masochistic type.

The generally accepted discussion of homosexuality takes into account the triad of Freud in which most cases of homosexuality express the symptoms of attachment to the mother, castration fear and narcissism. There is nothing specific in any of them. Superimposed upon them may be a premature fixation of the libido, as well as the constitutional factor in which the individual has a tendency to assume the passive role in love. The author's case did not conform to any of this symptomatology. For example, there was no attachment to the mother since she died before the boy reached an age of understanding. There was no outspoken narcissism present in the case. In spite of impotence, this case had almost no feelings of inferiority which is almost regularly encountered in cases of complete repression. He accepted his impotence as a matter of fact and seems to have had no emotional attitude toward it. Castration anxiety which is usually found before intercourse was not indicated in this patient; he did not fear castration, accepted it and confined himself to the female role in relation to his father.

There are a number of other small details in which this case did not conform to established patterns of homosexuality. The author raises the question as to whether or not the Oedipus situation should not be re-evaluated and more importance attached to it than has heretofore been done.

V. C. B.

* This article appeared originally in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago* 26:105, 1941.

DEFLECTION OF ENERGY, AS A RESULT OF BIRTH TRAUMA, AND ITS BEARING UPON CHARACTER FORMATION. GRACE W. PAILTHORPE, *Psychoanalytic Review*, 28:305-326, July, 1941.

This paper considers the whole quantum of energy of a new born infant, how it becomes regulated and controlled, and the bearing of the disposal of this energy, by the infant, upon the character in adult life. A case history is present to bear out the thesis.

The patient was a young man. He was successful in his work, however, he felt that he was not using or able to use his energies to capacity. The patient had certain character difficulties. He was interviewed and the treatment extended over a period of one month and five days. A new form of psychoanalytic treatment employing various graphic media as a vehicle of expression was used rather than the classic method.

The essential vitality of the foetus at birth is extensive. The patient had had considerable vitality *in utero*, resented the discomfort of the occipital position, and had kicked himself back to the previous position. He felt the act of birth was a punishment for his kicking. As a baby he thus developed the idea that if it became angry and resisted aggressively it was always punished. Muscular and vocal aggressions were present at birth and in addition it defecated in anger during the process of birth. A vicious cycle of attack and retaliation to destroy, punishment and attack and destroy was thus set up. The infant thus came to know that punishment would follow every angry use of its body against interference. The numerous restrictions in the use of energy during the birth process affected the patient in many ways. Resultant from his early conditioning, the patient, as an adult, found himself unable to apply himself to anything he undertook. He not only could not use his physical powers in the healthy adult way, but he had to avoid situations which placed him into an equivocal position. There was a limitation of leg activity, arm activity, bowel action, and crying in infancy.

The analysand was able to critically

analyze his numerous approaches to problems of adulthood, and, ultimately, he was able to resolve a number of them himself. He was not considered neurotic and no one seemed to observe his lack of staying power. Birth traumata marks each of us. We are all inhibited. It is only through deep analysis that finally the unconscious deviations of our vital force are exposed. Then we become aware of what has been lost in the dynamic enjoyment of life.

Chester D. Owens,

Woodbourne, N. Y.

NOTES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. A. N. FOXE. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 23:68-75, Jan., 1936.

Educators and criminologists feel that the relationship between schooling and crime is close. A psychoanalytic study of a criminal convicted of robbery shows an important constellation determining his inability to go beyond the seventh grade. Before entering school he had met a girl of roughly his own age. He was somewhat timorous toward her. She became one of a series of surrogates for his sister who in turn represented the mother. On their first meeting he noted that when she smiled there was a close resemblance to himself, thus, narcissistic attachment was established. His attitude toward his mother was ambivalent with distance and fear predominating. Anal and oral sadism were pronounced and his superego was severe.

He always did his work well until the fifth grade. The girl previously referred to was always in the same school until that time. Then she was transferred to another building. That day of transfer marked him. He went "crazy." He was saved from going under a truck by a companion. During the next year he was in considerable difficulty in school. However, he was promoted and went to the same school the "Strange Little Girl" went to. He promised the teacher he would behave. During the year his conduct was so exemplary as to draw praise from his teacher. The following year the girl graduated and he was then finishing seventh grade. The last day she spent in school marked the beginning of further assaultive tendencies.

The next autumn when he started eighth grade found him unable to concentrate on his work. He ran away from school and refused to attend. He was finally permitted to attend the part-time school where his girl friend was in attendance. He even went the same day as she. He then plunged into his work. When she was transferred to another class time, he again lost interest in his work. He finally accepted the interpretation of the psychiatrist and the relationship of these incidents to his life.

In slang expressions, feeling of being the black sheep, playing cops and robbers, and foolishness, the psychiatrist finds further evidence of the relationship of these elements to crime.

Chester D. Owens,

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B - Neuropsychiatry

PSYCHIATRIC STUDY OF JUVENILES INVOLVED IN HOMICIDE. RALPH M. PATTERSON. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*. 13:125-130, Jan., 1943.

Aggressive behavior of children may take various forms of expression, such as belligerent language, stealing, fighting, truancy or other sadistic behavior. The "wish to kill" is so frequently given verbal expression by youngsters that a repressed homicidal drive is looked upon as an ordi-

nary psychodynamism. However, the actual execution of the homicide or a substituted overt murderous act is very unusual. Because of the uniqueness of the behavior of six boys who did commit homicide in the State of Michigan in the short period of two years, Dr. Patterson felt it advisable to present this study of the group as a whole in order to draw comparisons and conclusions within the limitations of the study. The material is presented in case study form.

The first case is an example of a problem in sibling rivalry which led a boy of 11 to shoot his 15 year old sister. The case illustrates very clearly the intensity of the sibling rivalry that may develop when two or more individuals are struggling to receive the affection, attention and recognition of their parents. The case study indicates that the domination or authoritative position of the older sister was of little significance, and that the actual motive for the assault was the competition for affection and recognition which existed between the boy and his sister.

The next two cases illustrate the overt expression of repressed patricidal wishes in the form of homicide. They are unusual cases since this conflict most frequently finds expression in the form of antagonism or rebellion and only rarely in physical assault. In one case, a boy of 14 shot his alcoholic, sadistic father after having fantasied killing him for several months. In the other, a boy of 14 also shot his father after having fantasied it for some time, but here the homicide arose from a moderately strong mother-attachment and a wish to remove the father in order to facilitate and promote this relationship.

The fourth case illustrates aggressive behavior directed toward individuals outside the family. It may represent a diverted homicidal wish directed originally toward one or the other parent. The 13 year old boy shot his boarding home father while under the influence of alcoholic liquor. The victim had frustrated the boy's attempt to go home to his mother. This frustration permitted an identification of the boarding home father with a hated step-father and led to the substitute patricide of the former.

Case number five is that of 14 year old boy who stabbed a friend when the friend took an authoritative role in commanding the boy to return a watch he had stolen. The friend's assumption of this authoritative role had permitted an unconscious identification with the patient's father. The murder of the friend thus represented the removal of the father, gratifying the patient's wish to achieve unopposed possession of the mother's affections. This analysis was supported by the demonstration of a very strong mother attachment. The actual act of violence was therefore

thought to represent a *concealed form of patricide*.

The last case presented is that of a mentally deficient boy of 14 who murdered a neighbor with whom there had been no previous friction. The homicide was accomplished by means of an axe and knife and following the murder, the victim was dragged to the woods and his genitalia mutilated. The psychiatric study did not demonstrate any psychodynamics of clear-cut character, although it was the impression of the therapist that this boy felt quite insecure in his community. This case was never satisfactorily understood, and though the act was explained as being a primitive response in a retarded individual, his previous behavior and adjustment in the community had not been of a similar pattern.

The author points out some significant facts in his conclusions. One of the six children was mentally deficient, one of dull intelligence and the other four of average or above average intellect. The social backgrounds were strikingly similar, with marginal or sub-marginal economic status the rule. The homes were disintegrated or disorganized by friction, quarreling, alcoholism and delinquency. In all six instances one or both parents were poorly adjusted, inadequate or unstable. One of the outstanding characteristics of the group as a whole was the incidence of *mother-attachment* and related *father-hatred*.

Dr. Patterson advocates prevention rather than prognosis or belated treatment for homicidal juveniles. Although expressions of hatred or homicidal wishes are frequent, they are too often viewed rather lightly. Such a casual attitude carries some risk, for it is evident that certain adolescents of immature and primitive emotionality are unable to repress or suppress such desires.

The cases point out the potentialities of common, rudimentary dynamisms. Every child who expresses homicidal wishes is not necessarily a potential murderer, but certain immature, insecure adolescents do carry out such wishes and phantasies with disastrous results. The therapist must be continuously alert to the possibilities in these primitive individuals to prevent any tragic accidents from happening.

Samuel B. Kutash, Woodbourne, N. Y.

GROUP PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS. FRITZ REDL. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*. 13:77-82, Jan., 1943.

This short contribution is introduced with a clarification of three common uses of the term discipline. In one, it is used as a synonym for order referring to something we want to establish and maintain in a group of pupils as a partial goal of the educator. In another, we refer to what the teacher does to get the pupils to behave. Here, it is considered as a technique, a tool for establishing the state of order referred to in the first use. The third use, which is obviously fallacious, is as a euphemism for punishment. This is what people mean when they say, "I had to discipline him." The author, however, deals with yet another variation of the concept of discipline, referring not so much to the order the educator wants to establish, or the technique by which he does so, but rather to the resistance he meets in the pursuit of his duties. "Discipline problems" would be the situations which arise when something in the attitude or behavior of the members of the group tend to block or disturb the leader in his attempts to establish or maintain order.

According to Dr. Redl, even those discipline problems which are clearly centered around the conspicuous behavior of one individual cannot be sufficiently understood or handled through just an individual study and treatment of the main actors involved. Even they require some group psychological analysis and handling. Two illustrative cases are presented to corroborate this suggestion.

The author further states that a group of normal children may suddenly produce problem behavior, whenever disturbances of the existing "group climate" occur. The question as to who will be the actor in these cases of problem behavior depends on the individual case history of the children. The fact, however, that some form of problem act will be performed by someone in the group is a group psychological necessity and highly independent of personnel. In short, given a certain amount of readiness on the side of the individuals, disturbances of group climate in themselves can produce discipline problems. Dr.

Redl believes that 90% of the discipline problems that teachers deal with are of this nature.

At least ten types of group emotional climate are differentiated and eleven of the main factors constituting group emotional climate are presented. When any of these are disturbed, discipline problems arise. Some of the most frequent factors which have been observed to disturb group behavior climate in classroom work are:

1. One individual, or several, insist on group-conflicting satisfactions. Example—the case of a youngster who aims at sadistic satisfactions in a group of non-masochists.

2. The group leader insists on group conflicting satisfactions. Example—when the leader attempts too much personal gratification from suppressive commands.

3. The group, or considerable parts of it, are exposed to events producing emotional strain, conflict or insecurity. Example—personal conflict between subgroup leaders.

4. Mistakes in leadership techniques. Example—iniquities in emotional proximity and emotional distance between leader and individual group members.

5. Mistakes in the construction of the group pattern. Example—sibling rivalry child in a strongly autocratic group consisting of much younger or care-needing children.

The conclusions reached on the basis of the above analysis are that any one of the five factors mentioned may disturb the existing group emotional climate so much that discipline problems will result even where no strong problem behavior trends were existent among the group members before. The handling of individual cases of discipline disturbers for their own good is one matter; the handling of the group so the problem-producing factors are taken care of, is an entirely different thing. Preventive planning against discipline problems must focus its attention on the group psychological elements in the picture and requires skillful "group situational analysis."

Practical, useful applications of these conclusions to the problems of school guidance and teacher training can be made. Firstly, some of the problems teachers must face are clearly of a group psychological

nature and require skill and training in group situational analysis. Secondly, some of the resentment of teachers and their distrust against the psychology, mental hygiene and psychiatry of the individual can be removed if we give them more help on their group psychological problems. Thirdly, a "school psychiatrist for every disturbed child" would not meet the full problem of the teacher, even if it were possible to realize this slogan in the near future. Group situational analysis must be provided. Lastly, we know surprisingly little in concrete terms about these group psychological phenomena and about the way in which they cooperate with the individual's case history in order to produce problem action. More effort and money must be spent in the detailed and concrete study of group psychological elements in school life.

The same conclusions can be applied in situations in the institutional treatment of disciplinary and behavior problems.

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DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA — THE CONCEPT OF
NORMAL AND ABNORMAL. LEROY M. A.
MAEDER, *The Family*, Oct. 1941.

This article is an attempt to define and classify the sort of things a case worker means when he or she says "normal" and "abnormal" and to present further definitions of these terms for use in clinical case work practice.

In a typical situation the client comes to the case worker when he encounters more than average difficulties in meeting a problem or group of problems. He comes for help. The case worker meets him with the resources provided her by interested agencies of the community as well as the skills she has developed in establishing rapport, in eliciting, defining and posing a problem in its broad aspects and with whatever emotional support she can give him in a more courageous attack on his problem.

This, in essence, entails an object relationship in which transference and iden-

tification play a part. These form an emotional bridge over which relevant data as to the problem may pass. On the basis of the relationship so established, and the data so obtained in this manner, a diagnosis may be formulated in terms of the client's general make-up and methods of functioning; a plan of treatment may be established in which the procedure and aims of the case worker in relation to this client are defined; and a prognosis made indicating the workers forecast of the course, duration and outcome of the maladjustment.

In case work, a person may be called *normal* if he meets criteria established in the economic, environmental, health psychological and sociological spheres. From an *economic* point of view, he is considered normal when he is able to command the essential materials and services necessary to maintain life for himself and his family.

Environmentally he is considered normal when he is able to utilize the economic and social resources of his immediate and wider community for his own benefit. This would include recreation, interest in his home, religious life, education, social life etc.

Physically he must be relatively free of painful or disabling diseases or injuries. He must feel strong and complete enough to function adequately in his economic, environmental and psychological life. Important in the criterion of normality is the following of a sensible health regime, and avoidance of all manner of excess.

Psychologically and sociologically the normal should be able to adjust and function adequately within himself and in his relations to others. To do this, he must possess the ability to form complete, warm object relationships. He must be realistically related to his experience in living thus being able to take positive advantage of personal and social aggrandizement. He must furthermore, be serious, self-dependent and able to take responsibility for his own actions and mishaps.

Object relationship (the ability to relate warmly and fully to another) is one of the premier criteria of normality. Friendship, the social form of object relationship, involves first, dependability or a sense of security within the relationship. Second,

it involves an understanding in which frankness, sincerity, tolerance, evaluation, emotional support, objectivity etc., all play a part. Third, it connotes an acceptance of one another usually based on similar interests, experiences and objectives. Transference and identification are methods the average man uses in developing this object relationship.

In summary then the normal person is one who is able to adjust reasonably well to life, measured by the standards of the community. The standards of adjustment will vary in the community with the persons' position and age. A child, for example, is not required to display the same behavioral adjustment as either the adolescent or adult.

The abnormal person is one who definitely and obviously departs from the typical and standard way of functioning as measured by the prevailing concepts in the society. It may be considered in terms of either lack of development or of distortion and disorganization. The former applies to social immaturity and mental deficiency; the latter to neurosis or psychosis.

By immaturity is meant socially undesirable inactivity or passivity, dependency, ambivalence and emotionalism, narcissism and partial object relationship.

Delinquency and criminality imply conduct which is so deviant from the average behavior in the community that it arouses community censure.

The mental deficient individual, by reason of injury, defect or disease in the prenatal period, at birth or early in life is so lacking in primary intellectual development and functions that he is not sufficiently competent to care for himself in his economic, social and personal life and is unable to manage himself or his affairs.

The personality of the neurotic usually remains intact and social contact is relatively good. However due to conflict and friction in his mental functioning he is unable to relate successfully to the real world and to establish successful relations under the criteria of normality. The condition is characterized by mechanisms of defense, fixed habits and stereotyped forms which the normal person does not find it necessary to adopt.

The psychotic suffers from a distortion

of ego in which observational powers, thoughts, insight, emotions, integration function, and the sense of reality are out of focus. Where these conditions bring about socially undesirable conduct, the person is termed insane.

The article is of value primarily to the professional case workers since it presents in readily accessible manner the major criteria of normality and abnormality. To the seasoned practitioner the article may represent an over simplification. However value lies largely in the breadth of area these criteria encompass. It brings to attention once more the fact that normality and abnormality of an individual can be evaluated only in terms of the social setting.

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ROLE OF THE HYGIENE CLINIC IN A MILITARY TRAINING CENTER, HARRY L. FREEDMAN, *Mental Hygiene* 27:83, Jan., 1943.

The army requires more major adjustments than any civilian activity. In July, 1918, General Pershing telegraphed the War department that the prevalence of mental disorders in replacement troops indicated a strong need for the elimination of the mentally unfit from military service. A few unfit persons in a military company can disrupt the whole organization. Special training units have been established by the Adjutant General's Office.

At Fort Monmouth it was found that there was a relatively small number of cases of illiteracy and low intelligence, hence, a special training unit was not set up. However, there were present a number of men who required psychiatric help and guidance. A psychiatrist was stationed at the camp and he suggested the organization of a mental hygiene unit or clinic, in other words, a classification clinic. The personnel was comprised of a psychiatrist, a captain in the Medical Corps, and a psychiatric social worker. The clinic was established on Jan. 1, 1942, and for a period of two months its functions

were exploratory. Its functions were defined; its relationship to various organizations and activities in the post as well as procedures for reference and study and disposition of cases were also considered. By March, the minutiae of organization were worked out and the clinic was officially instituted as a regular part of the replacement Training Center. It functioned through the Adjutant's office and thus became related to all other units of the organization.

This mental-hygiene unit was distinct in method, procedure, and types of men seen. The classification section was interested in the assignment of the men whereas the clinic was concerned with the best functioning of the individual. Men with deeper mental conflicts and those with serious personality deficiencies were studied by the unit: The potentially psychotic, psychoneurotic, and psychopathic can be detected by an organization closely integrated with the Replacement Training Center. An important function of the unit is to sift out those of potential mental disorders, provide treatment or recommend discharge. A clinical team of a psychiatrist, social case-worker, and psychologist have been increasingly recognized as having something of vital importance to contribute to the most efficient functioning of any type of organization. In functioning, these professional workers become an excellent diagnostic instrument for the treatment of emotional and psychological problems and the determination of mental disease.

This report also presents information on the functioning of the clinic, the development of relationships with various staff organizations, case load, nature of cases treated, methods of treatment, and special problem cases seen at the clinic.

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ASSAULT INJURIES IN A STATE HOSPITAL.

LOUIS CARP AND LAWRENCE P. HAWKES.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
96:67-634, December 1942.

A statistical and interpretative study of assaults, many serious in their nature, which occurred in the Rockland State Hospital for the nine year period 1931-40 forms the basis of this report. The hospital records were consulted and an attempt was made to ascertain which diagnostic and age groups made assaults, how the assaults were made, the provocations, the injuries which were produced, and their results.

There were 16,337 admissions and 287 (or 1.76%) patients made 857 assaults committed mainly by males (60.3%). About 40% of the admissions were schizophrenics

It was found that the major portion of patients (65.1%) making assaults were schizophrenics and of these 53% were of the paranoid group. Males between 21 and 40 made the greatest number of assaults. Again, it was found that the epileptic was the most assaultive with the schizophrenics and paretics second and third respectively. The predominant number of assaults were from impulsiveness and the mechanisms were striking with an open or closed hand, with weapons, or by pushing. Of the patients assaulted fourteen died as a result of injuries and most of these deaths resulted indirectly from other complications. Most of the injuries were bony and fractures of the nasal bones predominated.

Three suggestions are offered to reduce the number of assaults: employment of an adequate number of and efficient personnel, proper segregation of patients who are annoying and bellicose, and, the concealment of objects which can be used as weapons coupled with a systematic search of weapons which are hidden by patients.

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C-Clinical Psychology

CRITERIA OF FRUSTRATION, STEWART HENDERSON BRITT AND SIDNEY Q. JANUS, *Psychological Review*, 47:451-470, September 1940.

The authors attempt to set up criteria of frustration through an analysis of its

various aspects. The aim is to present certain limited aspects of frustration to which all judgements relating to the problem can be referred with the understanding that any gaps for which data are as yet wanting may be filled in from time to time as research progresses. The frustra-

tion process is conceived of in entirety as having aspects of emotion, tension, conflict, inhibition, aggression, withdrawal, regression, adjustment and the like. The problem consists of the determination of the proper relations of these to frustration.

If frustration is causal in its manifestation, it is related to emotion as stimulus is to response; if it is effect, it is then possible to show that it may also be aroused by external stimuli and directed toward the environment. These two concepts are not incompatible; the notion of frustration either as cause or as effect is equally tenable, provided that frustration is in turn related to its proper contexts. Almost fifty years ago, Dewey pointed out the close connection between emotion and human activity, advancing the hypothesis that emotion appears when human activity is obstructed.

For purposes of analysis only, the author speaks of the frustrating process as constituting (1) a frustrating situation involving conflict or inhibition; (2) a frustrated organism characterized by change in tension, disturbance of homeostasis and maladaptation; and (3) a frustrated reactional system involving emotional reactions such as anger, primitive reactions like aggression as well as withdrawal, regression or even complete breakdown. Frustration cannot be defined by either the stimuli or the responses considered separately but rather by the interaction of these two systems.

The analysis of the frustrating situation begins with the introduction of the concept of the element of barrier or obstruction. This is taken from the work of Mowrer who has emphasized the operation of a barrier in the frustration sequence whence conflict or inhibition may ensue. Such a barrier need not necessarily be real or apparent, as in the case of a rat faced with an electrified grid, but may be quite imaginary or arise out of anticipation of punishment, injury or the like, as the fear aroused through a danger signal or warning. Further analysis introduces the factors of goal-attainment and reward-expectation. Thus, Dollard et al have attributed frustration to the "interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in

the behavior sequence." "Goal-response" is defined as "an act which terminates a predicted sequence." This factor is also emphasized by G. L. Freeman who uses the phrase "conflict situation" in describing a state of affairs where "an inhibiting condition of frustration to the realization of the goal" is likewise exhibited. It would therefore seem that frustration occurs when there is interference with goal-attainment. A special case of disturbance of the goal-response is represented by interference with attainment of reward, desire or need. Thus, Haselrud working with chimpanzees found experimentally that interference with a reward-expectation was frustrating. Maier, Cook, Pavlov and others have produced experimental neurosis by interference with goal-attainment and reward expectation.

In analyzing the effects on the frustrated organism, the authors speak, for convenience of discussion only, of failure, change in tension, cognitive effects and frustration-tolerance. They also consider the cultural implications of these factors. The conflict and inhibition which ensue from the frustrating situation have direct bearing upon the organism's failure in satisfying certain needs of the ego according to Rosenzweig. White also described frustrated efforts as those which lack certainty and have a high percentage of failure.

Mowrer and Rosenzweig both associate a rise in tension with frustration where tension is not merely the equivalent of muscular tonicity but also includes psychological tension. Freeman points out that if tension is used merely in the sense of muscular tonicity, then a rise in it is not inevitable in a frustrating situation.

Concerning the cognitive effects of frustration, there are two opposing points of view. W. A. White suggests that frustration may be harmful to intellectual behavior while by some authors such as Barker, it might be considered as favorable to creative behavior of a high order. The role of cognitive effects in frustration is very significant in the interplay of culture and behavior.

Frustration may ultimately result in tolerance whenever the organism, under the influence of punishment-anticipation, either ignores the frustrating stimulus

without suffering any untoward effects, or substitutes responses more satisfactory to itself. This concept of frustration-tolerance is supported by the experiments of Rosenzweig, Mowrer and others. Freud, in his work on civilization and its discontents, spoke of this concept, although using other terminology, such as cultural privations, and related it to cultural considerations. As an example of cultural conditioning in frustration, Freud mentioned the sexual barriers in the way of the adolescents in our culture.

In analyzing the reactionary system in frustration, the authors group the various reactions to frustration into two main categories, for convenience in handling the problem. These categories are objective reactions and subjective reactions. Objective reactions to frustration may be aggression, withdrawal, regression and resistance. Subjective reactions may be anger, guilt and remorse, shame and embarrassment. Each of these are discussed with supporting evidence from the literature. They are presented as possible types of reaction to frustration. What determines the specific pattern of reaction for an individual, whether he will react through aggression, withdrawal or through anger or guilt, remains a problem for future research.

A bibliography of 82 titles furnishes the material upon which the authors have drawn in their discussion. The article has significance in furnishing a theoretical and practical framework into which can be fitted future theories and researches dealing with frustration, so that their relation to previous work can be evaluated.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARANOID THINKING,
NORMAN CAMERON, *Psychological Review* 50:219-234, March 1943.

The presentation of a novel theory of the development of paranoid thinking which differentiates only between social and individual behavior, and ascribes delusion to defective socialization, is preceded by Dr. Cameron's critique of cur-

rent approaches to this problem. The two commonest attacks upon the problem of paranoid thinking, according to him, agree in confining their hunt for the sources of delusions to the isolated organism. One of these approaches limits itself entirely to the psyche while the other is concerned exclusively with the central nervous system.

A consideration of the psychic explanation leads to its complete rejection by the author. This theory begins by postulating a psyche, present at birth, which is itself unreal and has as its great enterprise in life the task of contacting a world of reality. In this process it is supposed to acquire layers of psychic ectoplasm which serve the double function of insulating it from reality and at the same time enabling it to operate upon the real world. In this rather weird foundation, says Dr. Cameron, have been erected the most intricate superstructures of theory which have actually come to dominate psychotherapy in this country today. This in turn leads to the forced acceptance by practical workers in the abnormal field of the division of our universe into two different worlds, an unreal world that we know directly in our 'psyche' and the real world which can only be known through the unreal one.

The author considers this psychic theory to be unnecessarily complicated and indirect and states that in terms of human living it makes no sense at all. He objects particularly to the view that the unreal psyche is supposed to start out from earliest infancy with a whole collection of ready-made attitudes, opinions and interpretations, many of them frankly delusional, the derivation of which is left unexplained.

So far as explaining paranoid thinking by searching in the central nervous system is concerned, the author points out that several decades of such probing on the part of competent researchers have yielded us practically nothing. Even in those cases where brain lesions can be demonstrated, there is nothing specific or consistent about their character and location. In the majority of cases of delusion no macroscopic or microscopic changes that are relevant and consistently present have been demonstrated. Dr. Cameron, therefore, decides to look for the conditions under which paranoid developments arise

in the field of social behavior instead of in the nervous system.

The positive part of the article places the main emphasis upon the commonest form of paranoid thinking, in which misunderstandings and misinterpretations develop into delusions of persecution, and finally erupt in reactions of defense or retaliation. Delusion is considered to be basically a disorder of interpretation and always involves some serious defect in the ability to alter perspectives and, as a natural result, a strong tendency to accumulate progressive misunderstandings. Paranoid actions and attitudes make their appearance in the effective social environment and grow out of a breakdown in the machinery of social cooperation. Solitary behavior in which there is an irresistible selection of the evidence on the basis of their special sensitiveness, replaces gradually, in paranoics, the mutual sharing of plans, acts and consequences that goes to make up genuine communication.

One's own attitudes towards one's own conduct get organized through the reactions of others; and the ability to take and shift perspectives depends upon how well habits of role taking are developed in the individual. Ability to shift and share perspectives is a form of social skill in which individuals vary greatly; under conditions of personal stress, perspectives that are relatively fixed and one-tracked constitute a grave handicap to adjustment. Surroundings and happenings are organized into an effective environment by one's own responses.

After presentation of a case study, the paranoid paradox is presented. Operations that have validity within the limits of private or organismic thinking are carried out by the paranoid in a social field where they have no validity. In the older mentalistic psychologies this was described as projecting one's ideas into another person. But where a paranoid person falsely ascribes functions, attitudes and intentions to other persons, he does far more than merely to put his thoughts into them. He sets up hypothetical interrelationships between other persons and himself and he organizes them functionally into a pseudo-community, made up of objective persons with imaginary functions. These imaginary functions are built up out of fragments

of the social behavior of social functions. The fragments of behavior are misunderstood by the paranoid in the direction of his expanding system. The actual movements, remarks and other actions of people around him become cues, signals, threats and warnings within a pseudo-community of plotters. Out of these raw materials in his surroundings, the paranoid organizes a functionally interrelated environment of which he is the focal point. Its pattern develops from his sensitivities and preoccupations, as well as from the more accidental character of their corroborative detail he takes about him. Eventually, he reacts overtly to this whole structure with measures and counter-measures and this brings him into conflict with his environment.

The author's description of paranoid behavior seems to be confined to the symptomatic level and one wonders whether his theory really explains the basic motivations and antecedents of such behavior. May we not be on safer ground in considering it as a product of psycho-social interaction rather than of the social environment alone?

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THE NATURE OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY, EDGAR
A. DOLL, *Psychological Review* 47: 395-
416, Sept. 1940.

The nature of mental deficiency is discussed from the historical, clinical, and theoretical points of view, Dr. Doll feels that through an elucidation of the concept of mental deficiency as a form of human deviation, much of the basic theories in biology, physiology, education, and the social sciences can be illuminated.

Historically, the conceptions of feeble-mindedness are traced through their origins with the work of Itard on the Savage of Aveyron to the experiments of Seguin, the development of the testing movement under the impetus of the work of Binet and Simon, to the culmination in the modern views concerning this condition. From Itard's work, we learned that environment and training do modify behavior.

This experiment like those of Seguin which followed, emphasized the relation of learning to the constitutional limitations of the organism. Social opportunity can only foster the personal capitalization of congenital aptitude; it cannot create talent that is genetically lacking.

About 1900 the British Royal Commission defined mental deficiency in terms of a four-fold criterion, namely, (a) social incompetence, due to (b) mental incompetence, resulting from (c) arrested development of (d) constitutional (chiefly hereditary) origin. This position was adopted by Tredgold in his classical textbook treatment.

Binet and Simon urged the essential mental incompetence of the feeble-minded as the basic manifestation and from this point of departure developed their now famous measuring scale. Their mental age method has since largely overshadowed comprehensive clinical diagnosis of this condition. Dr. Doll feels that it is regrettable that Binet and Simon did not more emphatically elaborate the acknowledged social manifestations of mental deficiency. In 1910 the American Association for the Study of the Feeble-Minded adopted a classification of the feeble-minded based on the Binet mental age. Although this was designed only to indicate the grades of deficiency after the feeble-mindedness was established from other evidence, it soon led to the indiscriminate use of mental age as the principal criterion of mental deficiency. In promulgating the 1916 Stanford revision of the Binet scale, Terman carried the mental age concept of mental deficiency to more serious limits through the use of the I.Q.

The 1930 White House Conference committee argued that feeble-mindedness be defined as social incompetence due to arrested mental development resulting from organic causes and that mental deficiency may tentatively be defined to include both feeble-mindedness (low I. Q. with social incompetence) and intellectual subnormality (low I. Q. without social incompetence). The committee emphasized the importance of situational factors in borderline cases.

Pintner, Paterson, Miner, and Burt all advocate a statistical definition of feeble-mindedness as the lowest segment (one-half to three percent) of the normal curve

of distribution considered as a continuum. Psychologists generally now unwarrantedly accept a 1916 Stanford-Binet I. Q. of below 70 as indicative of mental deficiency, and the term mental deficiency is used interchangeably with feeble-mindedness. This essentially statistical definition evades the social criterion which many authorities, especially Dr. Doll, consider essential. It also evades the disparity of test performance in battery testing, and the marked overlapping in mental age for morons and dull-normals. Such ill-advised simplification of mental diagnosis has been steadily opposed by clinical psychologists and psychiatrists.

Dr. Doll summarizes the clinical concept of mental deficiency and suggests that clinical appraisal requires a fairly comprehensive evaluation of each case in terms of all the significant criteria. This leads to differential diagnosis based on total developmental history and total present status.

The first evidence required is that of social insufficiency. The individual's social competence must be evaluated. For this purpose the Vineland Social Maturity Scale affords a systematic standard method of appraisal. This instrument formulates, defines, and quantifies the social criterion in terms of maturational progression.

The second evidence is the Mental criterion which serves to explain the social evidence. It differentiates the social incompetence of the feeble-minded from that due to other causes. The validity of the Binet measures must be supported by well-chosen supplementary tests (non-verbal and manipulative) of intelligence. But intelligence is only one phase of 'mentality.' Emotion, volition, temperament, skill, motility, etc. must be taken into account. When M.A. and I.Q. fail to differentiate, the psychologist may resort to the estimation of insight, foresight, resourcefulness, shrewdness, originality, transfer of learning, and other psychological evidences of normality versus deficiency.

The third type of evidence of importance is the developmental criterion. In clinical practice the evaluation of development is subjectively determined from the history data of the clinical syllabus. This anamnesis includes family history, medical events (prenatal, natal and postnatal), psychogene-

tic evolution, social maturation, school record, occupational success, conduct, and adjustment bearing on the record of development.

Fourthly, the clinical psychologist must consider the educational criterion. Apparent educational inaptitude must be judged with due regard for special educational disabilities, regularity of attendance, adequacy of instruction, suitable motivation, verbal handicaps, sensory defects, and the like.

Lastly, the somatic criterion must be considered relating the evidence on social and mental maturation, as far as practicable, anthropometric and medical evidence on constitutional (organic) factors.

The analysis of the various theories of mental deficiency makes it obvious that no single theory satisfies all cases. Two of those discussed by the author are that mental deficiency represents a simple quantitative deviation from the general norm of human behavior and that it is a qualitative variation associated with the quantitative deviation or a Gestalt with unique qualities of its own. Another theory is that it is a pathological abnormality rather than merely a quantitative deviation. Some consider it an atavism, a reversion to type, a harking back to a primitive stage of social evolution, or a preliterate stage of anthropological progression.

Dr. Doll concludes his penetrating discussion with the plea that psychologists should give more careful attention to the determination of mental deficiency which constitutes a fertile field for research and should not restrict their activities to I.Q. determinations.

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THE MEASUREMENT OF ADULT INTELLIGENCE.
RAMOND B. CATTELL. *Psychological Bulletin*. 40:153-194, March, 1943.

Psychologists working in penal and corrective institutions will be particularly interested in this inclusive summary of the field of adult intelligence testing. Adult intelligence testing, besides being used in prisons, is widely utilized in colleges, in-

dustrial concerns, clinics and above all, in the U.S. Armed Forces. This abstract naturally stresses the references to the measurement of adult intelligence in the penal and correctional field and in institutions for defectives.

Dr. Cattell brings to our attention the fact that there are now available, in English-speaking countries, no fewer than 44 intelligence tests either specifically designed for adults or ranging into such levels of difficulty that, although designed primarily for older children, they can also be used with adults. The tests are of all varieties: verbal literate, verbal oral, non-verbal, perceptual, group and individual. A fairly complete alphabetical list of the available tests is presented. From this list, the following can be used by psychologists in the field of criminal psychopathology for diagnosing mental defect: Arthur Point Scale, Cornell-Coxe Performance Ability Scale, Culture Free Intelligence Test, Dearborn Anderson Formboards, Ferguson Formboards, General Intelligence Tests for Africans, Herring Revision of the Binet Scale, Kent-Shakow Formboard, Kuhlmann-Anderson Scale, McGill Picture Anomaly Test, Porteus Maze Test, Revised Alpha Examination, Revised Beta Examination, Snedden Disguised Intelligence Test, Terman-Merrill Revision of the Stanford-Binet Test, Tests of General Knowledge (Benge), A Disguised Intelligence Test, and the Wechsler-Bellevue Scale. Two other tests of value left out of this list by Cattell, are those for conditions of mental deterioration by Babcock and the Simmins test for deterioration of "g" in psychotic patients. The modern institutional psychologist, in order to choose wisely from these tests available, must have an advanced clinical training of a high order and a true clinical insight.

Dr. Cattell discusses the limitations of most of the tests and finds that the main difficulty to overcome in the field of intelligence measurement is a correct, agreed-upon concept of the nature of adult intelligence. He presents a mass of material dealing with such concepts from scores of authorities representing the best thought of three different fields: (1) clinical study of the defective, (2) biological observation and animal experimentation and (3) educational measurement. The respective rep-

representative definitions issuing from these fields are: (1) the capacity to think abstractly, (2) the ability to learn and (3) the capacity to adapt means to ends.

The helpful review and discussion in this article of the methods of validation and construction used in standardizing the tests, will afford one basis for choice of particular tests for specific purposes. Also, the varying methods of expressing measurements brings up the point of the comparability of the various tests and the ambiguity of comparing I. Q.'s derived from different tests.

The comparison of tests on the basis of their discrimination of superior deviates, normals and mental defectives is, according to Cattell, unsatisfactory because, as Doll is constantly reminding academic psychometrists, mental defectives do not differ from normals only in intelligence and "we in the field of mental deficiency deplore the current tendency to segregate inferior deviates by means of intelligence tests alone." The author states, that quite apart from the mixed grounds on which individuals are judged as geniuses or defectives, we have to reckon with the well known sociobiological fact of genetic adhesion of distant psychological traits as a result of class stratification and assortative mating. He asks whether we are to include epileptic symptoms in an intelligence measurement if epilepsy becomes linked with low intelligence because mental defectives marry epileptics with greater than average frequency.

The new and unexpected difficulty confronting the standardization of adult intelligence tests lies in the discovery, between 1928 and 1934, by Willoughby, Miles and Miles, Jones and Conrad and Cattell that *adult intelligence test scores actually decline after the age of 20 or 25 years*. Much remains to be discovered concerning the forms of mental ability which persist or decline together with age for knowledge here would throw light on the nature of intelligence and on the necessary observances in adult mental test construction.

The problems of the use of the I.Q. as a measure expressing relative brightness in adults, enters into the discussion. All the accumulating criticisms of the I.Q. in work with children receive such added power

from the special difficulties of the adult situation that a considerable proportion of the psychometrists do not hesitate to condemn its use in this field. As alternatives to the I.Q. one may use a percentile score, a standard score (including such derivatives as the T-score), or one of the growth constants that some researches have suggested. However, after full discussion, Dr. Cattell concludes that to go off the I.Q. standard at the present juncture, would seem quixotic as far as theory is concerned, and wasteful with respect to the accumulation of useful knowledge. To this, one might add that it would greatly confuse the commitment procedures in use by the courts and institutions for defectives and defective delinquents as well as the basis for assignment of school children to ungraded classes, etc.

There is appended to the article an exhaustive bibliography containing 137 titles of recent research which should prove invaluable to users of adult intelligence tests as well as to researchers in this field.

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A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR CANTRIL'S THEORY OF MOTIVATION. PETER A. BERTOCCHI, *Psychological Review*. 49:365-386, July, 1942.

This paper aims to clarify the many "vexing questions" raised in Professor Hadley Cantril's book, *The Psychology of Social Movement*, by expounding and examining the theory of motivation presented therein. It is thus focussed on the basic explanatory concepts which the book introduces to account for social change. The discussion of Dr. Cantril's motivational scheme is presented under the headings of basic orientation, the matrix of social change, the pre-socialized individual, the functional anatomy of derived motives, the nature of the Ego as an anchor for autonomous motives and the anchorage of Egos vs. the Ego as anchor.

The basic orientation of Professor Cantril is the estimation of behavior as a function of the environment and of predispositions in motivating the particular individual.

He tries to get away from instinctive, individualistic and physiological "explanations." He is clearly oriented against instinct theory and its "fictitious, schematic man who represents abstract 'human nature', endowed with a bundle of fixed needs of capacities." Dr. Bertocci thus concludes that Dr. Cantril is seeking a purely functional explanation and proceeds to analyze the latter's account of the motivating predispositions and their relation to the environment.

Dr. Cantril regards the individual, born in an organized society, as entangled in the social network from which he cannot escape. However, he will develop the capacity to select alternate courses of action and to change some characteristics of his culture which are by no means to his liking but this selection and desire to alter are themselves determined by the original conditions imposed by a certain way of life. Dr. Bertocci does not attempt to question this statement of the situation but discusses some doubts that arise. For example, opportunities, in the last analysis, are relative to the needs and abilities of the individual and, therefore, Professor Cantril's analysis does not give adequate attention to the desires and abilities of the individual and does not emphasize enough in theory what needs to be emphasized if we are to explain social leaders, revolutionaries or any other variants from the common pattern. The individual, says Bertocci, is not relative to the environment (as Cantril believes) but the environment, once it allows him the means of sheer physical subsistence, is fundamentally relative to him, to his needs, to his abilities. The causal matrix of a social movement is not in social norms but in the dynamic life of the individual who reacts to these norms with satisfaction and dissatisfaction and who has the necessary understanding and ability to produce the same effects in others.

A consideration of Professor Cantril's treatment of the pre-socialized individual aligns him with the views of Professor G. W. Allport in his *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*. He tries to find some way to account for the variety of human motives without positing a total host of instincts or needs and without trying to classify all specific motives as

some permutation of one of a more restricted number of basic drives. He does not deny that there are certain basic biologic needs such as those for food, shelter and sexual gratification, more or less common to all men, but says that they become so conditioned or regulated by cultural influences that later on they may be scarcely recognizable. The author criticizes Dr. Cantril for not realizing that a longer list of original drives more or less common to all men, is both a better support for such uniformity as there is and also a better partial explanation of the causes of conflict in a given culture. To Dr. Bertocci, it seems highly improbable and psychologically impossible that three basic needs on this biological level should be the motivational roots of our complex lives.

Professor Cantril accepts the Allport theory of functional autonomy to account for the uniqueness of individual personality. Thus, he stated that "whether or not the real origins of derived drives are ever discovered, there would seem to be overwhelming evidence from personal experience and observation that men's interests, when once formed, are by no means necessarily sustained by some original urge." He says that derived drives are autonomous of their origins but not autonomous of the ego or of the values in the culture which the individual has somehow interiorized as part of him. Dr. Bertocci points out that the consistency of personality structure is hard to explain once drives are granted freedom from their original sources. He says that functional autonomy of motives would be possible from one or several, but not from all, original motives. If motives retain no functional connection with their original roots neither their "go" nor "contemporary energy" can be explained, let alone the continuity between motives.

The crucial controversy between Drs. Cantril and Bertocci concerns their concepts of the ego and its nature as an anchor for autonomous motives. The "ego" as Professor Cantril sees it, is on one side an effect of a culture and not a cause. Therefore, underlying this empirical or phenomenal ego, there must be presupposed, as the receiving agent of cultural influence, another entity or process of

activity,—the pre-cultured ego, the subject or agent-ego. In these terms, according to the author, Professor Cantril's 'ego' is the cultured ego, as opposed to the pre-cultured ego, or it might also be called the predicate ego, since it tells us something about the subject ego and the world in which that subject ego is both causal agent and receiver of cultural influence. Professor Cantril is criticized by Dr. Bertocci for not mentioning needs among the causes of differentiation among egos, but stressing instead, differences in abilities, temperament and training. According to the author's views, the agent-self at any one stage of its history actually selects its ego, according to its conception of its need, ability and environmental tensions.

Dr. Bertocci asks what has happened to the anchorage motives which, according to Cantril, were to be considered autonomous of original needs, but not autonomous of the ego or of the values in the culture which the individual has somehow interiorized as part of him. He says that if his analysis is correct and the ego itself is a derived motivational pattern of values, the general problem of anchorage of this ego must be solved over and above the specific problem of the ego being the anchor for derived motives. If the ego is in part a product of interiorization, then its anchor is the interiorizing agent, or agent-self, with its abilities, needs and temperament. The agent-self interiorizes or accepts already established values, because it has certain needs to satisfy and thus functions as an internal frame of reference for the further satisfaction of needs and abilities.

According to Cantril, the "subjective counterpart" of the ego is the feeling of self-respect or self-regard, in relation to which the individual "evaluates the felt significance of an action." Thus the feeling of self-regard has been tied to the ego which, in turn, has been tied to social values with which the individual identifies himself. Bertocci asks, why does the individual identify himself with any one set of values. He answers, because the cultured ego produces a high regard for self if that ego is consistent with the best the individual knows for his needs and abilities.

Finally, Professor Cantril himself introduces an underlying "desire for meaning" to help account for the individual's pursuit of meaning when he is faced by a problematic situation with which he is dissatisfied. Bertocci concludes by stating that the pursuit of meaning in psychology will lead us not only to an innate need-to-interpret (curiosity), but to investigate other less physiological or non-physiological sources of conflict.

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SOCIAL FACILITATION, E. WULFF, *Acta Psychologica*, 4:275-294, May, 1939.

Controlled experiments with rats were made to determine the facility with which they could adapt to certain factors having social values. It was found that rats will react differently in groups of three than when alone. After rats had thirsted for forty-eight hours they were permitted to drink for five seconds and then were subjected to an electric shock. The single rat would be deterred from attempting to drink again, to the extent of twice as much as if he were in company with two other rats. Rats in groups of three will approach and withdraw without drinking 16.4 times for a given period as compared with 11.8 times for single rats. In the triad group a rat will drink much more frequently than if left alone. Factors, such control of litter, weight and technique, of course, were kept constant for all these experiments.

The author concludes that the experiment seemed to support to a certain extent the Gestalt Thesis that an individual reacts to the situation as a whole. Social facilitation plays an important role in every human society and apparently the same factor seems operative in the case of animals. It is noted among human beings that few people will drink alone and even in these cases there is a sense of wrong doing. Social facilitation is especially noted in connection with the criminal offenses because many individuals could not and would not commit crimes except accompanied by other people. This theory has

a bearing upon the reliability of witnesses. Testimony given by an individual who was present at a scene in company with other people is affected to considerable extent by mass psychology. In social enterprises, as well as in criminal behavior, the stimulus of carrying out projects in the presence of other people is a notable factor in the success of the undertaking.

V. C. B.

INFERIORITY ATTITUDES AND THEIR CORRELATION AMONG CHILDREN EXAMINED IN A BEHAVIOR CLINIC. LUTON ACKERSON. *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 62:85-96, 1943.

Inferiority attitudes or feelings as a clinical description first appeared in America about 25 years ago under the name of "organ inferiority" with the publication of Adler's Study of Organ Inferiority and its Psychical Compensation. The late Alfred Adler at first seemed to consider the patient's physical or anatomical inferiority to be the most potent cause of mental reactions and "compensations", but soon modified the concept to include constitutional and mental inferiorities and social and cultural factors. Most recent writings tend to assign less causal importance to the actual physical and other objective conditions and to stress the importance of social pressures impinging upon the given individual. The trend in this direction is illustrated by Dr. Ackerson with quotations from Louttit, Stagner, Kimball Young and Maslow and Mittleman. The present study, in so far as its limitations may warrant specific interpretations, supports the view that inferiority may be largely a "state of mind."

The research consists of a series of statistical correlations between the notation inferiority attitudes and about 120 traits or conditions noted among 2,114 white boys and 1,181 white girls examined consecutively at the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research. Of these 202 boys and 62 girls were noted by the staff as manifesting inferiority attitudes. These

were school children whose ages ranged from 6 years through 17, with means of about 12 years and standard deviations of about 3 years. Their I.Q.s ranged from about 50 to about 150, with means of about 82 and standard deviations of about 17.

The children studied were referred from a number of sources: the schools, charitable agencies, by family physicians and frequently by the parents themselves. Among the reasons for referral were (a) poor work or retardation in school, (b) suspected of mental defect, (c) enuresis, (d) conduct problems such as disobedience, truancy or stealing and (e) personality difficulties such as restlessness, "nervousness", unhappy appearance or manner, daydreaming, and the like. All children were given an extensive examination by a staff composed of a psychiatrist, pediatrician, psychologist, psychiatric social worker and also frequently by a recreation worker. For several weeks during the time these children were examined, the late Dr. Alfred Adler of Vienna was himself a guest member of the Institute Staff.

The results are presented in tabular form as Pearson tetrachloric or biserial correlations, with age "partialled out." The relatively high bi-serial correlations of .43 (plus or minus) .02 and .59 (plus or minus) .03 with personality-total indicates, in the author's view that an inferiority attitude is an important indicator of the extent of a child's personality problems. The personality total is the total number of personality problems noted for a given child such as "daydreaming, crying spells, seclusiveness, etc. Also, the statistically significant correlations with conduct-total indicates that children with a staff notation of inferiority attitudes are likely to manifest a large number of undesirable conduct traits such as, lying, stubbornness, fighting, etc. Concerning six physiological conditions which presumably might cause inferiority reactions, the only statistically reliable correlation was with neurological defect among girls. Enuresis, underweight, etc. showed no significant correlation with inferiority feelings. The finding with regard to I.Q. was contrary to the frequently expressed belief that mental defect was in itself a

source of inferiority reactions. Many other results are presented.

Among the conclusions drawn are, (a) that physical, mental and social conditions of objective inferiority do not per se give rise to inferiority attitudes; (b) that higher intelligence tends to be

associated with inferiority feelings. The data unfortunately did not enable the author to proceed to investigate directly the effect of this social pressure.

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D - Medico - Legal

THE PERVERSE CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY. NERIO ROJAS. *Archivos de Medicina Legal*, Argentina, 11:3-12, 1941.

This paper was originally read by the author at the Second Latin-American Congress of Criminology which met in Santiago, Chile in January 1941. Dr. Rojas originally adopted the expression, "perverse constitution" to denote a type of psychopathic personality. He defined the condition as a psychopathic disequilibrium, usually congenital, based on weakness or impotence of the moral sense and consisting of egoistic and anti-social tendencies with relative unimpairment of the intellect.

Many synonymous terms have been applied to describe this abnormal condition such as, "moral madness" (Pritchard, Krafft-Ebing, Lombroso), "moral insanity" (Pritchard), "moral weakness" and "Moral imbecility" (Despine), "moral Daltonism"—"Moral perversity" and "instinctive perversions" (Dupre), "moral invalidity" (Mairet), "innate delinquency" (Ferri, Lombroso), "instinctive delinquency" and "delinquency by inclination" (Italian Penal Code), "constitutional immorality" (Tanzi), "perverse personality" (Mira y Lopez), "perverse psychosis" (Delmas), "moral idiocy" (Grohmann), "affective insanity" (Maudsley), and "instinctive monomania" (Georget). The author rejects all those expressions which imply mental impairment or alienation such as "madness," "insanity," "imbecility," "psychosis", etc. The others, he states, can be utilized provided that their exact meaning is clarified.

Dr. Rojas points out that an instinct is a spontaneous, biological, internal stimulus which excites human and animal ac-

tivity without the aid of intelligence. Some authors have described as many as fifty different instincts confusing them with secondary tendencies, reflexes and habits. Others have reduced instincts to their primitive fundamental types and speak of only three instincts,—self-preservation, reproduction and the instinct of association. The author postulates that there is, in reality, only one fundamental instinct, that of self-preservation, which functions in three directions — personal preservation, preservation of the species and preservation of society. From the point of view of this article, there are disturbances of the instincts which alter personality and conduct which we call "instinctive perversions" or "abnormal instincts."

These "instinctive perversions" were classified by Dupré as follows:

I. Perversions of the Instinct of Self-Preservation.

Prodigality, collectionism, avarice uncontrollable gambling, vanity, autophilia, self-accusation, suicide, toxicomania, gluttony, etc.

II. Perversions of the Instinct of Reproduction.

Erotism, satyriasis, nymphomania, sexual rage, frigidity, inversion, bestiality, necrophilia, sadism, masochism, sadomasochism, fetishism, exhibitionism, onanism, perversion of the maternal instinct, incest, etc.

III. Perversion of the Instinct of Association.

Maliciousness, destructiveness, cruelty against living beings, criminality, poisoning, fire-setting, unfounded accusations, assassinations, oppositional tendencies, misanthropy, insubordination, etc.

Dr. Rojas regards the above classification as a good semiological one which

takes into account isolated symptoms but does not trace them to their morbid causes. However, from the point of view of clinical psychiatry, criminology, legal medicine and penal law, we require a better classification. Before presenting what he regards as an improved classification of "instinctual perversions," the author points out that this term is not synonymous with "perverse constitution." The first is a broader concept and can be frequently reconciled with society's moral standards but the second term is restricted and intimates an anti-social tendency. There are instinctive perversions in which there is no malignity. For example, suicides or prodigality and even some sexual perversions need not be anti-social. Perverse constitution is specifically the result of perversion of the instinct of association into anti-social, criminal conduct. Thus, the term "perverse constitution" can only be used when there is perversion of the social instinct.

To define "perverse constitution" more fully, Dr. Rojas emphasizes that it is exclusively or predominantly in the affective-instinctive-moral sphere that the abnormality occurs, and that there results a complete absence or negation of social and ethical discrimination while the intellectual capacity remains more or less intact. From this type of difficulty is derived bad conduct, insubordinations, moral maladaptation, delinquency and the whole series of anti-social actions which is referred to as "the Odyssey of the perverse." Regis has summarized the fundamental nature of perverse constitution in four words: amorality, ineffectivity, maladaptation and impulsiveness.

The criminal with perverse constitution has some insight into his difficulties and continuously rationalizes his conduct and attempts to justify it with a sort of immoral logic. He thus cannot be considered as mentally diseased. He is abnormal but not insane. He lacks moral consciousness which should result from the integration of the affective and intellectual components. Characteristically the affective element is impaired and thus the intellectual component becomes weakened and loses its inhibitory functions. These individuals know right from wrong but cannot inhibit their anti-social actions. The in-

tellectual component may be defective through a specific defect of moral judgment although the individual may be normal in intelligence.

For a complete clarification of terminology and concepts the author refers to his earlier articles in *"Annals of the Society of Criminology"* (1937) and in the *Rev. de Psiquiatria y Criminologia* (no. 9, 1937). He hopes that the expression "moral insanity" will be discarded and that the other confusing concepts will be clarified by the adoption of his classification which is clinical, nosographic and logical.

Clinical Classification
"Instinctive Perversions" and
"Moral Insanity"

I. Constitutional Forms.

1. Pure: essential moral "insanity"—perverse constitution — innate delinquency. (These are not to be considered as mental disease.)

2. Combined: with epilepsy, imbecility, hysteria.

II. Acquired Forms

1. Pure: encephalitis lethargica, traumatic, etc.

2. Symptomatic: dementia, mania, delirium, etc.

Dr. Rojas arrived at the above classification through clinical observation and experience, review of previous literature and theoretical considerations.

In the final section of the article we are given a discussion of the concept of legal responsibility and culpability in relation to the "perverse constitution" (the pure constitutional type of the Rojas classification.) Dr. Rojas considers criminals with perverse constitution to be dangerous in the juridical sense and incorrigible in the medical and pedagogical sense. Criminal justice, police science and legal medicine already recognize this category of offenders. For the judge and the expert, it merely has to be determined whether the offender is insane or not. If the subject falls in the category of combined or symptomatic form in the classification, he may be treated as not responsible from the legal point of view. However, if we have a pure constitutional form and the state of the intelligence is normal, the sub-

ject is not treated as a case of mental alienation and is considered responsible.

In the Penal Codes, provisions are made for the condemning of the perverse constitutional criminals, making them suffer the full consequences of their acts and their dangerousness although medical treatment can be given later by the prison doctor. This treatment may take whatever form the individual case calls for, such as glandular treatment, psychotherapy, occupational training and therapy, etc. Such provisions are primarily for social defense. Some Penal Codes have express provisions concerning criminals with perverse constitution. Thus, in Article 108 of the Italian Code, they are referred to as "delinquent by tendency with a special inclination towards crime." The article excludes from this category those cases in which the criminal propensity was produced by mental illness. Dr. Rojas discusses in addition, the Argentinian, Brazilian and French Penal Codes on these points.

The article should prove interesting for psychiatrists in the field of criminology since Dr. Rojas has given a useful resume of the psychiatric and medico-legal points to provide a basis for future legislation.

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IRRESPONSIBILITY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
D. A. THOM. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 99:330-337, November, 1942.

The existence of a group of incorrigible delinquents who inevitably mature into hardened adult criminals remains as a menace to the community because the problem has not been effectively handled thus far. The Court exercising its usual formula for determining legal responsibility dubs these children as delinquents and treats them largely from the viewpoint of incarceration and punishment in much the same manner as it handles adults. The repeated offenses committed by the children indicate clearly that such methods of disposition by the court are inef-

fectual. Some of the reasons for the determination of irresponsibility by the court are discussed by the author. A typical case is cited in detail and certain conclusions are drawn therefrom.

The delinquent, a boy aged 15, pled guilty to the murder of a 15-year old girl. He had lured the girl into an unoccupied house, raped and murdered her and then had proceeded day after day to go back to the locality and to mutilate the body. At least three different weapons were used and twenty-two different types of wounds were noted. The victims eyes were gouged out, there were knife slashes under the eyes, stab wounds of the chest and the entire skull was bashed in. It was one of the most atrocious murder cases in the history of the State of Massachusetts, committed by a 15-year old boy.

A study of his history indicates that in infancy he was unstable and difficult to manage and that he had always during his childhood wanted to be the center of the stage. He was in constant friction with other children and always chose younger boys whom he could easily lead. He was extremely attached to his step-sister. At the age of 12, besides his resentfulness and destructiveness, he began to lie and steal. At the age of 14 he was expelled from school for pushing a girl. Nine months later he was again charged with assault for pushing a girl off a bicycle. He was noted for writing obscene words on the walls and in school books and for defacing property. At the age of 15 years and 9 months he assaulted a girl and slashed her about the face; sixteen stitches were necessary. Rape was attempted. One month later he committed the atrocious murder mentioned above. The question obviously raised is why such an individual with markedly vicious tendencies was not dealt with sufficiently early to prevent the final culmination of his conduct in atrocious murder. This case was quite a problem one since the age of 3 years and yet nothing constructive was done toward meeting the situation. The author rightly calls attention to the fact that the community is responsible for protecting such an individual against himself and the community from his overt behavior. The boy was not legally insane but certainly he was socially irresponsible

and a dangerous menace. There are many juvenile delinquents of his type in the community who are not being cared for with any better efficiency than the case cited although the end results might not be so disastrous. These children are cruel, sadistic, and perverted. To meet the situation the author recommends, "There is a crying need for the legal and medical professions, in cooperation with the legislature and an enlightened public press, to exert all pressure in an untiring effort to have enacted a law which will permit of the recognition of irresponsibility that does not now fall within the narrow confines of our legal definition of insanity."

The psychiatrist called upon to pass an opinion in juvenile delinquency cases is somewhat at a disadvantage. He really has the need for action and his viewpoints regarding medical irresponsibility must be shaped up to meet the practical needs for disposition of the case. Consequently, he permits his testimony to be compromised and it frequently does not present his complete viewpoint on the situation. Dr. Sheldon Glueck in a discussion of Dr. Thom's paper called attention to laws which have been passed in four states, California, Illinois, Michigan and Minnesota, respectively, for the purpose of hospitalization of sexually aggressives through commitment rather than criminal procedure. The great difficulty in the past in trying to devise laws which would govern the hospitalization of the psychopath is the definition of the term itself. Of the four states perhaps the Minnesota law covers the definition most effectively from the psychiatric viewpoint. This reads as follows:

"The term 'psychopathic personality' means the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instabil-

ity, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons."

The marked importance of such an act is that it is the entering wedge of behaviour categories of psychopaths. Much psychopathic conduct other than sexual is in need of hospitalized evaluation. This cannot be legally secured under the present set-up.

Dr. Glueck in the discussion of Dr. Thom's paper comments regarding the use of clinics for the determination of psychopaths. He states that clinics are essentially diagnostic and that they have not received enough financial support to become therapeutically useful. They could extend their present activities, however, to the preparation of prediction tables. The juvenile court is especially useful in the handling of the pre-delinquent but it should have available adequate psychiatric personnel which is not always the case at present. The institutions set aside for the treatment and rehabilitation of the defective delinquent, according to Dr. Glueck, have been a great disappointment. They have come too much under the domination of penal administrative routine and should be stepped up by the employment of the best research and therapeutic personnel and facilities available.

Topping all other procedures should be a systematic campaign to educate the public regarding its responsibility toward providing facilities and personnel for clinics, court, and institutions.

V. C. B.

E - Anthropology & Sociology

THEORY AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH. SVEND RIEMER. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 48: 188-201, September 1942.

The current trend of criminological research has shown a strong drift toward

being unduly influenced by the science of measurement. The statistical approach to criminality involves certain pitfalls which have not been sufficiently evaluated by recent investigators. Causal relationships are not to be deducted from mere numerical regularities but rather they are to be used

as verification of the total frame of reference for only in this way can objective validity be obtained. This association can be secured by "the mutual relationship between the theoretical concept of the 'ideal type' on the one hand and the 'hypothetical average' and the 'operational definition' on the other."

More specifically the methodology included the searching out of significant units which could be used as factors in evaluating crime causation. Thus statistical information does not have any value per se unless certain units are segregated for the purpose of bringing leverage upon the problem at hand. These isolated unit factors, however, must be inter-related to form a configuration upon which conclusions can be drawn. Relative to this the author aptly remarks "If research is unguided by a coherent and continually expanding framework of hypothesis, it is likely to disintegrate into detailed studies which only by accident strike upon a problem relevant to the development of social theory." Thus the search for a significant unit must not proceed just for the purpose of isolating and developing a single fact, but it must be related to criminological knowledge as a whole. For example, investigation of incest in Sweden showed that the father-daughter relationship was conducive to incest mostly in the farm group. If one were to draw generalized conclusions from this isolated fact that farm life conduces more to incest than urban life, the conclusion would be strongly at variance with what is found in other communities. A similar investigation in Denmark, for example, showed that incest was far greater in the urban areas. The total picture, therefore, must be evaluated first before any particular line of investigation is interpreted. A failure to comply with this dictum is noted in present trends in criminological research.

The ideal type in criminological research is outlined by the author as a concept on a theoretical level having for its purpose speculation and the control of statistical data for the purpose of arriving at more significant predictions. It is purely a theoretical method, of course, and serves as a standard against which environmental and hereditary circumstances in the life history of criminals could be approximated.

V. C. B.

THE PROCESS OF URBANIZATION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. MARSHALL B. CLINARD. *The American Journal of Sociology*. 48:202-213, September 1942.

Careful distinction is made by the author between the ordinary concept of urbanization which is largely a matter of population and the sociological concept which views this as a mode of living. In fact, a district relatively thinly populated may have a high degree of urbanization and may represent the splitting off from a more densely-populated area in which the mode of city life and thought is carried with it. To a degree then urbanization represents what might be termed sophistication and specialization.

Source material consisted of 200 inmates of Iowa Men's Reformatory; 116 life histories were studied. Each man was contacted personally and this material was supplemented by a carefully prepared and edited questionnaire. The information thus obtained was segregated into three groups in the following proportions:

Farm Group (Slightly urbanized)	60
Village Group (Moderately urbanized)	52
City Group (Extensively urbanized)	88

TOTAL number of cases	200
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Definitely organized criminal behavior was found to be the outstanding characteristic of the city offender. In their careers it became possible to make contacts with other criminals, to develop better techniques and to operate more successfully than was possible in the other two groups. The city has a criminal cultural group of its own which becomes *sine qua non* for organized crime. Criminals have the need for contact with their ilk to learn the most effective techniques in this way and to utilize the specialized facilities which arise out of criminal organization. Thus the fence, the prostitute, the pimp, the disbarred lawyer, and other criminal accessories become available to the city criminal which is not true of the rural offenders. The city criminal considers himself as such and takes considerable pride in it. The rural offender is inclined to look upon himself as merely playing pranks or committing something for which he feels he will not be called to account and which

he does not consider particularly criminal in nature.

With respect to motility the offenders in the rural areas show more motility than non-offenders and also more motility than city offenders. An individual in the country because of the close scrutiny to which his personal life is subjected by his fellow townspeople finds it necessary to range at some distance from home to commit his misdeeds. The automobile has made it possible for a country offender to range widely and to be back at his home environment within a short period after committing offenses. Thus offenses are likely to be committed in this fashion individually or by two or three individuals loosely organized. This type of offense is likely to show poor technique and to rely upon its success chiefly through boldness. An illustration of the lack of resources of rural offenders is in the matter of forgery. Absurdly simple and easily-discoverable forgeries are perpetrated by them.

With respect to age the rural offender proved to be considerably older than the city one which is a fact of great importance in determining the degree to which the individual has established identity with the community. In the city areas the offender is inclined to split off at an early age from group participation. His prognosis for rehabilitation in later life, therefore, becomes

increasingly poor. Over 90% of farm offenders were first arrested after the age of 17 years, 40% of the urban offenders were in conflict with the law before this age.

Of extreme importance is the feeling of the individual offender concerning his relationship to the community. The impersonal attitude adopted by the city offender makes him feel that any offense against the community is a negligible quantity. The closer relationship of the rural offender to his fellowman makes him realize that any offense against them is more culpable as an act against society. Their feelings against the community were not of bitter hatred or war against society but they possessed only an embryonic state of asocial conduct. The absence of gang formation in rural areas further strengthens this tendency for the rural offender to feel that he is a man apart. He is inclined to consider himself as partly emancipated from the strong social control that rural areas exert over their constituents. In many instances this seems to be a protest on the part of the individual against such control. The exercise of social control in this manner, therefore, becomes one of the most effective preventives of crime and by and large city areas will always have a considerable lag behind rural areas in this respect.

V. C. B.

F - Social & Statistics

SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DELINQUENCY IN WARTIME. FRED R. KEARNEY. *Journal of Social Hygiene*, 29:74-79, February, 1943.

The year since December 7th and Pearl Harbor has eased some of the mass emotional tensions, and we are now faced with the problems as outlined by the Atlantic Charter, "the people's war," "the war for survival," and the preservation of "our way of life." This latter does not mean that the pre-Pearl Harbor arrangement of society, with its pyramid of unsolved social problems, is what we are striving for in this struggle. It means that there is a new freedom to be added to the Four Freedoms as already stated—the freedom from want—for the masses of people. All state-

ments by our leading world thinkers and statesmen underscore this position. The world looks to our leadership in this field, and this leadership carries with it the great responsibilities that we must assume as our part of the struggle. The question posed is, "Of what importance is delinquency under the need for freedom from want?" Delinquency is not a cause but an effect resulting from a variety of causes—economic, political, social, and individual abnormalities. Any consideration of delinquency leads inevitably to the doorstep of all major social problems in any community. The implications of delinquency in war time are of the same genre as the implication of this social aberration in peace time, except that it is much more concentrated

and accentuated during a war period. The economic and sociological causes are similar. Low wages, poor feeding standards, overcrowded and inadequate housing facilities, demoralizing employment conditions, and hosts of others, are basically at the inception of the cause of delinquency. Sex delinquency, a prime condition, comes from the broken homes due to dislocation of civilian hours in war work, and the concentration of large numbers of men in the industrial and military areas. Due to restrictions upon the professional harlot, the incidence of venereal disease from this source has been diminished. The major source of infection facing us today is in the unattached prostitute and the young amateur, who bestows favors in return for a good time, a few beers, and a meal. This source of uncommercialized and non-professional harlotry comes from the dislocated and poorly supervised home life of these individuals. At the basis, however, is the fact that the home and family have been reduced to the status of the third rate social problem, and consequently the third rate status of the home and family life, due to the economic and social pressures of the war.

The line between delinquency and non-delinquency many times becomes quite vague and indiscernible. These delinquency cases cannot be categorized. The causes of delinquency seem to have a common character relating to the family of relief status, submarginal economic and social groups, disorganized homes, poor family control, early termination of schooling, untreated behavior problems, and many other less important factors. The opportunities for seeming escape from these conditions cause a dynamic and forceful drive toward adventure, thrills, and "a chance to really live." An exodus from these areas to the war centers takes place among the young boys and girls.

To relieve this situation no one has a cure all or a single formula that would wipe out these evils. Some of the problems can be met by good sound community organization and by supplying the social services which will divert the drive to the pleasure areas into wholesome and constructive group and community activity channels. Community-wide planning will help us. The full coordination and inte-

gration of existing services and a social welfare group which will keep close to the community and its problems, will go a long way toward helping to relieving this pressure upon the social group, although it will not cure the basic causes of this delinquency.

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Woodbourne, New York

TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY. HORACE G. MILLER. *American Journal of Mental Deficiency*. 47:296-300, January, 1943.

The common attitude of society toward those who learn with difficulty is that feeble-mindedness must be attacked as a special problem. This attitude results from the idea that people must be complete in themselves. Mental defectives are the permanent children of the race and any principles which lead to their maximum development can help us in the development of all children.

The problem of responsibility is sometimes confused with the problem of motivation but the latter is already present. The interests and actions of children are, at first, uncontrolled. The problem of motivation is one of preserving and harnessing life force for the fullest possible living experience. Children accept themselves as individuals only when given that feeling by their larger social organization. They must learn to accept themselves as persons with inadequacies. They must learn that they have worth for what they are and not for what they would like to be.

The problem of developing responsibility in institution children strengthens the feeling that they need more than learning facts. They need contacts with their superiors in the terms of work to be done. Children come to have the idea of themselves that they are given. If the self we recognize is their ability to work with us, their ability to assume responsibility, that is the feeling they will come to have as their true self. When they have this self-feeling, they do not wonder about their adequacy nor do they seek affection on

recognition as of special worth. They grow in their own right. It is the responsibility of the larger group to see that the highest degree of responsibility toward the whole is accepted by the individual as an integral part of himself.

Chester D. Owens,
Woodbourne, N. Y.

EDUCATION IN PRISON. JACK SCHUYLER.
Educational Forum, 6 :403-408, May, 1942.

It is recognized that over a period of centuries crime is on the increase. During the decade 1920-30, New York State penal population increased 108%; whereas, the civilian population increased but 21%. The population of federal prisons has increased 10% every year since 1924. It is obviously stupid and completely wasteful to remove men from society for a great many years and add to their mental, physical, and moral deterioration. James V. Bennett of the U. S. Bureau of Prisons has stated that in two thirds of the U. S. Prisons, we do not even attempt to do anything more than lock up the prisoner and forget him. Several years ago the American Prison Association reported that from 90,000 to 100,000 are idle in state prisons and reformatories throughout the United States.

The criminal represents a failure of the home, the church, the neighborhood, the school and other social and industrial agencies. Penal education extends beyond the "Three R's" to include programs of academic, vocational, and recreational activities. These programs must find their justification and value in their contributions to the adjustment of the individual offender. A standing committee on education was established by the American Prison Association in 1930. New York State has gone farthest in expanding the program of penal education. Academic education enrolled 43% of the population of all the prisons in New York State in 1936-37. Altogether 50% were enrolled in some phase of the educational program. Organized vocational education enrolled 35% of the total educational enrollment. Appropriations for penal education in New York State in-

creased from \$141,000 in 1931-32 to \$350,000 in 1937-38 or an increase of 148%.

Vocational opportunities are afforded through maintenance details. Individual training needs, previous occupational history, mental ability, capacities, interests, etc., are carefully weighed. The library as an integral part of the penal education program has been demonstrated in but a few of the prisons.

The objectives of prison education are best summarized in the 1935 amendment to the Correction Law of New York State. "The objectives of this program shall be the return of these inmates to society with a more wholesome attitude toward living, with a desire to conduct themselves as good citizens and with the skill and knowledge which will give them a reasonable chance to maintain themselves and their dependents through honest labor."

The public must decide whether we shall place offenders in a state of idleness in prisons or fit them as well as possible through education for their restoration to society.

Chester D. Owens,
Woodbourne, N. Y.

A BEHAVIOR PROBLEM—RUNAWAYS. BEN H. BALSAR, *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 13:539-557 July, 1936.

The study is limited to females coming to the attention of the Psychiatric Clinic of the New York Travelers Aid Society. Some three hundred thirty-three cases are included, 83% being over twenty-one years of age and the peak of this group being seventeen years old. From a psychiatric point of view 17.7% were found to be definitely schizoid, 10.5% were found to be feeble-minded and 3.9% had a basis of organic psychosis. The remaining cases were classified under the general group of psychopathic personality, manic up-set and general behavior problems (with no apparent psychopathic background). Attention is called to the fact that a great many of these cases are not chronic but they represent single episodes that can be easily adjusted. The author lists the causes for runaways in the group studied as follows:

(1) *Familial or Emotional Problems in the Home.* Poverty-stricken filthy homes, assaultive, alcoholic or psychopathic parents and incest are the chief problems in this group, which comprises 29.2% of the total number considered.

(2) *Children from Broken Homes.* The state of the home was almost invariably emotionally unstable. The lack of a parent or the possession of a step-parent was a primary difficulty. 21.4% belonged to this group.

(3) *Young Wives and Mothers.* In this group the marital problems and the

problems of the home have become too difficult and the young girl has tried to run away from them. 14.6%

(4) *Economic Insecurity.* 10.1%

(5) *Specific Physical and Mental Problems.* In these cases physical deformities and homosexuality predominate. 9%

(6) *Love of Adventure.* Most of these are adolescent children. 4.5%

(7) *Undetermined Causation.* Wanderlust seems to be a prompt predomination factor in this group. 11.2%

V. C. B.

G - Medicine & Biology

ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHIC STUDIES OF DELINQUENT BOYS. R. L. JENKINS and B. L. PACELLA. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*. 13:107-120, January, 1943.

A series of 37 boys who were inmates of the New York State Training School for Boys at Warwick, New York, and a second group of 50 cases as a control made up of recidivists comprise the material for this study. A large proportion of the boys did not show abnormal brain wave patterns and the history on these particular cases indicated that the maladjustment was purely a social one. The authors, however, have clearly delineated another type of case which shows definite abnormality of pattern and which might be called tentatively "the organic type of behavior syndrome." These children show a somewhat different mode of behavior than the purely socially maladjusted type. The latter has a behavior response which is specific to the particular problem involved. For example, if the child was reacting aggressively against a domineering father, a specific response was obtained. The brain pattern, of course, was negative for pathology. The organic type of behavior, however, shows a stereotyped behavior characterized by over-activity restlessness, excitability, temper outbursts, distractibility, short attention span and peculiar proneness to impulsiveness. This syndrome is almost pathognomic of organic symptomatology for children.

These cases, of course, show a definite abnormal brain pattern. A sub-group of the organic type just mentioned which is not founded on social maladjustment are those with assaultive tendencies resulting from emotional instability, irritability, and poor self-control. The epileptic is a good example of this type of case.

In addition to the socially maladjusted type, the organic type with social maladjustment backgrounds and the sub-organic type without social maladjustment just mentioned, there is another group for which the authors have suggested the term "Handicapped Personality." These children are well known to the school authorities and have various personality disabilities which prevent adequate fitting into the school routine. The authors make the plea that as much attention and facilities should be devoted to this group as have been allocated to the adjustments of auditory, speech, and visual defects. Cases are cited in brief to illustrate the difference between the social maladjustment case and the various types of organic cases.

Relative to the technique employed, a 2-channel amplifier recording system was utilized with bi-polar leads placed antero-posteriorly in alignment with the pupils. The areas studied were the usual ones of occipital, motor and pre-frontal. Dr. Pacella has been especially alert to the fact that children tend normally to give divergent brain patterns which bear some simi-

larity to pathological patterns noted in adults. This is especially true of irregular patterns and of slow waves. The smilitude tends to disappear gradually with advent of adolescence.

Cases showing severe generalized electro-cortical dysfunction revealed a high incidence of 2 to 5 cps waves of high amplitude. This was especially noticeable over the frontal regions of the cortex. The "Epileptic Equivalent" case cited revealed many 2 to 5 cps waves of high amplitude appearing synchronously from both sides of the head over all regions of the cortex. It is a well-known fact that hyperventilation in these cases increases markedly the incidence of slow potentials. The type of behavior syndrome mentioned previously which showed distractibility, short attention span and emotional explosions has a characteristically abnormal pattern of organic type. There was revealed a frequent appearance of 3 to 5 cps waves of high amplitude, particularly over the frontal regions bi-laterally. This type of case shows some tendency toward focalization and not so much diffuseness over the brain area as in the other organic patterns.

The conclusion reached by the authors, obviously, is that the Electroencephalogram is a very definite aid in diagnosis and prognosis of behavior cases in children of the so-called "organic" type.

V. C. B.

EPILEPSY AND SUICIDE. CHARLES PRUDHOMME.
The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 94:722-731, December, 1941.

The author makes an attempt in this study to disprove the widely-held view of psychiatrists and neurologists to the effect that suicide is rare among epileptics. He has obtained his information by personal communications and questionnaires from two sources—institutions and private physicians treating extra-mural patients. Roughly he classifies his patients according to these sources indicating that those in institutions are psychotic while those treated on the outside are neurotic. This contention obviously would be disputed by a

number of authorities in the field. Approximately 75,000 epileptic patients constituted the author's series. It is estimated that there are about 500,000 epileptics in the country and that the total number of suicides of all types of people is 20,000 annually. Data are lacking regarding how many of these suicides are epileptics. There are a number of factors which prevent an accurate estimate but inquiry should be made into the subject on account of its relative importance.

As to the institutional groups studied by the author, the reports of some twenty-three institutions covering State Homes, Psychopathic Hospitals, State Hospitals for the Insane, and Epileptic Institutions throughout the country revealed a relatively low incidence of suicide according to statements made by the superintendents of these institutions. However, there were certain vitiating factors in such reports such as a population containing a number of obviously non-suicidal types (for example, children 12 to 15 years of age), readmissions which would duplicate the count, the exceedingly long period of time covered in some cases, etc. There is difficulty also in determining whether or not death was suicidal or whether or not the individual who had committed suicide was epileptic. The author believes, however, that particularly in the case of Craig Colony for Epileptics at Sonoma, New York, an exceedingly high number of epileptic suicides was indicated—in fact, about five times the incidence of that of the general population. This figure was obtained after readjustments along the lines indicated above but the author admits that in no case has he been able to eliminate all sources of error.

Noyes states that only 10% of the epileptics in the United States are institutionalized. The incidence of suicide in 90% of the epileptics, therefore, is undeterminable.

Billings says that only 10% of all epileptics are considered deteriorated. The author believes that deteriorated epileptics would not commit suicide; that it is necessary for a certain preservation of the personality to be present to give the necessary drive for self-destruction. Here again investigators might question the author's

statement that most institutionalized epileptics are deteriorated.

The method of suicide was largely by the poison route—phenobarbital showing the largest incidence, drowning second, and hanging third. The author was inclined to believe that the reason for the use of poisons as a method of suicide among epileptics is due to the familiarity of taking drugs, particularly the barbitol group. Certain analysts would probably point out, in addition to this, that the narcissistic component of the epileptic makeup is such as to put strong inhibitions upon the marring or destruction by violence of the human body.

Of the neurotic group treated by private physicians, the same elements came into play. However, the neurotic group so-called shows a much lower incidence of suicidal rates than the institutional group. Excerpts of letters from physicians all over the country would indicate that suicides among epileptics are considered by them to be exceedingly rare, thus refuting the general trend of the author's article. The author concludes by an interpretation of the genesis of the successful suicide in epileptics. The symbolical death achieved by the major seizure in epilepsy is indicated. The author states that escape from reality through the epileptic seizure indicates to the patient that he might secure permanent escape through suicide.

V. C. B.

HYPOGLYCEMIA IN DELINQUENTS. NERIO ROJAS AND ALFREDO FERRER SANCHI. *Archivos de Medicina Legal, Argentina*. 11:29-35, Jan.-April, 1941.

This study of hypoglycemia in criminals was undertaken as a further exploration of the hypotheses suggested by Dr. Joseph Wilder in his article on this subject which was published in 1940 (p. 219) in the *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*. Dr. Rojas had previously investigated the medico-legal problems in crimes associated with hunger, and hypoglycemia is usually associated with a state of hunger. Other authors such as Aldersburg, Dalger, Sigwald, Wanchape, Greenwood, Klein,

etc. have studied the relationship between hypoglycemia and crime. Their work was summarized in the Wilder article. As a result it is known that crimes committed by individuals with hypoglycemia are attributed to the marked irritability, impulsiveness, anxiety and partial or complete amnesia which accompany this condition.

Two types of hypoglycemia have been described—the *induced* type and the *spontaneous* type. The first type, which results from insulin therapy, occurs in diabetic patients who have taken too large a dose of insulin causing low blood sugar content and producing abnormal psychiatric symptoms and anti-social reactions. The symptoms disappear with the administration of some sugar. In the spontaneous type, the hypoglycemia results from a natural change in the organism because of faulty nutrition, lactation, endocrine disturbances or other pathological processes.

Various types of anti-social acts have been perpetrated by hypoglycemic individuals. Thus, one patient boarded a street-car in a highly excited condition and proceeded to insult all the passengers. Another, pressed by the need for sugar, entered a store to buy sweets and provoked a tumult. Still another attacked his wife with a kitchen knife. A hypoglycemic mother pricked her child's eyes with a pin. Assaults, homicides, infanticides, abortions, cruelties to children, various sexual perversions and excesses, sexual crimes, aggressions against authorities, immoral conduct, matrimonial cruelty, fires, robberies, etc. are committed by both adults and minors under the influence of hypoglycemia. In all such cases there is a metabolic disturbance with autotoxicity which might serve to explain some of the accompanying psychic phenomena leading to criminal acts.

The authors studied a total of 129 delinquents who were tested for hypoglycemia in their Institute of Legal Medicine with the assistance of the chemist. There were 61 from the National Penitentiary, 22 from the Villa Devoto Prison, 28 from the National Prison and 18 from the Reformatory for Minors. The blood extractions were, in all cases, made in the morning after a fast of 8 or 9 hours and the number of miligrams of blood sugar per c. c. determined by Hagedorn Jensen's method.

The results are presented in statistical and tabular form for the group as a whole and for subgroupings according to type of crime, seriousness of offense, adults and minors, etc. The lowest *fasting blood sugar* registered was 0.38 per 100 c. c. in a minor, 17 years old, who was committed for vagrancy and had a record of many previous offenses of this kind. He was also an epileptic. The highest *fasting blood sugar* content found was 1.30 per 100 c. c. in a man serving a 25 year prison term. He was alcoholic and epileptic, had syphilis and a perverse constitution. He was considered incorrigible, had hit his victim over the head with a hammer and then committed anal coitus.

The subgroupings of data, as analyzed by the authors, did not permit a definite conclusion. They found wide differences of blood sugar content or glycemia in all the categories of offenses. There seemed to be no correlation between the degree of glycemia and the type of crime even if the extreme cases were taken into account. Thus, the offender with the highest degree of glycemia (1.30%) is a subject of very dangerous propensities because of constitutional perversity and epilepsy, convicted of homicide and sodomy.

On the other hand, when the data was analyzed as a whole and not according to type of crime, Drs. Rojas and Sanchi found it possible to affirm the *relatively low* glycemia or blood sugar content in the total group of delinquents. On the average, they are one-third lower in blood sugar than physiologically normal subjects.

The possible influence of the nutritional regimen of the prisoners was ruled out since, if that were the cause, there would not have been the variability in the data nor the number of cases with high glycemia.

The final conclusion is the *hypoglycemia* or low *fasting blood sugar* may be related to criminal tendency but this conclusion should only be regarded as a working hypothesis.

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FOLLOW-UP STUDY OF TREATED NARCOTIC DRUG ADDICTS. MICHAEL J. PESCOR. *U. S. Public Health Service Report*, No. 170, pp 18, Washington, D. C.

A five year follow-up study from January 1, 1936 to December 31, 1940 inclusive, of 4766 narcotic drug addicted patients discharged from the United States Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky is presented. Their legal status on release comprised six categories.

(1) Voluntary Patients Completing Treatment: Individuals in this group account for only 5.7% of the total releases. Their average stay in the hospital was 7.5 months and their average period of abstinence following release was 25.1 months. The present addiction status is unknown in 19.3% of the cases; 52.8% have relapsed to the use of drugs, 17.1% are still abstinent.

(2) Voluntary Patients Discharged Against Advice: Members of this group comprise 19.3% of the total releases. Their average stay in the hospital was 1.7 months. The present addiction status is unknown in 31.5% of the cases; 46.1% have relapsed to the use of drugs, 12.1% are still abstinent.

(3) Probation Patients: This category constitutes 10.3% of the total releases. Their average stay in the hospital was 9.4 months and their average period of abstinence was 20.7 months. The present addiction status is unknown in 21.7%; 42.1% have relapsed to the use of drugs and 26.5% are still abstinent.

(4) Paroled Prisoners: Individuals in this group make up 2.3% of the total releases. The average stay in the hospital was 17.2 months and their average period of abstinence following release was 26.4 months. The present addiction status is unknown in 33.9% of the cases; 24.8% have relapsed to the use of drugs. 31.2% are still abstinent.

(5) Conditional Release Prisoners: These constitute 43.9% of the total releases. Their average stay in the hospital was 19.3 months and the average period of abstinence was 18.8 months. The present addiction status is unknown in 40.2%; 40.4% have relapsed to the use of drugs while 13.7% were still abstinent.

(6) Other Prisoners: In this category were included a miscellaneous assortment of prisoners serving their full terms. This group makes up 16.8% of the total releases. They spent an average of 17.7 months in the hospital and abstained from the use of drugs an average of 19.2 months following release. The present addiction status was unknown in 64.1% of the cases; 28.4% have relapsed to the use of drugs and 3.2% were still abstinent.

Judged by the findings of this investigation, the most successful treatment pro-

gram for narcotic drug addicts appears to be along these lines:

(1) A comparatively short period of hospitalization, not less than two months but not more than five months.

(2) Acceptable employment as a prerequisite for release.

(3) Adequate extramural supervision for a period of three years following discharge preferably under a parole advisor as well as a probation officer.

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Clinical Reports

ANNUAL REPORT. THE ILLINOIS SOCIETY FOR MENTAL HYGIENE. 1942. Vol. XXI, March April, 1943, No. 2; 7 P.

The Illinois Society of Mental Hygiene, in its annual report for 1942, emphasizes the work that it has done during this difficult war period with members of society who have been rejected by the Armed Service. They are not hospital cases, but represent individuals in need of help and are a potential community problem of enormous size. The facilities of the Society are used toward building up self confidence and a definite effort toward making these individuals productive in our war economy.

In addition to this service, the Society acts in an advisory capacity to people having the usual run of problems, such as lack of employment, money worries, discouragement, and insecurity. Such individuals are encouraged to seek counsel and help, and recommendations are made for continued treatment if necessary.

The Society has also been active in committee work, having a keen interest in legislation in the field of the care of the mentally ill. The Society has recognized the need for the extension of out-patient care in psychiatry. In addition, a member of the Society has served regularly on the Executive Board of the Citizens' Committee for the Juvenile Court, and a great deal of interest has been shown in the field of juvenile delinquency, since a close relationship exists between mental conditions and delinquency.

This organization has embarked on a very progressive program for 1943, in which they expect to continue and expand the services to neuro-psychiatric rejectees, improved planning for neuro-psychiatric veterans of World War No. 2, to extend out-patient facilities in psychiatry, and to explore further activities which will be of service in relation to the war.

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THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHILD STUDY CENTER OF MARYLAND, INC., 1942, H. ROBERT BLANK, M. D.

This communication is considerably more than a mere statistical report of an announcement of the functions of the Center. Dr. Blank has drawn up his material with a weather eye for the larger relationships of the Center and of this type of work to community welfare as a whole and to the obligations of the people of the community toward the immensity of the problem involved. A good deal of highly significant observation is made up the psychiatric treatment of problem children. The report, therefore, deserves extended and careful reading by all those interested in the readjustment of problem children.

On account of the presenting symptom being of such marked importance in the prevention of delinquency, it seems advisable to quote the reason for reference of these children to the clinic.

*Chief Complaints and Presenting Problems
Leading to Study Center Referral*

	NO OF CHILDREN
Disobedience or defiance of authority	24
Burglary, larceny, or stealing	21
Truancy	17
Temper tantrums	16
Combateness	14
Enuresis	12
School retardation	12
Destructiveness	8
Runaways	8
Sexual activity	7
Firesetting	6
Fearfulness	6
Encopresis	5
Moodiness	5
Lying	4
Cruelty to animals	4
Night terrors	2
Convulsions	2
Begging	2
Special	6

The table clearly indicates that the children were presented largely because of "socially intolerable behavior." The author rightly calls to our attention that the fundamental responsibility of the clinic is the early recognition of signs of underlying conflicts which may or may not develop later into anti-social conduct. Some of these individuals may even go through their entire lives without any overt behavior but they are profoundly unhappy and are unable "to form positive meaningful relationships with others."

From the psychiatric point of view, the great majority of the children fell into the so-called *neurotic reaction type*. The

author defines this group as "Children whose inter-personal relationships were pervaded by anxiety and guilt feelings and who retained infantile trends." Approximately 50% of the cases studied came into this category. About 20% showed maladjustments without severe personality distortion, (it is this group which offers the best promise of social readjustment); 81% of the children were considered serious psychiatric problems; 58% of the children were delinquents. The *psychopathic reaction type*, so-called, was differentiated by the author largely on the basis of "seeming absence of guilt." About 8% of the cases studied came in this category. Defective intelligence did not seem to be a major factor in the whole series studied, although the general run of the group was dull normal.

In the larger sphere the author calls attention to the urgent need for the co-ordination of child welfare services and for a juvenile court "with complete jurisdiction over violations of the law and matters pertaining to neglect and dependence; and for real scientific programs designed to meet the needs of inadequate and unstable parents." The need for thorough study and adjustment of the parents themselves and the responsibility of the community toward seeing that problem programs of this kind are established are emphasized by the author. Several interesting case histories are cited briefly in illustrating the social problems involved and the methods of the Study Center in meeting these.

V. C. B.

Book Reviews

NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY. HARRY ELMER BARNES AND NEGLEY K. TEETERS. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1943. 1069 pp.

To workers in the field of criminology it did not seem possible that so soon after the appearance of Donald R. Taft's excellent text on this subject in 1942, another work, even more complete and with even fresher, newer point of view, would be published. This massive volume, synthesizing existing knowledge and practice in the field of criminology, contains 40 chapters, 67 illustrations and charts, and a preface. Its pages, numbering over 1000, are replete with suggestions as to desirable future reforms in the repression of crime and the treatment of prisoners. The book is encyclopedic in scope and provides a longitudinal cross-section of present day criminology and at the same time, a vertical investigation into the history of our ideas on crime, criminals, and punishment. Its careful perusal discloses little that could have been omitted. The forward by Professor Frank Tannenbaum of Columbia University prepares us for a distinct contribution and we are not disappointed. The extensive bibliography, conveniently arranged, contains numerous references to practically every important book and article on criminology written in this country in the past four decades. The reader is thus provided with a comprehensive treatment of crime, criminals, punishment, and prisons. The work is excellently written, well-documented, and scholarly in its approach.

Part I deals with the new perspective on crime in contemporary America. We are given a rounded historical and sociological perspective which makes it possible to better understand our present concepts about delinquents and their treatment, and to appreciate the need for fundamental changes in our present attitudes. The biological and physical theories from that of Lombroso to the anthropological theory of Hooton are summarized. Very helpful is the discussion of the relatively new sci-

ence of *Constitutional anthropology*, which is founded upon the older anatomy and physiology and the more recent study of the endocrine glands. Of great interest is the survey of social explanations of crime, particularly the cultural analysis of crime and punishment (elaborated in Rusche and Kirchheimer's book, *Punishment and the Social Structure*).

Intermediate between the biological and the social explanations is the theory that criminal behavior is a result of *psychological traits* which encourage criminality. This theory, with its roots in the early work of Albert Morel and Henry Maudsley, has culminated in the most important contributions made by psychiatry, developed as a result of the work of Charcot, Bernheim, Janet, Kraepelin, Freud and their recent successors. An outstanding contribution of psychology to our understanding of criminal behavior was the technique of mental testing, the result of the work of Binet, Simon, Goddard, Yerkes, Terman, and others, which has enabled us to measure mental capacity and to discover the relation, if any, between feeble-mindedness and criminality.

Attention is given to the importance of economic factors in crime causation. Other topics, ably discussed, are the relation between crime and political graft, racketeering, and the nature of white-collar crime, the revolution in the nature of crime itself, some relevant facts about crime and criminals and the total crime picture in the United States.

Perhaps the most interesting section of the book for psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychopathologists, is the part entitled, "*Factors Favorable to Criminality*," particularly the chapters on Biological Factors Related to Crime, Race and Crime, Socio-economic Causes of Crime, Cultural Influences on Crime, and the Psychiatric Approach to Delinquency and Crime. The authors give a thorough treatment of all modern approaches to the study of crime and trace their historical development. We get illuminating discussions of criminal anthropology (the work of Gall, Lombroso,

Ferri, Goring, Hooton) which cause us to discard the thesis that criminals are physically differentiated from law abiding citizens. The review of the endocrinological explanations of Sheldon, Berman and others, leads us to agree that there is little, if any, evidence to show that "dysfunctioning" of the glands is more prevalent among convicts than among the general population. Descriptions of numerous studies in the field of crimino-biology, concerning the possible hereditary nature of crime, brings us to the point of view that the individual is a product of both heredity and environment and is motivated by innumerable factors. The resumé of past and present concepts of feeble-mindedness in relation to criminality convinces us that the feeble-minded are not inherently vicious but because they are unusually suggestible, they are more easily influenced than normal types by either good or bad surroundings.

A summary of what has been written about the effects of pathological social conditions on the behavior of those individuals who are considered criminal by society is presented. The authors are less thorough in this chapter than in others but do refer to many excellent books devoted to these subjects. We learn that poverty alone and *per se* is not a cause of crime. However, many crimes may be traced to economic causes as shown in the studies of Dr. Cyril Burt, Breckinridge and Abbot, Healy, and others. Inadequacy, frustration, and emotional insecurity, often concomitants of poverty, play an important part in delinquency. Other topics examined by the authors under the caption of "Socio-economic Factors in Crime" are unemployment, uncongenial employment, blind-alley jobs, and the broken home in relation to delinquency.

Of the cultural influences on crime, the authors cover religion, education, vocational training, the press, the motion picture, and the radio. Their point of view, especially as regards religion, is well-balanced. They suggest that the numerous studies showing that Catholics tend to be more criminal than Protestants, and that Jews are the least criminal of the three groups, should be accepted guardedly because other factors are always present when

we attempt to evaluate the criminality of large groups.

The *psychiatric* approach to the problem of crime is probably the most recent contribution to the field. The authors ask whether the thesis of the *psychologically malfunctioning individual* answers the riddle of antisocial behavior. They fail to answer this question. They merely give us a glimpse into the work of the psychologists, psychoanalysts and members of other psychological schools of thought. Nevertheless, they do present the fundamentals of modern psychology and psychiatry as applied to this field. The material on the nature of the mental life of the individual, the psychoanalytic approach, and psychiatry as an aid in understanding delinquent behavior, is a short survey which should stimulate the curiosity of the reader to further exploration of the rich literature in this area—such books as "*The Roots of Crime*" by Franz Alexander and a host of others.

The next part, dealing with the apprehending, convicting and sentencing of criminals, is invaluable for police officers, criminal interrogators, lawyers and prosecutors, judges, probation and parole officers and court psychologists and psychiatrists. Into 138 pages has been assembled a mass of knowledge about the police function, scientific police methods, court procedure, types and specialization of criminal courts, rules of evidence, the jury trial, the probation program, etc. Particularly stimulating is the section on insanity and the courts. Many books and articles have been incorporated into the massive literature dealing with this subject. Most of it resolves itself into a discussion of the role of insanity in the commission of a heinous crime. The insane were the first to be relieved of legal responsibility for their acts. A thorough description of the early and recent tests for insanity from the "*wild beast test*" of 1724 through the "*delusion test*" of the nineteenth century, to the modern "*right and wrong test*" and "*knowledge of nature and quality test*," is given. The role of the psychiatrist is discussed in an enlightening section in which the authors give due credit to the unparalleled recent progress of psychiatry and psychology for ushering in a more scientific knowledge of the relationship between crime and mental

disease. They rightly point out the handicaps imposed upon forensic psychiatry by courtroom procedure and rules of evidence, etc. There is also included a creditable section (pp. 332 to 338) on the presentence clinic, behavior clinics and psychiatric clinics as parts of courtroom procedure.

The historical origins of punishment for crime are traced in Part IV. This contains chapters on the philosophy of punishment and early forms of punishment, corporal punishment, history and philosophy of capital punishment and the transportation of criminals, and is chiefly of historical interest. In it the authors seek to "debunk" and discredit the erroneous notions and the brutal and futile methods employed in dealing with criminals by presenting the history of how we came to "get this way" with criminals. Their eloquent writing, backed by factual data, effectively strikes blows at the "chains that hold us in bondage to an archaic, ineffective and even dangerous system of thought and action."

A similar historical spotlight is thrown on the origins of the prison system and the reform of the criminal law, particularly the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems of penal treatment. Part VI traces the development of the reformatory system, the English Borstal system and other comparatively recent developments in the prison system. We find a brilliant analysis of the cruelty and futility of the modern prison, including such topics as the psychology underlying prison cruelty, how prisons demoralize the convict personality, the sex problem in the modern prison, prison psychoses, etc.

The picture of the new penology and the new institution with its institutional program and its specialized personnel is of unique value. Medical care and hospital facilities, housing, recreational facilities, education, parole planning and humane visiting and letter writing facilities are all related to rehabilitation of offenders. "In their repudiation of imprisonment as the chief and almost the only method of dealing with the criminal, the authors are to be commended for courageously facing the issue and frankly proposing the abolition of the penal institution." If they mean to substitute for it the rehabilitatory institu-

tion of the future, this reviewer agrees, but this new type of institution first must be *fully developed*, must prove its worth and be prepared to fill the shoes of the traditional prison with a better fit. Thus, the new treatment institution plus an extended system of parole and probation, the Youth Correction Authority, etc. will rise and *is* rising from the ruins of the old prison of punishment and demoralization.

We are introduced to the problems of prison administration and the reformation of prisoners. The history and significance of prison labor, the development of contract prison labor and the piece-price system, the state-use system, etc., all come in for critical review. Education behind prison walls, social and vocational education, prison libraries and the role of the prison chaplain, form an illuminating chapter indicating the trend from a concept of punishment to one of rehabilitation and training. There is a new day in prison education aimed at well-defined ends, such as changing attitudes, increasing vocational efficiency, elimination of complexes and the development of willingness and skill for cooperative living after release. The authors stress the value of the psychologist in the educational program especially in making available the findings of vocational aptitude and intelligence tests. Separate chapters are devoted to the systems of prison visiting, self-government and honor systems, release and care of discharged prisoners and parole and its problems. In the chapter on the "Classification of Prisoners," the main stages and trends in the history of segregation and classification of prisoners are indicated. The modern *classification clinic* is amply treated and the functions of the medical doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, educational director, social worker, chaplain, etc. are described in detail. The classification procedure is pictured in operation.

In the concluding part of the volume, the writers take up special problems involved in dealing with delinquents. The county jail, children's courts, child-guidance clinics and crime prevention programs are covered in individual chapters. The special problems of vagrants, drug addicts, alcoholics, prostitutes, sex criminals, etc., are treated from a progressive, modern point of view. A rational approach to the

repression of crime and the reformation of criminals is proposed. Such experimental programs as the adolescent court, the Youth Correction Authority, the Chicago Area Project and others, are carefully evaluated. A special chapter is devoted to the institutional treatment of juvenile delinquents.

To critically estimate the value of this compendium of criminological knowledge which represents a historic departure and a milestone in the efforts to deal with the problems of crime, we must emphasize the monumental task which the authors undertook in gathering together tremendous masses of facts, data, and literature and at the same time evaluating and integrating them into a bible of criminology. In addition, we have a more than usually complete synthesis of newer attitudes towards crime and its treatment, of the more recent research on the subject and of the current progress being made toward the ultimate establishment of a rational system of criminal procedure and rehabilitative practice. The author's main purpose has been more than fulfilled in that they "forcefully and fully reveal the futility of current attitudes and practices in the fields of criminology and penology and provide some impulse to further efforts to introduce a rational system of dealing with crime and criminals." The book deserves to be widely read not only by professional workers and students of criminology, but by intelligent laymen. It will be in wide use as textbook, reference book and as general reading matter.

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LOVE AGAINST HATE. KARL MENNINGER.
Harcourt Brace and Company, pp. ix 31.
New York. 1942. Price \$3.50.

The title of this book is misleading, as though seeking to capitalize out of current issues also, and it does not do justice to the breadth of its theme. Lucid language, straightforward diction and much case material of an illustrative order, enhance this

work for the intelligent layman. It represents a rather condensed and much oversimplified exposition of the forces of altruism and rancour in a sensate world, and the ultimate triumph of the Good Life, synonymous with Love. The previously discussed theme of *self-destructiveness in man appears* again in this volume, whilst the directives of rage, vituperation and envy compose the rubric of Hate with which it deals. Such an elementary treatise on the aberration of the love life in the community should form the required collateral reading for every sociology student. For this is the work of a sympathetic keen observer of humanity, whose own optimism and bubbling good humor pervade the work. Its dynamic style, its euphoria and enthusiasm, with the crying need of the world to give of love and energy, should make this a much sought for publication.

Having posited that Love and Hate exist in social life as separate entities, instead of being dual components of the same thing, Menninger finds difficulty in reconciling the presence of feuds and conflicts in the outside world, with divine love; but his whole argument is based on this irrational ambivalence. Patterns of hate, he feels, are inflicted on us in childhood, akin to "mother hate," obscured though they are by secret and unrecognized revenge motives.

Each page gives evidence of much serious thought, also of unbounded benevolence and extratensive imagination. Yet love is the sempiternal theme, and maybe we have traveled far from Have-lock Ellis.

As in previous works we find jejune imaginary examples to illustrate concepts, cheek to jowl with flashes of real insight, "... child bearing deprives her (woman) of the primary safeguard against her own aggressive impulses" (p. 52). Further we have a comforting philosophy for our times in the remark: "Hate means death and love is stronger than hate." It is consoling that Life goes on, but this is no proof that love continues; unless it be that *analism* is here equated with the pleasure principle.

The sentimental meaning of the term love constantly arises when tacit absence

of aggression component is all that is implied. The author fails apparently to realize the ethical propriety of hate impulses in a sensate world. It is responsible for sculpture, surgery, accountancy, caricature and a thousand other sublimations.

Cursory examination of titles may alarm the serious student; for when Faith, Hope and Charity came in for scientific disquisition, it is evident Psychology has made some strides! Unfortunately the treatment is here of the law-pastor order and is better left to and exemplified in theological tracts. Insofar as this book represents the layman's *vade mecum* to the vicissitudes of misdirected libido or *attention* cathexis, it does attempt (in under 300 pp.) to explain the vagaries of civilization to a harassed world, wherein the elementary virtues are supplanted by mechanical affection, and Hate by convulsions of pain. But this has little to do with the *love* and *hate* of the title. If the author is rather head-line conscious, it is because he realizes that the ultimate laws of loving and hating cannot be left unwritten, cannot be left unchallenged.

His chapter on Work is forthright and explains analytically its outcome in aggressive capacities and in substitution phenomena. All too briefly it explains the theory of sublimated pain and pleasure. Indeed, in this work, unrelieved Hate as the synonym of *displeasure* nowhere receives sufficient attention. Some striking views obtain "... time is the greatest tyrant of all realities" (p. 171) or the "assuagement of a sensitive ego ... restored by great victories in the play life." He eschews "the treadmill" compulsive element of education and in relation to the Wish, and emphasizes the real liberation motif back of work and play; but he finds no evidence that work is in itself pleasurable, although you "must undertake both seriously." He gives little credit on the part of hate as being normal, but while observing the silent drama, also student and child reaction, he believes "Men are turned not to work or play but destruction"—altogether omitting man's love of war reality from an arm chair. "... and there of course is exactly the rub."

It would therefore seem that Menninger does not paint a vision of *constructive* hate. That nature and lovers can be bound

by a mutual antipathy stronger than death, and with the evident desire to perpetuate this state, is the evidence of all history, i. e. to be locked in a mortal struggle that is the symbolic counterpart of coitus, and to seek the very acme of happiness in an orgasm of hate. Has this to be considered necessarily a perversion, when it has all the sanction of history behind it?

Fear and hate being inextricably bound, belligerency is its only external manifestation; and it protects against real hate and suspicion, only to gratify and to preserve the world of amity at all costs, (to conserve our own good objects). This is the dual burden of this work, that derives from the obfuscating mists of the Modern Sinai—Sooner or later it must be brought down to earth concretely, to rescue a perplexed generation, gone astray in the fields of its emotions and lost in its own frustration. If "This medicine love" has achieved one purpose, such a booklet will have been worthwhile. After all, as Ferenczi emphasized "it is the physician's love that heals the patient."

The work carries all the well worn clichés of analysis, and I rather like its style though it is deceptively simplified. Much of the author's well known analytical methods and views on *destruction*, that have unshamedly dropped the fustian and something of the shabby genteelity of the older school—of an historic Vienna now outmoded; and he has given us a vigorous analytic outlook on the affairs of the heart, couched in a journalese style, poised somewhere between the austerities of the Monitor and the virginal column of the lesser dailies. Quotations are generous and well placed. It covers something more than the solid loves and hates of the clinical analytic session, and gives glimpses of the larger conflicts into which they naturally flow—those selfsame instinctive aberrations that at present rock the world, and of which Glover found origin in repressed sadism alone.

His next ten chapters cover Femininity, its depreciation and frustration, also the Child's World in play and frustration, and the place of love intruding in the 'Vicious Circle.' One can only take exception to the self-limiting nature of the theme, and the lesson implied; for love covers a much larger field than the division here suggest-

ed; e. g. to the *associative* impulses of Ian Suttie (who by the way is singularly omitted, yet his work on "Love and Hate" is almost classic); play covers the entire conative meaning of childhood phantasy. It explains Love as something desirable, and uses all the resources of charitable writing to support this.

The upshot of this treatise, then, is a concept of outrage, anger, and physical wrath masquerading as Hate, which, it is suggested, is pitted against the fires of Love (nowhere defined) and of the power love in a war of the instincts. Thus two intangible ideas are bandied about. Its ultimate outward expression is combat; indeed Menninger says "... the present educational system seems to exist for the purpose of training the youth in some kind of warfare," but "we don't seem to know whether the world we live in is dominated by religious warfare or by economic warfare or military warfare." It is "love which transforms this impulse to hate into the impulse to play" (p. 260).

There is some reserve exercised in the retailing of Freudian ideas here, e. g. in the chapter on love (Cr. X) and it is written with sly humor and a deeper empathy. Here the author's usual generous use of paste pot and scissors is repeated to advantage. Some typographical errors mar the finished work where the work for the most part bears impress of a tremendous dynamic and affectionate personality; whose extravertive enthusiasms and sheer love of life carry the reader with him, on a journey of good will.

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Woodbourne, N. Y.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.
EMORY S. BOGARDUS. Appleton Century
Company, pp xii 538, New York, 1941.

The publication of a third edition of this popular college text with up-to-the minute citations and comprehensive bibliographies, makes for a timely revision of past estimates of its merits. As it stands, its lively manner and humanistic understanding, its extratensive tone and laconic phrasing in places, serve as a constant stim-

ulus to progressive thought, both from the standpoint of the behaviorist assumed, the elaboration of pertinent *propositions* in the text, and the usual provocative questions at the end of each chapter, by way of catechism and check on collateral reading.

In a work of this dimension on normal behaviorisms of groups and crowds, something might have been expected out of the field of anti-social psychology (i. e., social psychiatry) to throw light on its thesis, in the same sense as pathology has enlightened clinical physiology. Yet we can find but one short paragraph devoted to anti-social behavior, and that an elementary discussion of criminality. "Pro-social attitudes (it claims) may still obtain in the delinquent," and it is only the fault of environment that employs weakly disciplines, unfair restraints, and unilluminated laws that arouse disrespectful conduct, or act by counter-suggestion. The gulf between such presentation and the dynamics of human conduct as at present understood in analysis, seems unbridgeable. The language of social control as a factor in the matery of group passion is neatly expressed. Public opinion is carefully reviewed as a process, whilst its engineering, its limitations and its control possibilities are nicely explored.

The use of words suggest an occasional unassimilated content e. g. *ambivalence* is not "the tendency to be pulled in opposite directions." *Repression* is used (p. 45) where suppression is intended, and *Regression* employed (p. 151) where Reversion is meant. *Censorship* is unexpectedly used as "guarding the group symbols of childhood." *Conflict* here denotes actual fighting, with pugnacity as its source. (Nowhere is the hint that it may be the result.) It is such misdirection that may be unfortunate for employment with students.

The origin of all these social institutions in the extrajection process of the individual is nowhere hinted at, (though there is a footnote on analysis in relation to social sciences), yet social psychiatry abounds in countless instances of projected mechanics of this order.

I like the idea of hate being "less blind than jealousy—revenge less sly" though the author fails to sense its own binding force and possibility for healing after wars and "conflict." Also how "consanguineal love" lays the foundation for international or-

ganization and makes possible the socialization of the world" yet inbreeding is usually decried.

He next takes for consideration serially the psychology of two individual attitudes. Leadership, Social Processes and finally group life. These chapters compose the 4 main parts of the work, which subheading further elaborate, always with a nice balanced appreciation of the part to the main contribution to the science of living, and are illustrated with arresting instances. The individual is subordinate throughout.

Man advances by observing others, for "the constant reconditioning of behavior pattern is learning." The sacerdotal and the anecdotal styles are often closely related here. For example, the fads and fashions of society were studied by the author for over 25 years in a personal questionnaire and are nicely tabulated, and make amusing reading. The capricious choice of topic suggests the directions of his own interest, and the implication of all this for social upheaval should have been followed out; e. g., the forces that are liberated by crowds, assemblies and 'publics' and that band them together, to prepare the way for unreasoning effectiveness, as MacDougall had long before insisted.

The whole course of social history, he feels, depends on the right grouping for a banding of these loyalties, crafts and traditions inherent in each. The *dissolution* of these in groups is conflict and the seed of chaos.

This reviewer's criticism limits itself to faults of style and theme. It is however a very satisfying thesis. Its directness, its student comprehension and its fine sense of social issues are its great features. It is all too short.

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Woodbourne, N. Y.

COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. CARL R. ROGERS. Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1942.

This book is an attempt to bridge the gap in common knowledge between theory and therapy. It is an examination of the

counseling process in its entirety. More than that, it is a volume documented significantly and illustratively by phonographic recordings of counseling interviews in actual progress. No single school of thought in the psychological field seems espoused. What does seem highly apparent is the extreme care with which the counseling process has been examined. Where a procedure or point of view is advocated there is fine illustrative evidence from phonographic recordings for its consideration, acceptance or rejection. The equating of psychotherapy with "counseling" by the author has avoided much of the in-group conflict which exists between psychiatrists, psychologists, social case workers, and other workers in the field of social sciences.

The therapeutic process is minutely analyzed and characteristic steps thus are outlined:

I. *The individual comes for help.* The individual signifies his dissatisfaction with status quo and has taken a long step toward change. It is the counselor now who must help him to keep on going forward to that point where he can again be independent of the need for help.

II. *The helping situation is usually defined.* The counselor is well aware of what he can or cannot do. He realizes he does not know all the answers but that the counseling situation offers a time, place and atmosphere in which the client can work out a solution to his own problems. Responsibility for the working out of problems, therefore, rests with the client.

III. *The counselor encourages free expression of feeling in regard to the problem.* The client, through the counselor's friendly interest and receptive attitude is able to bring forth the hostilities, fears, guilts, anxieties, ambivalences, and indecisions which have blocked his growth and impelled him to come for help.

The elemental skills necessary to bring forth this process of catharsis are later reviewed.

IV. *The counselor accepts, recognizes and clarifies these negative feelings.* Response in this part of the process is not to the intellectual content of the client's state-

ments, but to the feelings underlying them. An acceptance by the counselor of the client's negative feelings permits him to go further in their expression, to plumb out all the accumulated stoppage and allow the entrance of newer thoughts and feelings.

V. *When the individual's negative feelings have been quite fully expressed, they are followed by the faint and tentative expressions of the impulses which make for growth.* It is almost axiomatic in therapy that the more violent the expression of negative feelings, the more surely will the positive growth-producing expressions come forth. This is a characteristic of personality. The drives for self-respect, growth toward maturity, social impulses, and love are deeply rooted and take over (for a while, at least) when the negative feelings have been expressed.

VI. *The counselor accepts and recognizes the positive feelings which are expressed in the same manner in which he has accepted and recognized the negative feelings.* Approbation is not given for these positive feelings. The attitude of the counselor is not and should not be subject to judgment. Both mature and immature impulses are alike accepted, for this gives the individual a real opportunity to see himself as he is, not as he wants others to see him or as he wants to see himself.

VII. *Insight, understanding of self and acceptance of self is the next important aspect of the whole process.* Having begun to see himself as he really is, pattern in his attitudes and behaviors begin to be revealed. It becomes possible for him, through self-acceptance, to go ahead to new levels of integration.

VIII. *Along with this development of insight goes a clarification of possible decisions or courses of action.* Often together with the consideration of these decisions comes fear and feelings of doubt. The counselor's function lies in recognizing these fears and in helping to clarify the issues. No direct effort on his part is made to allay these fears, give consolation, advice or urge a certain course of action.

IX. *Minute, but highly significant positive actions are the next step.* The

client through contact with the counselor's acceptance of him finally gains enough courage to make small moves on the level of his newer integrations. He is not urged to take these steps.

X. *Development of further insight is now in order.* Having fearfully and tentatively made some positive actions, this is possible since self-confidence is reinforced.

XI. *Increasingly integrated positive action on the part of the client.* At this point in the relationship there is a desire on the part of the client to give as well as to take. He is getting his sea legs and is reoriented in terms of the new developments in his personal situation.

XII. *Finally, there is a decreasing need for help and recognition and desire on the part of the client for the relationship to end.* Perhaps there will be reluctance, but ultimately the recognition is reached that the client is handling his situation with more assurance and that therefore the contacts should no longer be continued.

The ending is not a cold one. Naturally enough, in the course of the client-counselor relationship, mutual warmth has grown and this may well be expressed and appreciated.

Rogers emphasizes that in a relationship so subtly structured these twelve steps do not always appear in numerical sequence. As a whole, however, the process has a predictable unity containing all or most of the above units.

First of these is the argument for the non-directive interview. Basic to this is the philosophy that "every individual has the right to be psychologically independent and to maintain his psychological integrity." The directive approach on the other hand, "places a high value on social conformity and the right of the more able to direct the less able."

There has been wide acceptance of the premise that in all types of counseling it is the client who must find the way to work out his own problems. This fundamental premise is based on the uniqueness of each individual and the understanding he alone has of the quality, depth and range of his problems.

In the directive interview much of what the client has to bring forth is shut off or channelized by the counselor's interpretation, no matter how kindly this may be given. Thus many clients will be misunderstood or led into struggles with problems nowhere near as fundamental as the ones he would bring forth if permitted and encouraged to free expression.

Characteristic techniques in the directive approach were persuasion of the client, the pointing out of problems needing correction, interpretation of test results and the asking of specific questions. In the non-directive approach, statements recognizing and interpreting the client's verbally expressed feelings or feelings expressed in action, indication of topic of conversation but leaving the rest to the client, recognizing the subject content of what the client has just said or defining the interview situation in terms of the client's responsibility for using it, were characteristic.

The release of expression (Step III in the above outline) is readily recognized as being largely dependent on the non-directive approach. Not only must the counselor follow the intellectual content of the client's expression, but he must follow the feeling as well. The degree to which he is able to keep on conveying to the client his understanding of the emotions underlying the problems brought to the treatment situation is the mark of the counselor's skill and of his success in developing a relationship which is meaningful to the client. The material thus brought forth is emotionally relevant to the client's problems and the interview is truly client-centered.

Rogers maintains that this is something that can be developed and trained. As proof, he points to the evidence from phonographic recordings of work done by counselors before and after training.

Expression of feeling alone is not sufficient in a successful treatment process. Achievement of insight (Step VII mentioned above) is a necessary corollary. By this is meant the reorganization of the perceptual field, the seeing of new relationships, the integration of accumulated experience and the reorientation of the self.

This is all gradual and does not ordinarily occur in one leap. In the process

of counseling, there is a typical swing from the achievement of segmental insights to relapses and the expression of negative feelings. Again the counselor's role is a sympathetic and understanding one. He recognizes with the client the difficulties in accepting the new roles in which he now sees himself. He supports the client in the tentative reaching out to self-initiated positive actions in line with the client's new self-insights.

Rogers gives ample case illustration of these developments in the counseling process. These richly repay study for they give in subtle feeling what no theoretical discussion such as this, could elucidate.

The ending phases of the relationship is characterized for the client by increased confidence in his ability to take positive action. He desires to be independent of the relationship yet he fears to leave the support he has received. The counselor's recognition of this ambivalence helps the client to the emotional conviction that he still wants to be independent and that he has utilized the situation as fully as was possible for him at the time. The client is left, not with the feeling that he has been wrung dry as happens so often in the discursive therapies, but with the conviction that he has taken a long step in the interests of his own growth and with a healthy feeling of independence.

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INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIATRY. W. EARL BIDDLE AND M. VANSICKEL. W. B. Saunders Co., Pa., 1943 pp. VIII 358, Price \$2.75.

The once closed-door system of the State Hospital, which applied alike to patient and would-be investigator, has gradually been replaced by a far more emancipated concept of its function, which is reflected in the welcome given to researchers, laymen and a host of skilled auxiliaries that compose the modern personnel. If nursing is the half of mental therapy, the other adjuncts, e. g. occupational, physical and medical therapy undoubtedly have their place. For those students who enter

these auxiliary services, as well as the more anxious relatives of the "patient in retreat," this book provides a wealth of reassurance and information. (

There is a systematic attempt to place under five units the resources of a modern hospital, its theories and practices from the standpoint of causation, preventive measures, therapeutic approach, nursing and clinical illustration. The bias in favor of selective interest is noted in the 90 pages devoted to organic psychosis and the 10 pages to the curable condition (psycho-neurosis), for some reason grouped with the psychoses. However, the everyday problems that confront the personnel are dealt with in a practical way and shrewd comment and experienced council are to be found on every page. It will be found invaluable for the nursing student. Indeed, the bibliography provided, the end-of-chapter question and the rather sketchy handling of theoretic problems of etiology and incipience, suggest the intentional limitation to this field. The chapter on mental mechanisms contrives to cover a vast field and goes deep into the artifices that favor insane reaction types. The absence of authoritative reference or diverse opinion gives this book an anemic quality of self-sufficiency, respectability and infallibility in a specialisation where experiment, broad horizons and originality might be welcome. Thus, disorders of volition, judgment, sensation, intellect, etc. still come up for individual reference, though complex factors in practice nullify this artificial distinction.

Constant stress is laid on habit correction and reanalysing instinctual impulses into constructive ways. The fashioning of "fine-feathers" out of ward linen is replaced by weaving at the proper time and place. Art has its uses in productive channels, and the provision of beauty parlors enhances self-respect. The work is enhanced by record blanks in actual use, some photos of seized contraband and ingenious weapons fashioned for assault or escape by the psychotic.

It would be idle to seek for any illumination of the forces of primary narcissism, the play of masochistic satisfaction and oroficial fixation or repression, etc. in the understanding of the psychoses with which the work deals. There is no inside

knowledge, but within the limits it has set itself, it is admirable, and written with kindly intent; it perhaps, recapitulates the problems specifically covered by other books of its kind, though the patient as such, scarcely comes to life and remains where he started—"an interesting case."

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POPULATION, RACE AND EUGENICS. MORRIS SIEGEL. Published by the Author, 546 Barton St., East Hamilton, Ontario, 1939. p. p. 206.

What constitutes the science and movement of modern eugenics is implied in Sir Francis Galton's definition—"Eugenics is the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally." The phrase improve or impair suggests to the author a two-fold policy a negative and a positive one.

The negative eugenic programme aims to study all the factors that lead to the birth of individuals with mild or serious physical or mental handicaps, and devise methods that will ultimately lead to a considerable reduction in the incidence and frequency of congenital degeneration and hereditary mental disorders. The positive and greater part of the programme is to search for the factors that lead to a negative correlation between fertility and cultural and intellectual attainment, and to devise methods whereby the correlation may be reversed.

The body of the book is accordingly subdivided into two parts, Book One, consists of five chapters and covers Positive Eugenics, one chapter each being devoted to, 1. Population and Eugenics. 2. Etiology. 3. Constructive Recommendation. 4. Racial theories in relation to Eugenics, and 5. Rational Marriage. Book Two, also in five chapters covers restrictive Eugenics, one chapter each being devoted to 1. The Feeble-Minded. 2. Mental Disorders. 3. Epilepsy. 4. Restrictive Measures, and 5. General Conclusions.

Positive Eugenics: Recent statistical

studies point to serious defects in the trend of reproduction. Those groups, gifted by nature or in a position to create suitable environment for their offspring have as a rule very small or no families, while those less gifted or otherwise unable to create suitable environment for the young have large families. We find that about 50% of all women-university graduates, women teachers, librarians and nurses, never marry.

The main underlying causes responsible for such differential marriage and birth rate are: 1. Difficulty to obtain suitable housing. 2. Knowledge of birth control. 3. Late marriages. 4. Economic conditions and, 5. Attitude toward marriage.

To reverse the present trend the author advocates many radical changes in our social life. In addition, among others, the author proposes an educational scheme for guarding the intelligence of the people! It is suggested the school medical office be taken advantage of and made a productive research department in the interest of eugenics. Children with superior abilities should be educated and maintained at public expense until their abilities have been fully developed. It is estimated about 0.5% of all children in the United States and Canada give an I.Q. index of 140, and were they given the opportunity, it is reasonable to expect, they may grow up to become real leaders of men. Such children appear among all groups of society, although less frequently in some groups than in others.

The chapter on Racial Theories in relation to Eugenics is timely. Anthropologically it has been established that all men are members of the species *Homo-Sapiens*. The division of men into distinct lines, called races came about through migration of early men into different regions of the earth and settling in the most habitable part. Thus were formed the four large races of men: White, Yellow, Brown and Black.

The factors that were chiefly operating in the differentiation of men into races were, 1. climatic, 2. exposure to disease, 3. means of sustenance, 4. inbreeding, 5. encounters with animals, 6. warfare with nearby tribes, and 7. cultural development. As time went on, further differentiation was recognized with the respective races,

and these are called sub-races. The chief sub-races of the white man are, 1. The Mediterranean Race, 2. The Alpine Race, 3. The Nordic Race, 4. The Australian Race, 5. The Hamitic, and 6. The Semitic. The chief sub-races of the Yellow-Brown race are, 1. The Mongolian Race, 2. The American Indian, and 3. The Malay. The chief sub-races of the Black Race are, 1. The Negro Race, 2. The Negrilo Race, and 3. The Bushman.

At the present time, the sub-races of the White men have long ceased to exist as distinct groups. Prof. I. S. Huxley, in his latest published book, "We Americans," concludes in part, "In most cases it is impossible to speak of the existing population of any region as belonging to a definite race, since as a result of migration and crossing it includes many types and their various combinations. The Nordic race, like other human races, has no present existence. Racism is a myth, and a dangerous myth at that. It is a cloak for selfish economic aims which in their uncloaked nakedness would look ugly enough. And it is not scientifically grounded. The essence of science is to appeal to fact."

Restrictive Eugenics: The feeble-minded constitute one of the major groups of defectives. While there exists a wide divergency of opinion in regard to the feeble-mindedness, it is the belief of many statisticians throughout the world, the actual number constitute about 1% to 2% of the population. Careful research discloses that about 20% owe their defects solely to heredity. In these cases sterilization is the obvious treatment. From 10 to 20% of the feeble-minded are due solely to environment; the chief environmental causes being, 1. Head injury in utero, at birth or in early life, 2. Meningitis or Encephalitis in early life, 3. At times serious illness of mother during pregnancy, and 4. Syphilis. From an eugenic standpoint sterilization is unnecessary. About 60% of the feeble-minded owe their defects both to heredity and environment in varying degrees of intensity. Those in this group who are safe for community life, may or may not be sterilized, depending on the judgment and advice of experts. The environmental factors, leading to defects must be corrected whenever possible.

The incidence of mental disorder has not been fully ascertained. Most psychiatrists are of the opinion that mental disorders are on the increase. It has been established by H. M. Pollock and his co-workers that approximately 4.4% of all male population and 4.9% of all female population are expected to be committed to a mental institution for some period during their life time.

Most types of Psychoses are acquired, the most common forms being, 1. Traumatic, 2. Senile, 3. Result of Brain Tumors, 4. Involuntional, 5. Alcoholic, 6 Psychoses with Psychopathic Personality resulting from a variety of causes, and 7. General paralysis of the insane and Cerebral syphilis. In, 1. Schizophrenia, 2. Manic depressive, 3 Paranoia, and 4, Epi-

leptic psychosis, heredity plays a major role.

Where a faulty heredity does exist, environment also is a contributory factor. Sterilization will therefore not reduce the incidence of insanity to any great extent. It seems the strain and stress of life in a great city, the constancy of worry, the lust for luxury and fast living are factors which undermine health, mentally and physically. Life must be simplified, and promise of great success in this field appears to lie in the efforts of social hygiene agencies and mental hygiene clinics.

In general, this book represents a valuable contribution on the subject of Eugenics. Briefly but adequately a great deal of material is covered.

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